Abstract
Throughout modern history, regulation of foreign trade has been a prime driver of federalism next to the removal of internal trade barriers and the creation of larger markets. The need to coordinate trade among the North American Provinces and with foreign powers across the Atlantic was a prime topic in the debates after the Boston Tea Party, leading towards the 1776 United States Constitution and the investment of foreign trade powers to the US Congress. Foreign trade was a main driver towards the German Reich of 1871, setting out with the German Zollverein (German Customs Union) in 1834 removing trade barriers among the German Kingdoms of the time. It was an important motivation to create a federal government for the Swiss Confederation under the 1848 Constitution. The advent of the European Economic Community in 1957 thus integrates into an extensive historical record of motivating federal and quasi-federal structures by the need to remove hindering trade barriers and creating larger economic entities competing in the world economy. In the case of the EEC, the choice was defined by the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Article XXIV leaves two options for regional integration: Free Trade Zones or Customs Unions, the latter requiring a common commercial policy with common external tariffs towards third countries. The European trade policy battles in the 1950s for one or the other were settled with the political choice by France, Germany, the Benelux countries and Italy for a Customs Union. The struggle for a large European Free Trade Zone under the auspices of the then OEEC failed, and resulted among those countries less willing to cede sovereignty in the field of trade regulation, in the creation of EFTA in 1960. It has since receded to the remaining four smaller countries while the customs union of today’s European Union has steadily grown up to its current 27 Member States.
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- 1.
Cf. generally Anderson (ed.), Internal Markets and Multilevel Governance: The Experience of the European Union, Australia, Canada, Switzerland and the United States, 2012.
- 2.
See generally Elsig, The EU’s Common Commercial Policy, 2002; Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union, 2004.
- 3.
After having entered an association agreement with Turkey in 1963, the first generation of regional trade Agreements started in 1969 and 1970. They were concluded with Morocco, Tunisia, Spain and Israel. They were followed in 1972 by Free Trade Agreements with EFTA Members. The next generation of agreements again involved Israel in 1975 followed in 1976–1977 by agreements with the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) and Maghreb countries (Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria), see Bartels, The Trade and Development Policy of the European Union, in Cremona (ed.), Developments in EU External Relations Law, 2008, pp. 128–171; for EFTA agreements see Friedrich, Die Freihandelsabkommen der Europäischen Gemeinschaften mit den EFTA – Staaten, NJW 36 (1983) 22, p. 1237; Cottier/Oesch, International Trade Regulation, 2005, pp. 313–324.
- 4.
See Bartels, The Trade and Development Policy of the European Union, in Cremona (ed.), Developments in EU External Relations Law, 2008, p. 128 (146–169); Stocchetti, The development dimension or disillusion? The EU’s development policy goals and the Economic Partnership Agreements, in Ngangjoh-Hodu/Matambalya (eds.), Trade Relations Between the EU and Africa, 2009, pp. 40–58. Panagariya, EU Preferential Trade Arrangements and Developing Countries, The World Economy 25 (2002) 10, p. 1415; Silva, Lessons Learned: The Caribbean Market Access Offer, Trade Negotiating Insights 7 (2008) 1; Scollay, Regional Trade Agreements and Developing Countries: The Case of the Pacific Islands, Proposed Free Trade Agreement, report prepared for the UN Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva, 2001; Bartels, Interim agreements under Article XXIV GATT, World Trade Review 8 (2009) 2, p. 339; an overview of Regional Integration Agreements is provided by Schiff/Winters, Regional Integration and Development, 2003, pp. 26–29; Alavi, EPAs, Cotonou and the WTO, in Ngangjoh-Hodu/Matambalya (eds.), Trade Relations Between the EU and Africa, 2009, pp. 185–198.
- 5.
See Cottier, International Trade Law: The Impact of Justiciability and Separations of Powers in EC Law, European Constitutional Law Review 5 (2009) 2, p. 307.
- 6.
Council Regulation (EC) No. 260/2009 of 26 February 2009.
