Decolonializing Applied Social Sciences (1971)

Abstract

The radical critique questions the theoretical conceptions implicit in much current social scientific activity. It implies not only that a measure of ideology is inseparable from professional practice [contrary to hollow claims to a ‘value-free’ social science], but also requires the development of adequate theory capable of explaining, even when not testable empirically, what society is all about (particularly those societies or parts thereof where applied social scientists generally exercise their profession). A second imperative refers to the problem of communications: how can research findings best be made available to those most in need of social knowledge yet usually least capable of acquiring it; who also happen to be precisely those groups most commonly studied by social scientists. A critical and committed social science must also turn from the traditional study of the underdog to that of the dominant elites and the system of domination itself. Ideological commitment by the social scientist to the anti-status quo might also lead to his emerging role as activist, and not merely as participant, observer. The applied social scientist cannot, by definition, be neutral to the larger political and ideological issues which determine the framework of his professional practice, whether he is engaged in international organizations or works on development problems within his own national context. (Rodolfo Stavenhagen was in 1970–1971 a Senior Staff Associate at the International Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva. This paper is a slightly revised version of the author’s guest lecture at the thirtieth Annual Meeting of the Society for Applied Anthropology, held in Miami, April 1971. The opinions expressed herein are entirely personal and do not reflect those of the institutions with which the author is associated. He would like to thank Dorien Grunbaum, Otto Feinstein and Jeffrey Harrod for helpful comments on a first draft of this paper).

In 1970 the Society for Applied Anthropology of the United States invited me to speak at their annual congress, and the revised text, presented here, later appeared in Human Organization, the Society’s official journal, with valuable critical comments by invited reviewers. In this contribution, I continue my debate with mainstream social science and challenge my colleagues to take a more critical and radical position in their work with subaltern peasant and indigenous communities (This text was first published as: “Decolonializing Applied Social Sciences”, in: Human Organization, Journal of the Society for Applied Anthropology, 30,4 (Winter 1971): 333–357. The permission to republish this text was granted on 19 July 2012 by Melissa Cope, Society for Applied Anthropology, Oklahoma City, OK, USA).

Comments

James Silverberg: Damned If We Do and Damned If We Don’t…

We should all deeply appreciate the relevance and honesty of Dr. Stavenhagen’s paper. It corrects naive assumptions in applied anthropology: all social conflict is evil; everyone’s interests can be reconciled and served by the same social program; cultural relativism + structural-functionalism = a need to preserve every status quo…. He cites the dim view about us held by members of the societies we study.

Stavenhagen emphasizes the need to expand our research universes up and outward from the local community to “global social units and total societies” and to study elites rather than only the ‘underdogs’…. (He) also called upon us to peer downward within the local situation to probe the “patterns of dominance, power structures and conflict potential between differentially located social groups (i.e., social classes)”, “the relationships binding the oppressed and their oppressors”. Yes, indeed. Anthropologists as a whole have far too much and for far too long ignored ‘production organizations’. Obsessed with ‘the division of labor’, ‘specialization’, and ‘social differentiation’, they have been almost oblivious to the combination of labor or, better, the mode of production. Inattention to the class-structured organization of work in a system of differential power is a defect in much of our ethnographic description, particularly for ‘peasant communities’…

Committed anthropology, however, may be damned by disheartening dilemmas so long as it entails the commitment of a ‘revolutionary intellectual’ or of ‘liberal anthropology’ as distinct from that of ‘a real partisan—an intellectual revolutionary’ or of ‘liberation anthropology’. Let us assume a willingness to face diminished access to research funds, or forced departures from countries as a result of our work. On this I have ample reason to second Stavenhagen’s homage to the many martyred revolutionary social scientists of Latin America, for my own close friend and compadre, the Colombian priest-sociologist Camilo Torres Restrepo, was harassed and ultimately killed as an activist observer. Let us also assume an ability to eschew the distortion of ‘wishful seeing’; we must if our observations are to be sound and our activism effective. Nevertheless, the process of decolonializing anthropology-studying elites, revolutionaries, and class conflict; shaping our research through ‘dialogics’ with the people toward whom we are committed; de-elitizing and demystifying our work and yet not radicalizing ourselves out of meaningful social scientific activity—comes smack up against at least two realities from the outset.

