Abstract
Clemens Spiess examines the overlap of European and the Indian discourses on citizenship. Both discourses share the challenges that growing transnationalism poses to their prevailing citizenship regimes. This brings Spiess to two recent ideas of citizenship, namely differentiated and multilevel citizenship, and how they have resonated in the Indian and European contexts respectively. The chapter asserts that both the Indian concept of a group-sensitive citizenship regime and the European experiments with multicultural citizenship rights have one thing in common. Both implicitly conceive of citizenship as a multilayered concept that sees citizenship as compromised by various “layers”—local, traditional, and transnational—beyond the national.
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Notes
- 1.
Contrary to the statements in most of the expert interviews conducted as part of the research project “Citizenship as Conceptual Flow. Asia and Europe in Comparative Perspective” citizenship is conceived of here as an inherently Western concept borne out of waves of collective action and grounded in the categories of “membership” and “rights/entitlement.” This view differs from the one encountered in the interviews that sees citizenship largely as a matter of belonging to a political community and claims that citizenship was present in traditional Indian society. T. K. Oommen, for example, states that “[t]he general belief is that the idea of citizenship came to this part of the world from Europe. That is based on a misconception. Because, wherever states existed there was citizenship,” (Interview database, “Citizenship as Conceptual Flow” interview conducted in March 2009, New Delhi). Rajeev Bhargava, however, takes a different view: “The idea of rights as subjective possession of individuals or communities could be seen as an import. You get the feeling of an entitlement even from your father when you feel that your father should give you something…but it is one thing to say that you should get something from your father and another to say that you have a right for (sic) it. This idea is an import, even if we don’t have a great intellectual history to go by here, but as far as I can tell (sic). The difference between ‘thou shall not kill’ and ‘I have a right to life’—within the tradition of Christianity, there is a huge gap between these two statements. There is only a certain period of time in the history of Europe, where one got abandoned in favour of the second. So, I would say that the fact that you have the right as a citizen is something that came through colonial modernity. Not in practice though, but just the thought of it…in practice it was not implemented. In a sense, this was introduced by the British colonial state in response to a social reality in India which made it mandatory to have community-specific rights, very different from other countries, such as France, US…the notion of ‘differentiated citizenship.’” (Interview database, “Citizenship as Conceptual Flow” interview conducted in December 2008, New Delhi). The belief in an indigenous notion of citizenship or the projection of the idea of citizenship into traditional society/a distant past is reminiscent of the bigger part of the Indian discourse on civil society (most prominently Kothari 1988). However, as Béteille has rightly argued, “citizenship and caste are antithetical principles. It is difficult to see how we can make a case for the presence of citizenship in traditional Indian society, unless we are prepared to argue that caste had little or no significance in that society, that it was indeed a colonial construction” (Béteille 1999: 2589; see also Gupta 2003).
- 2.
The distinction between the “ethnic nation states” of Europe and the “immigrant societies” of North America and Australia (Walzer 1997) has of course become obsolete in the era of worldwide immigration, but the difference in (nationhood) tradition still lingers on in the respective citizenship regimes; see also Brubaker 1992.
- 3.
The statement is reminiscent of Turner’s (1990) distinction of historically different contexts of the emergence of citizenship and his differentiation between “citizenship from above” (as a means to pacify society) and “citizenship from below” (as a result of a struggle about citizenship rights within society).
- 4.
See Mitra and Lall in this volume. See also Rodrigues (2005).
- 5.
The distinction between the categorical and the contingent principle of inclusion stems from Robert Dahl’s work (Dahl 1989). According to the categorical principle of inclusion being an adult member of a political community is sufficient qualification for full citizenship, whereas the contingent principle of inclusion grants citizenship only to those who are qualified to rule; qualification can be grounded in property, merit, or existing membership in a religious, ethnic, or cultural community.
- 6.
Comaroff and Comaroff (2005: 127) illustrate this ever increasing importance of “difference” under the impact of globalization: “The neoliberal age, especially after 1989, has seen an explosion of identity politics, not just of ethnic politics. Also of the politics of gender, sexuality, age, race, religion, lifestyle, and yes, class. As a result, imagining the nation rarely presumes a ‘deep horizontal fraternity’ anymore … Although most human beings still live as citizens in nation-states, they tend only to be conditionally, partially and situationally citizens of nation-states. Identity struggles… seem immanent almost everywhere as selfhood is immersed—existentially, metonymically—into claims of collective essence, of innate substance and primordial sentiment that nestle within or transect the polity. In short, homogeneity as a ‘national fantasy’… is giving way to recognition of the irreducibility of difference.”
- 7.
Not only ideas, but also a growing realization of transnationality, such as in the case of the European Union.
- 8.