- 7.
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1061/2009 of 19 October 2009.
- 8.
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009.
- 9.
Council Regulation (EC) No. 597/2009 of 11 June 2009 and also in particular Regulation (EC) No. 868/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004.
- 10.
Council Regulation (EC) No. 3286/94 of 22 December 1994; For further information on the TBR see in particular the website of the European Commission at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/tackling-unfair-trade/trade-barriers/.
- 11.
ECJ, Case 22/70, Commission v. Council, [1971] ECR, 263. The Court recognized under this doctrine implied external powers to the extent that the subject matter had been regulated in EC internal market law, or to the extent that effective internal market regulation depended upon prior international agreement. For an analysis see Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union, 2004, pp. 58–100.
- 12.
For the theory of different generations of trade barriers see Cottier/Oesch, International Trade Regulation, 2005, pp. 56–62.
- 13.
ECJ, Opinion 1/94, WTO Agreement, [1994] ECR I-5267.
- 14.
See e.g. Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union, 2004, pp. 26–35; Leal-Arcas, Theory and Practice of EC External Trade Law and Policy, 2008, pp. 163–175.
- 15.
See the UNCTAD World Investment Report 2011, 16, available at http://www.unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2011_en.pdf or the database of BITs provided by the ICSID at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet.
- 16.
See Müller-Ibold, Handelsaspekte geistigen Eigentums sowie Investitionen, in Herrmann/Krenzler/Streinz (eds.), Die Auβenwirtschaftspolitik der Europäischen Union nach dem Verfassungsvertrag, 2006, pp. 117–133; Ortino/Eeckhout, Towards an EU Policy on Foreign Direct Investment, in Biondi/Eeckhout/Ripley, EU Law After Lisbon, 2012, pp. 312–327; Hindelang, Der primärrechtliche Rahmen einer EU-Investitionsschutzpolitik: Zulässigkeit und Grenzen von Investor-Staat-Schiedsverfahren aufgrund künftiger EU-Abkommen, in: Bungenberg/Herrmann (eds.), Die gemeinsame Handelspolitik der Europäischen Union nach Lissabon, 2011, pp. 157–184; Benyon, Direct Investment, National Champions and EU Treaty Freedoms, 2010, in particular pp. 72–92.
- 17.
Burgstaller, The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties of EU Member States, in Bungenberg/Griebel/Hindelang (eds.), International Investment Law and EU Law, European Yearbook of International Economic Law, 2011, pp. 55–77; Terhechte, (National-) Verfassungsrechtliche Grenzen der Weiterentwicklung des europäischen Auβenwirtschaftsrechts, in: Bungenberg/Herrmann (eds.), Die gemeinsame Handelspolitik der Europäischen Union nach Lissabon, 2011, p. 25 (31–33); Griebel, Der Weg seit Lissabon – Die neue Kommissionsstrategie im Bereich der Direktinvestitionen, in: Bungenberg/Herrmann (eds.), Die gemeinsame Handelspolitik der Europäischen Union nach Lissabon, 2011, p. 193 (202–207); Ziegler, Die neugewonnene Kompetenz der EU im Bereich der Direktinvestitionen – ein Kommentar aus Drittlandsperspektive, in: Bungenberg/Herrmann (eds.), Die gemeinsame Handelspolitik der Europäischen Union nach Lissabon, 2011, p. 217 (221–222).
- 18.
BVerfG, NJW 62 (2009) 31, p. 2267 (2291) margin no. 380; see also Tietje, Die Auβenwirtschaftsverfassung der EU nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, Beiträge zum Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht (2009) 83, p. 1 (17–18).
- 19.
Herrmann, Die Zukunft der mitgliedstaatlichen Investitionspolitik nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, EuZW 21 (2010) 6, p. 207 (211–212); Johannsen, Die Kompetenz der Europäischen Union für ausländische Direktinvestitionen nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, Beiträge zum Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht (2009) 90, p. 1 (22–27).