• (1) Under what circumstances is such research possible? Think of the obstacles in situations where protest is just beginning and a full picture requires research on both sides of the nascent conflict. In much of the world today we see social categories (conceptual aggregates) becoming militant organized movements. In the USA alone we see this strikingly among Blacks, women, Chicanos, students, Indians, homosexuals, youth. There are overwhelming difficulties in studying nascent protests. The activist radical scientist will be hard put to establish rapport with the elite to study them. Even if he gives up direct study of the elite, he will be hard put to stay in the community—the semi-feudal village, the factory—they control as an activist observer on behalf of the oppressed. The face-to-face participant observation that is ethnographic research makes activism possible, true, but in the situations I refer to the elite have power to harass, block, or oust activist researchers. They have guns and we have not. If I am referring here to the ‘large fields of study where this approach is simply not feasible’, are they not precisely the ones we should be studying?…

• (2) How is it possible to feel ethically secure in publishing any empirical description? This question remains even if our research findings result from a mutual learning process with the people to whom we are committed, and we avoid or are ostracized from elite-controlled publication outlets…. In addition to decolonializing anthropology, we should seek to enhance its relevance and utility by deparochializing and de-imperializing it.

Clifford R. Barnett

I have been most stimulated by what has been said by indirection in this article and by what has not been said at all. I hasten to add that I am in agreement with what I perceive to be the basic proposition in the article, namely, that anthropologists in one sense are like doctors. Despite their expertise, doctors are vulnerable to the microbes and viruses they study; and anthropologists, despite their special knowledge, are just as subject to cultural and social influences as are their informants.

When Dr. Stavenhagen suggests that anthropologists have neglected the study of “total societies” and that this is a question of “research methodology and adequate theory” it seems to me he leaves out one very important factor, namely money. If we look at such a simple thing as the shifts that have occurred in culture area emphasis in U. S. anthropology, it is evident that federal (and to a lesser extent, foundation) dollars have helped point the way…. In large complex societies such as ours, the development of knowledge of all sorts is controlled through the allocation of resources….

As Dr. Stavenhagen notes, Vine Deloria, Jr. and other politically conscious members of the groups we study are extremely critical of us. They are angered that as anthropologists, with special knowledge of their needs, we have done nothing for them. First, in terms of numbers, even if we all became ‘activist observers’ it is doubtful that we would have the impact that Dr. Stavenhagen and the groups in need would like to see us have…. Moreover, more than ninety percent of all anthropologists work in universities. Thus, we are an academic discipline, and not oriented professionally to the types of problems that Dr. Stavenhagen suggests we address ourselves.

This is the crux of my concern over the article. What makes anthropologists specialists in ‘activist observation’ or ‘militants cum observers’? Where does the anthropologist get the expertise to provide practical advice to ‘labor unions’, ‘neighborhood voluntary associations’ and ‘revolutionaries’?… National development problems have not been central to anthropology, and neither has been the study of elites… In summary, the article touches on two major areas without clear distinction made between them: (1) the need in academically-oriented research to select problems that are significant to the discipline without being unconsciously or needlessly swayed by the power and social biases of our own society; and (2) the need to develop a corps of anthropologists trained in anthropology as a profession (offering a service) in addition to those now trained as academicians.

Gerrit Huizer

Too long ‘Western’ anthropologists or ‘non-Western’ sociologists have exchanged ideas and data mainly amongst themselves in their own circles. At the high level they consider themselves to belong, only rarely has a scholar from a non-Western country (a developing country) had a chance to make his voice heard. It seems an important sign of the decolonializing in the social sciences that Rodolfo Stavenhagen, a Mexican, was able in a Western forum to express his views on the role of applied anthropology.

