Abstract
If we take a look at theories of scientific knowledge creation, we can identify a “rational” and a “social” approach (Longino, 2002, Chap. 4).
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Notes
- 1.
See our reflections in Sect. 4.3.1.
- 2.
I will not discuss formal sciences like mathematics or logic.
- 3.
- 4.
In fact this openness for change of general assumptions is historically important. Scientific revolutions where never based only on new observations, but on a general shift of the “paradigm” from which a scientific community operates (Kuhn, 1970).
- 5.
This case was introduced in (Longino, 2002, p. 179f.)
- 6.
Strictly speaking, this is no metaphorical comparison because creating a map is a knowledge creation process.
- 7.
This terminology motivated our own terminological distinction between a theory of organizational knowledge (which focuses on the “epistemic attributes” of organizations) and an organizational epistemology (which focuses on “epistemological criteria” for organizational knowledge creation).
- 8.
Although there certainly are communities which fulfill many of the presented features (see, for instance, our organizational use-case in Chap. 10).
- 9.
To be “normatively” dependent means no mechanical determination, but to be in a situation of epistemic responsibility; here, responsibility is the obligation to confirm and accept knowledge aligned towards aims and standards of the community. Of course actors can do otherwise. However, from our normative viewpoint, they “should” (or “ought”) not. The reason for this is epistemic. It is based on the idea of knowledge as a non-arbitrary (yet open-ended) concept.
- 10.
- 11.
Otherwise, our account of social epistemology would leave this important second level of knowledge creation without any normativity. From a critical point of view, one then could object that if we fail in providing normative criteria for that second level, we ultimately would be exposed to relativism. This is because we grounded our normative criteria on elements (aims and standards) which were themselves not bound to any norms. Hence, the argument would conclude, in the end there is no rock bottom on which the whole approach lies upon.
In fact, we do not have clearly defined aims and standards while evaluating aims and standards, but this does not mean that there are absolutely no general guiding aims or standards available (we will deal with this in Sect. 9.5). Furthermore, the normative criteria of discursive interaction are formal criteria for any knowledge creation environment and not fully dependent on underlying aims and standards (we will also explicate that argument in Sect. 9.5).
- 12.
These three terms are not used by Longino. They are our own expression and systematization of her social epistemology. A systematization which we are going to reuse in the shift to organizations in Chap. 9.
- 13.
Authors translation; original quote: “letztbegründet”
- 14.
E.g. the law of the excluded middle: Apel or Habermas would say that to refute this law one would have to apply it. Hence, to them, it is “ultimate” (or “transcendental”) because it is necessarily at the bottom of any knowledge claim.
- 15.
Longino’s criteria of critical discursive interaction are themselves partly based on Habermas’ notion of “communicative action”. Especially the conditions of tempered equality and open critical dialogue is related to Habermas “consensus theory”. However, the difference lies in the fact that Longino’s introduced norms are criteria for “legitimate consensus” rather than criteria for “truth” (Longino, 2002, p. 131).
- 16.
Henceforth, “social epistemology” will be used in a narrow sense, i.e. it will refer to the outlined approach of Helen Longino. In its broader sense, “social epistemology” subsumes different philosophical approaches which try to take the social context of knowledge creation into account (Fuller, 1996; Goldman, 2009).
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Seirafi, K. (2013). Social Epistemology. In: Organizational Epistemology. Contributions to Management Science. Physica, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34194-6_7
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