Abstract
Side Channel Attacks are a major concern in modern security. Two main countermeasure techniques have been studied in order to counteract them: hiding and masking. Hiding techniques try to randomize the obtained traces by adding noise or by swapping instructions of the performed algorithm. In this work, we present a randomization of AES where AES operations can be executed even if previous operations, in the corresponding non-randomized execution of AES, are not finished. We present theoretical and practical results about the distribution of the execution times and show interesting results in comparison to existing techniques. An implementation is available on the author’s website.
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Fernandes Medeiros, S. (2012). The Schedulability of AES as a Countermeasure against Side Channel Attacks. In: Bogdanov, A., Sanadhya, S. (eds) Security, Privacy, and Applied Cryptography Engineering. SPACE 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7644. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34416-9_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34416-9_2
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