Stavenhagen’s points are well made but it can be expected that among the ‘established’ anthropologists doubts will be raised regarding the effects of some of the approaches proposed by him. Until today, very few anthropologists have risked taking the activist anthropology line. Does it really lead to scientific knowledge? Does it sufficiently avoid or overcome ‘subjectivity’?…

First, an observation about Stavenhagen’s idea that anthropologists have to see the villages they study in their wider social and political context: it could even be said that village research-if-combined-with-action if carried out properly and consistently, automatically leads to knowledge about the macro level of the society to which the village belongs. ….The polarized social structure of the country, and the ‘resistance to change’ of the upper class were easily discovered as the reasons behind the peasants’ distrust and ‘resistance to change’. The surprising thing about a great deal of anthropological research is that such wider implications are not being discovered (or not being published?). Anthropologists appear to have a strong bias against such facts. This may partly be due to their own cultural background, but partly to the fact that even applied anthropologists, involved in some kind of action, seem to close their eyes to the political implications.

Not experimenting by promoting the kind of change that provokes ‘resistance to change’ from above leaves the anthropologist in a rather static situation where many things of interest can be studied, but where hardly any insights into the potential for dynamic change can be achieved. He only observes ‘resistance to change’ from below. Only rarely are anthropologists present when the static rural society becomes upset or dynamic—peasant movement, unrest or revolution. It seems important to notice in this context that, contrary to strongly held beliefs among traditional anthropologists, it is necessary to identify as much as possible with the peasants and their Weltanschauung in order to properly understand their life. One has to try to see the world through their eyes. Empathy, ‘Einfühlung’ and the phenomenological approach seem to be too rarely applied in anthropology.

A quite important proposal by Stavenhagen which may raise doubts among traditional anthropologists is the usefulness of discussing research data with the people who were the object of study…. Proper questioning and discussion of preliminary data can help the people in a village or region themselves to become more aware of their own problems. It can help in the concientização of the people … as well as in the gaining of more profound insight by the researcher. Insights gained by the researcher about a conflict situation, be it hidden or overt, can be used to help the underdog to achieve a better understanding of his situation and give him means to struggle for improvement, as Stavenhagen has pointed out. For all those worried about the increasing use of anthropology for ‘counterinsurgency’ or ‘establishment sponsored’ research to purposely help the underdog, these may be the most effective forms of protest and of defense of the professional ethics of the anthropologists.

Delmos J. Jones

I agree very strongly with most of the points made in Stavenhagen’s paper. His comments on the relationship between social science and society, his criticism of radicals, and his comment on the relationship between ideology and reality are all excellent points….. But despite the very positive position taken in this paper an element of elitism emerges which is disturbing. It is a radical elitism but elitism nevertheless.

The impression of elitism emerges because the author places too much stress on the role of the social scientist as teacher and not enough is said about groups—peasant organizations, labor unions, neighborhood voluntary associations, etc.—that are actively working to bring about social change. The recent political activism of such groups has, in fact, done more to politicize social scientists than vice versa. More importantly, in order for an activist social science to be effective it must be rooted in an organized social movement….

In order for the information to be meaningful it must in the first place deal with problems which are of concern to the group in question. This requires a continuous dialogue between the social scientist and the group and implies an equal relationship between researcher and researched. In order for a social scientist to make a contribution to social change in the manner proposed by Stavenhagen, he must be willing to conduct research on the types of questions that the group itself is interested in. It is at this point that most social scientists, including most ‘radical’ social scientists, draw the line. The questions which the people are interested in may not have any theoretical importance as defined by the discipline and they may not relate to the problem that the researcher himself is interested in.

I believe that it is both desirable and necessary for some social scientists to take the activist role which Stavenhagen proposes. But the expectation should not be that the social scientist will play a key role in social processes just because he is a social scientist. It is unfair to imply that militants are not “careful observers of their own action”. The truth is that they observe the impact of their action for a different perspective than a social scientist would. The social scientist who works with an activist group can perhaps introduce a different perspective but will learn a new perspective in the process. Thus, it must be emphasized that the social scientist can only join with others as a partner in the effort to awaken and develop a critical conscience which will “enable the powerless, the oppressed, the downtrodden, the colonized, first to question, then to subvert, and finally to modify existing systems”.