- 9.
There is of course variation in the European citizenship regimes, probably best exemplified by the difference between the republican citizenship regime in the political nation of France and the more exclusive citizenship regime in the ethnic nation of Germany (Brubaker 1992). Overall, however, the citizenship regimes in the European tradition, until recently at least, have always been more exclusive and “ethnicised” than, for example, the US citizenship regime.
- 10.
At the same time, the introduction of the PIO and OCI categories can also be considered as an example of the growing ethnicisation of the citizenship regime in India. As van der Veer (2005: 285) notes on the categorisation of PIO: “One is of Indian origin if one has held an Indian passport, or if either of the parents or grandparents has held an Indian passport or if either of the parents or grandparents was Indian. The wife of a person of Indian origin is held to be of Indian origin, too. [Neither] Citizenship nor residence are thus the criteria for deciding who belongs to this category, but ‘origin’ is and in that sense it has much in common with the German genealogical definition according to which migrant communities in Eastern Europe belong to the German nation and have the right to return to Germany.”
- 11.
The wording “culturally excluded groups” in the Joppke quote hints at the distinction between the “legal status” and the “identity” dimension of citizenship. Against the background of the ethnic diversification of societies the latter is of crucial importance since the existence of “formal citizens” who do not act and conceive of themselves as members of a (cultural) collectivity is now a commonplace phenomenon (Joppke 2007, 1999 and see also the discussion of the category of reluctant/excluded citizens below).
- 12.
As Bhargava notes on the incorporation of the Indian citizenship practice into theoretical discourse: “So, yes, we got this early on and the practice of ‘differentiated citizenship’ was being applied in India long before the theory coined the term… the bearers of citizenship rights are both individuals and communities. The balancing of that is being left, in large cases, to democratic negotiation rather than fiat. The ambiguity should not be seen as a weakness but as strength.” And he goes on to argue for the integrative capacity of differentiated citizenship in India: “It [the differentiated citizenship] is a non-assimilationalist strategy, very important for the sense of all being together, solidarity, and recognition of difference.” (Interview database, “Citizenship as Conceptual Flow”, interview conducted in December 2008, New Delhi)
- 13.
Both entities have of course devised coping strategies, which could loosely be labeled as conceptualisations of ‘unitiy in diversity’ (as the result of the straightjacketing of a multi-ethnic civilisational society into a single territorial state in the case of India) vs. ‘unity and diversity’ (as a result of the coming together of sovereign states in the case of Europe; Oommen 2004: 533).
- 14.
There are of course other issues that determine the current debate on citizenship and resonate in both discourses, European and Indian, such as, for example, the role of civic duties as a core element constitutive of citizenship, but these shall not be dealt with here.
- 15.
Or between the liberal tradition of a more or less passive and private ideal of the citizen as bourgeois, which has—by virtue of legal status and protection within a given political community—the right to act out his/her individual freedom as long as he/she does not interfere in the individual freedom of his/her fellow citizens, and the republican tradition of the active citizen as citoyen, who has the obligation (and opportunity) to participate in public affairs as part of his/her belonging to a certain political community.
- 16.
In a way, of course, these “swings of the pendulum” could, in some cases at least, already be labelled “transformations” of the idea of citizenship: the ethnic diversification of society has undermined the basis for social rights in favour of anti-discrimination rights and multicultural recognition, because it constrains creating and retaining “the ethnic homogeneity and solidarities that are required for the redistribution of wealth” (Joppke 2007: 38); regarding the membership dimension of citizenship, an erosion of the once steadfast association of membership/status and identity is clearly visible in many of the (former) ethnic nation states of Europe whereas transnational forms of belonging and, some would say, a concomitant decoupling of citizenship and the nation state are gaining momentum. The following, however, is concerned with existing malfunctions of citizenship arising out of the enduring validity of the traditional concept of citizenship and still acknowledges social rights and the membership-identity nexus as constitutive elements of the idea of citizenship (especially the latter is seen here as a decisive “tool” of citizen making in a postcolonial context, see Mitra 2008 and Mitra in this volume). In addition, many a (scholarly) swan song of the nation state as a reference point of citizenship involves conceptual stretching, since both membership and rights, as two core constituents of the citizenship status, still relate almost exclusively to the national context. For a discussion of the empirical tenability of the now prominent category of the “transnational citizen”, for example, see Fox (2008).
- 17.
A similar case could be made for the Amish or Hutterite communities in the United States who make use of their “exit option” from the national citizenship regime. Another mismatch of an individual’s and the political community’s perception of what citizenship entails, which is prominent in discussions about citizenship in Western countries, is illustrated by the dichotomy of active versus passive citizen (or bourgeois versus citoyen), which has been brought up as a result of electoral/political apathy (“Politikverdrossenheit”) and passivity due to long-term welfare dependency.
