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The Strategic Interaction Based on Public Goods Provision on Infinite Endogenous Plane Lattice

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Network Computing and Information Security (NCIS 2012)

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 345))

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Abstract

In this paper we consider the strategic interaction based on public goods provision and study equilibrium structures and the blinkers on infinite endogenous plane lattice. In contrast to other literatures, we emphasize the endogeneity of network, i.e., agents actively establish or delete links according to his benefits and interactive network is formed. The other key point is that the rule of network formation is the Bilateral-Bilateral rule. On the assumption, we use Netlogo simulations to verify the theoretical results.

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© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Hu, P., Gao, HW., Wang, GR. (2012). The Strategic Interaction Based on Public Goods Provision on Infinite Endogenous Plane Lattice. In: Lei, J., Wang, F.L., Li, M., Luo, Y. (eds) Network Computing and Information Security. NCIS 2012. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 345. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35211-9_54

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35211-9_54

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-35210-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-35211-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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