- 20.
Griebel, Der Weg seit Lissabon – Die neue Kommissionsstrategie im Bereich der Direktinvestitionen, in Bungenberg/Herrmann (eds.), Die gemeinsame Handelspolitik der Europäischen Union nach Lissabon, 2011, p. 193 (211–215); Johannsen, Die Kompetenz der Europäischen Union für ausländische Direktinvestitionen nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, Beiträge zum Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht (2009) 90, p. 1 (32); Boie, European-Chinese Investment Regulation, PhD, University of Bern 2011 (on file with author); Leal-Arcas, International Trade and Investment Law, 2011 and Benyon, Direct Investment, National Champions and EU Treaty Freedoms, 2010.
- 21.
See in particular Krajewski, Die neue handelspolitische Bedeutung des Europäischen Parlaments, in Bungenberg/Herrmann (eds.), Die gemeinsame Handelspolitik der Europäischen Union nach Lissabon, 2011, pp. 55–74; for an early account and assessment see Kleimann, Taking Stock: EU Common Commercial Policy in the Lisbon Era, CEPS Working Document 346, 2011.
- 22.
The linkages of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Commercial Policy, as well as the role of different actors are addressed by Dederer, Die gemeinsame Handelspolitik im Einflussbereich von Kommission, Rat, Hohem Vertreter und Europäischem Auswärtigem Dienst, in Bungenberg/Herrmann (eds.), Die gemeinsame Handelspolitik der Europäischen Union nach Lissabon, 2011, pp. 103–120, as to the different branches in a general overview see Frenz, Handbuch Europarecht, Band 6, Institutionen und Politiken, Teil IV, 2011 or Tietje (ed.), Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht, 2009.
- 23.
Krajewski, The Reform of the Common Commercial Policy, in Biondi/Eeckhout/Ripley (eds.), EU Law after Lisbon, 2012, p. 292 (310).
- 24.
See also Dederer, Die gemeinsame Handelspolitik im Einflussbereich von Kommission, Rat, Hohem Vertreter und Europäischem Auswärtigem Dienst, in Bungenberg/Herrmann (eds.), Die gemeinsame Handelspolitik der Europäischen Union nach Lissabon, 2011, p. 103 (120).
- 25.
The current legal qualification of the European Union remains controversial, but is largely semantic in nature in light of a long standing constitutional approach in treaty interpretation and jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. Not surprisingly, the constitutional approach and qualification is mainly contested by domestic courts following the failure of the Constitutional Treaty and in defence of national sovereignty and domestic prerogatives under national constitutions. For the current discussion in Germany see Terhechte, Europäischer Bundesstaat, supranationale Gemeinschaft oder Vertragsunion souveräner Staaten? – Zum Verhältnis von Staat und Union nach dem Lissabon-Urteil des BVerfG, in Hatje/Terhechte (eds.), Grundgesetz und europäische Integration, EuR Beiheft 1, 2010, p. 135. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany in his opinion of 30 June 2009, BVerfG 123, (267) 3rd. Leitsatz, coins a new term for the EU by depicting the EU as a treaty-based Union of sovereign States (“Vertragsunion souveräner Staaten”).
- 26.
ECJ, Case 22/70, Commission v. Council, [1971] ECR, 263.
- 27.
See also Weiβ, Handelspolitik im Europäischen Verfassungsverbund: Auβenhandelskompetenz und die Lissabon-Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, in Bungenberg/Herrmann (eds.), Die gemeinsame Handelspolitik der Europäischen Union nach Lissabon, 2011, p. 35 (46).
- 28.
See Joerges and Petersmann (eds.) Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation, 2011 (2nd ed.).
Acknowledgements
I am truly indebted to Lorena Trinberg, attorney at law, LL.M., for her timely and engaging support in preparing the short paper.
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Cottier, T. (2013). Towards a Common External Economic Policy of the European Union. In: Bungenberg, M., Herrmann, C. (eds) Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34255-4_1
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