- 18.
Very often, too, reluctant citizens are, to some extent at least, “produced” by changes in a citizenship regime elsewhere or, for that matter, by transcultural flows (of citizenship practices). In that regard, Rodrigues (2005: 222) notes that “the closure of citizenship in other societies, such as in the UK following the agitation launched by Enoch Powell against Asian migrants, had immediate repercussions in India in not only reinforcing the ethnic slide in considerations of citizenship, but also in fuelling the ethnic divide, particularly between Hindus and Muslims.”
- 19.
For example, think of a person who has all the (active) citizenship rights and entitlements that his/her belonging to a political community implies, but whose mother tongue is different from the official language of the political community he/she belongs to, so that the language in which citizens debate or negotiate with one another (as a basis for meaningful participation) is not identical to his/her mother tongue (Bhargava 2005; Kymlicka and Norman 2000).
- 20.
Exclusion sometimes comes across in an institutionalised form, for example through definitions of criminality (“terrorism” in the West) or health (“leprosy” in India). I am thankful to Barbara Hariss-White for this comment.
- 21.
“[I]mmigrant communities which are culturally and politically committed to continue to ‘belong’ to their ‘mother country’—or more specifically to the national collectivity from where they, their parents, or their grandparents, have come” (Yuval-Davis 1999: 127).
- 22.
See, for example, Kymlicka (1995) and Young (1990).
- 23.
In a sense, differentiated citizenship also aims at the reconciliation of the status and the identity aspect of citizenship’s membership dimension insofar as it acknowledges the membership-identity nexus. It thus bears resemblance to Mitra’s statement that legitimate citizenship needs to be co-authored by the state and society: “Just as the legal right to citizenship is accorded by the state, identity, and following from it, the moral right to belong, is what people give to their claims to citizenship. When both converge in the same group, the result is a sense of legitimate citizenship where the individual feels both legally entitled and morally engaged. If not, the consequences are either legal citizenship devoid of a sense of identification with the soil, or a primordial identification with the land but no legal sanction of this” (Mitra 2008: 4). In fact, the main motivation for the original conceptualisation of differentiated citizenship is the failure of liberal conceptions of justice and equality to account for the importance of identity or cultural membership.
- 24.
Differentiated citizenship is thus not altogether different from Lijpharts’s conceptualisation of consociationalism (see, for example, Lijphart 1971) as an institutional device to facilitate democracy in culturally segmented societies, except for the assumption that consociationalism is largely a matter of elite collaboration and does not necessarily involve the citizenry.
- 25.
The distinction between explicit group rights and the rights-based manifestations of multiculturalism in European nation states roughly corresponds to Kymlicka’s distinction between measures that facilitate the integration of “polyethnic minorities” and measures that are directed at “national minorities.” Polyethnic minorities include groups that, at some time, have voluntarily immigrated to the state (e.g. Sikhs in Canada or Turks in Germany), in contrast to those groups that are considered national minorities within the state, such as the Nagas in India’s Northeast or the Flemish in Belgium.
- 26.
Even though some of the group rights, such as reservations and quotas that made up India’s at least partially differentiated citizenship regime were initially designed as time-bound measures to be abandoned when the social inequalities that they were supposed to overcome had been levelled. The fact that a kind of differentiated citizenship has been practiced in India since independence and has entered the European citizenship discourse only recently (in the shape of “multiculturalism”) is an indication, but no evidence for, a conceptual counter flow from ‘Asia to Europe’. In a similar vein, the debate on multiculturalism and “Britishness” in the wake of the Rushdie affair has shown how conflicting ideas about cultural identity—in this case those of South Asian immigrants and of the “properly British”—result from the flow (and confrontation) of ideas (in the minds of people) and produce a rethinking, or at least a debate on what it means to be a citizen (beyond legal technicalities), fuelled by the confrontation of different perceptions thereof; see Asad (1990).
- 27.
As Acharya (2001: 82) notes: “in any case, a complete liberal individualist approach was a non-option given both the procedural and pragmatic compulsions to devise an inclusive political community. A quasi-liberal spirit, one that precariously balances rights of individuals with those of communities, permeates and informs the Indian constitutional experiment. Indian constitutionalism, it will be safe to concur, is deeply embedded in a ‘thickly’ constituted multicultural society.” Given the influence of the colonial model and, at the same time, the need for a thorough departure from India’s constitutional/colonial predecessor, the Indian constitution is also, paradoxically, a derivation and a deviation from the colonial model: it retains some aspects of the principle of group representation exercised during the colonial period (alongside a common citizenship model), but treats different groups differently. It gives exemptions from laws (e.g. for Sikhs, Article 25), exercises positive discrimination (for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes), concedes self-government (in Kashmir or the autonomous district councils of the Northeast, Sixth Schedule), recognises traditional legal codes (various personal laws), provides special representations (Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Anglo-Indians), acknowledges symbolically the status of various groups (e.g. through national holidays character) etc. (Acharya 2001: 80). For a discussion of the indigenisation or strategic “re-use” of Western party politics and Westminster parliamentarianism in postcolonial India see also Spiess (forthcoming).
