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Tight Lower Bounds on Envy-Free Makespan Approximation

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Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2012)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 7695))

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Abstract

In this work we give a tight lower bound on makespan approximation for envy-free allocation mechanisms dedicated to scheduling tasks on unrelated machines. Specifically, we show that no mechanism exists that can guarantee an envy-free allocation of jobs to m machines with a makespan less than a factor of O(logm) of the minimal makespan. Combined with previous results, this paper definitively proves that the optimal algorithm for obtaining a minimal makespan for any envy-free division can at best approximate the makespan to a factor of O(logm).

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© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Fiat, A., Levavi, A. (2012). Tight Lower Bounds on Envy-Free Makespan Approximation. In: Goldberg, P.W. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7695. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_46

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_46

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-35310-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-35311-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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