Adaptive Play in a Pollution Bargaining Game
We apply adaptive play to a simplified pollution game with two players. We find that agents with longer memory paradoxically perform worse in the long run. We interpret this result as an indication that adaptive play may be too restrictive as a model of agent behaviour in this context, although it can serve as a starting point for further research on bounded rationality in pollution games.
Keywordsevolutionary economics game theory adaptive play
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