Art Gallaher, Jr

I am sympathetic to the general thrust of Dr. Stavenhagen’s paper—that there are questions to be asked about the subject matter anthropologists have generated, the roles employed to do it, and about the professional practices of applying the science. This is, I think, the only posture that a science can take and remain viable. Also, I believe his paper to be in the mainstream of our current dilemma—the conjunction of anthropological past with anthropological future, with explanation of the former justification for the latter.

More specifically, I share Dr. Stavenhagen’s concern for the anthropological focus on small-scale, isolated, traditional, societies. Surely this has influenced the nature of the questions asked by anthropologists, and has produced a theoretical world view far too limited. I agree, too, that anthropologists have studied mainly the ‘underdog’ segments of society; that we have ignored elites and their power, and a host of other critical topics and processes… It is in the explanation for these conditions that I withhold, at least temporarily, agreement with Dr. Stavenhagen.

My interest is strongest where Dr. Stavenhagen suggests new directions. I agree we should study elites, and we should engage the topical and process areas that he suggests. Dr. Stavenhagen, however, goes the added step and advocates a genuine activist role for the anthropologist.

Dr. Stavenhagen… advocates an anthropology in the service of the disadvantaged; others press for an official stance on the reduction of intergroup tensions; and some push for very specific political postures. This is probably the most serious, complicated, and potentially decisive issue yet faced by the discipline, and the first genuine test of our maturity.

Vera Green

One can realize that the types of problems which have delighted anthropologists to date often required focusing on the most ‘untouched’ elements of the total population, or according to Stavenhagen, the ‘underdogs’. What is more difficult to comprehend is why their findings are generally not discussed in terms of other segments within the same societies where such exist; as for example, the ‘elite’ as illustrated in his article. Stavenhagen also states that the anthropologist should attempt to channel to oppressed Third World peoples “… not only scientific knowledge about themselves, but also about how their system works”. Perhaps the fact that few anthropologists attempt to follow this admonition stems not only from (1) the fear that their informants would be furious over what was written and they would not understand the lofty implications of their findings; but also (2) to the fact that change such as pointed out in the discussion of indigenismo has often been treated simply as processes of acculturation. And of course acculturation is seen as unidirectional and final.

As their significance seems to be continually overlooked by a number of current anthropologists, certain of the points raised by Stavenhagen definitely need to be stressed. This lack of awareness continues in spite of the fact that more individuals are expressing concern that they are ‘not wanted’ in Third World and minority areas, giving the impression that all anthropologists had formerly been welcomed everywhere with open arms. It becomes evident, therefore, that there has been little connection made between the resistance of Third World peoples to anthropological research and the types of points raised by this address.

Guillermo Bonfil Batalla

(Summary from the original Spanish comment). The issues raised by Rodolfo Stavenhagen make a substantial contribution to the discussion, so heated in the Third World countries at present, about how to make the social sciences, and particularly anthropology, become more dynamic and coherent in the processes of revolutionary transformation required by their current economic and social problems.

Murray L. Wax: On Demythologizing the Slogans of Revolutionaries

In a few areas, Stavenhagen’s sketch is imprecise, possibly because of an uncritical acceptance of popular radical rhetoric. The space allotted to me does not permit a dialectical elaboration but only a simple listing.

(1) Stavenhagen repeats the contention that anthropologists (and fellow social scientists) should reorient themselves from the study of their oppressors—the elites. The contention has a radical gloss until the reader reminds himself that most conventional historical research has been devoted to elites, their cultures, modes of action, and dramatic contests. The development of cultural anthropology (as of social history and sociological research) represented a radical reorientation of such historical effort, as it was a declaration that the culture and conduct of the subordinate masses were of equal or greater importance than the posturings of military heroes or the speeches of proconsuls.

As Stavenhagen comes close to stating, when he deals directly with this critique, the terminating of social research would equally terminate the great tradition of Marxism as the heir of the Enlightenment and the revolutionary liberator of mankind…. (2) Anthropologists and Marxist humanists (in which category I place Stavenhagen) tend sometimes to be naive about the struggle for power and the conduct of political leaders, whether radical or repressive. In consequence, they often exhibit an eschatological attitude toward revolution, politically defined, and a failure to anticipate the sordid realities of the post-revolutionary political epoch. Certainly, as Stavenhagen argues here (and I have argued elsewhere in 1969), the reformist social scientists oriented about ‘community development’ are naive in failing to grasp the larger picture; but are not these revolutionary social scientists even more naive in failing to grasp the realities of power?

