Towards Formal Analysis of Key Control in Group Key Agreement Protocols
In group key agreement protocols, it is desired that every honest participant is assured of its contribution to the shared session key. This property ensures that no dishonest insider or a group of dishonest insiders can predetermine the key. In this paper we propose attacks on the Dutta-Barua protocol in which one or more dishonest insiders are able to control the key. We use the algebraic approach given by Delicata and Schneider to formally analyze the attacks on the protocol.
KeywordsDishonest Participant Honest Participant Message Template Honest Member Dishonest Member
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