- 28.
That this original citizenship regime or, for that matter, its group-sensitive components became heavily contested later on is ample evidence of the awkward positioning of group rights in a majoritarian democracy. In contrast to the multiculturalism espoused by the Indian constitution, “Hindu nationalism and other ethno-national exclusivist ideologies are trying today to re-imagine and re-appropriate the conventional (European) requirement that the nation-state display a particular ethnic character and unleash a corresponding homogenizing politica1 project” (Acharya 2001: 20).
- 29.
In the words of Bhargava (2005: 52), “the story of nation-building in India is a process of the straightjacketing by the British colonialists of a multi-ethnic civilisational society into a single territorial state.”
- 30.
Take, for example, the above mentioned PIO and OCI categories in the Indian context.
- 31.
Since recently the idea of a more substantial European citizenship is also officially endorsed. This is clearly visible from various pronouncements following the formal establishment of EU citizenship through the Maastricht Treaty, which expressed a notion of European citizenship wider than the Maastricht Treaty rights. In 2004 the European Commission declared “giving full content to European citizenship” as one of three priorities for the enlarged European Union and in 2006 the decision to launch a second phase of an EU programme to promote active European citizenship (Europe for Citizens) reflects a notion of European citizenship going beyond the Maastricht Treaty rights, “incorporating shared values, active participation in public life, a sense of belonging, the promotion of ‘European awareness’, engagement with civil society and the role of ‘intermediaries between Europe and its citizens’” (Painter 2008: 7).
- 32.
In this regard, the yet to be passed Lisbon Treaty, while sticking to the criterion of national citizenship as a qualifier for European citizenship, shows a change of wording in the relevant Article (9) referring to European citizenship from “Citizenship of the Union shall be complementary to national citizenship” to “Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to national citizenship.” While this is unlikely to change the trajectory of EU citizenship, it reinforces the duality between national and EU citizenship and “makes the point that the development of different layers of citizenship entitlements is not a zero sum game, in which rights given at one level must necessarily detract from those given at another level” (Shaw 2008).
- 33.
The formal introduction of European citizenship came with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 through an amendment of the Treaty of Rome (Article 8 of the Maastricht Treaty). The rights catalogue referring to European citizenship laid down in Article 8 was complemented by the right to bring cases in the European Court of Justice against EU institutions, as per the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997.
- 34.
For more discussion on this see Pfetsch’s paper in this volume
- 35.
For example, the provision that only citizens of Jammu and Kashmir can buy property in that State as well as anywhere else in India.
- 36.
In the case of Nagaland, Article 371 extends these special rights even further, from the State to the district level (limited to the Hill district of Tuensang).
- 37.
See also Sonntag (2004) for a similar argument regarding the exclusionary effects of granting self-government to the Northeast’s national minorities on the basis of their cultural identity; see also Baruah 2009.
- 38.
Hönig (2009) highlights additional problems related to the idea of state-level citizenship and its potential implementation in India’s Northeast: “First, it is not clear how politics would play out in the regional arena if competences relating to citizenship were to be transferred to the state level. It cannot be ruled out that the pendulum will swing back and compound discriminatory practices. Second, the areas of ‘citizenship, naturalization and aliens’ are inscribed in the Union List of the Constitution, giving the centre exclusive jurisdiction over these subject-matters. As a result, the explosive issue of cross-border (‘illegal’) immigration would remain outside the reach of the states, diminishing the appeal of multi-citizenship. Third, the issue of a ‘border within’ throws up questions of how to square the goal of affording equal opportunities for all with strategies of positive discrimination and affirmative action for disadvantaged segments of society. To sum up, multi-level citizenship may serve to fill the Indian polity with the federal spirit that is central to the idea of power-sharing, but it is a contested notion for its potential of being exploited by nationalist groups using the notion of citizenship as a ruse for their exclusionist agendas.”
- 39.
See also Oommen (1997).
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Spiess, C. (2013). Reluctant and Excluded Citizens, Differentiated and Multilevel Citizenship: Where the Indian and the European Discourse on Citizenship Meet. In: Mitra, S. (eds) Citizenship as Cultural Flow. Transcultural Research – Heidelberg Studies on Asia and Europe in a Global Context. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34568-5_3
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