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Adaptive Play in a Pollution Bargaining Game

  • Vincent van der Goes
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7401)

Abstract

We apply adaptive play to a simplified pollution game with two players. We find that agents with longer memory paradoxically perform worse in the long run. We interpret this result as an indication that adaptive play may be too restrictive as a model of agent behaviour in this context, although it can serve as a starting point for further research on bounded rationality in pollution games.

Keywords

evolutionary economics game theory adaptive play 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Vincent van der Goes
    • 1
  1. 1.Vrije Universiteit AmsterdamThe Netherlands

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