(3) Anthropologists are indulging themselves in a form of elitism (or delusions of grandeur) when they exaggerate their role in affairs of empire.

Nancie L. Gonzalez

I found this paper very provocative and valuable for the issues it raises concerning the future role of social science. In general, I am sympathetic to Stavenhagen’s position and will here deal only with a few items which seem to me to be particularly thorny.

I should like to start by referring to Stavenhagen’s final paragraph, in which he states, “Certainly no amount of applied social science… can alter by itself the social forces that are at work. But the committed social scientist has an obligation to raise the issues, to ask the embarrassing questions, to carry the critique through to its conclusions, to create new models in place of the ones he is obliged to discard. And if he can, to take the necessary action”. I heartily endorse his recognition that social science is unlikely to be the force which saves (or destroys) the world. What, then, comprises commitment? One might argue that the adjective, ‘applied’ implies commitment on the part of the scientist to something or someone. The question is to whom and to what? Stavenhagen several times chastises the social scientist for ethnocentrism, which raises its ugly head in a variety of areas including the selection of a research topic, the theoretical perspective with which one attacks problems, and the final analyses and/or recommendations.

However, the question of making data available to the people being studied raises some rather interesting problems. When Stavenhagen says, “Can books about peasants be brought to the attention of, discussed with, and used by peasant organizations?” the answer must be, “It depends on who did the study, for what purpose, and from what perspectives”. Most of the present literature on peasants (urban migrants, primitives, tribal organizations, etc.) is probably not too valuable to “the natives” themselves. By this, I mean that it is either not relevant, or it may appear to them to be simply untrue. When Stavenhagen makes a plea that such nonelite groups could benefit from having scientific information about themselves, he should have specified that this must be only information on how others see them, since the anthropologist or other social scientist rarely attacks problems of special concern to the people being studied. ….

Andre Gunder Frank

Anthropology of whom, applied to whom, for whom, by whom? That is the question. Stavenhagen has scientifically and morally posed and answered that, in bourgeois-legitimated orthodoxy, anthropology and other social sciences have traditionally been of the people and applied to the people, but for their colonial capitalist rules at home and abroad; and by these rulers or their hired action anthropologists the better to govern the oppressed people. In courageously saying so before the Society for Applied Anthropology (SAA), Stavenhagen himself sets out on one of the new paths he advocates inasmuch—or insofar—as his denunciation itself amounts to an untraditional study of the rulers instead of the ruled. Therein he wages a valiant battle on the ideological front insofar as his message reaches out to the people or at least to some of the colonializing applied anthropologists whom it may help take conscious stock of the question. (Inasmuch as the SAA itself invited Stavenhagen to so address it…. More important than asking anthropology of whom applied to whom, is the question, anthropology for whom and by whom? Indeed, and herein Stavenhagen and the present writer perhaps disagree, the class of anthropological activist for and by whom anthropology is applied is more likely to determine the kind of anthropology he practices than the other way around.

And certainly the for whom that troubles Stavenhagen will be determined principally by the by whom, which Stavenhagen rather mentions in passing instead of making the applied anthropological actor the principal object—or subject—of our meta-applied anthropology. While the anthropologist or other social scientist is one who sells his labor—and his soul—to the highest capitalist bidder, little good for the people is likely to derive from his anthropology, irrespective of what kind he applies.

Anthropology and other social science is more likely to be for the people if it is applied by the people, regardless of whether this science is of the people and applied to them to mobilize them or whether it is science of their enemies applied to them by the people who combat them. Similarly the question is not, as Stavenhagen poses it, where the distinction between reformist and revolutionary change or anthropology is at any moment. The question is rather one of the distinctions between a reformist and revolutionary organization. … And therefore also, only militancy in a revolutionary organization and the application of anthropology and other social sciences guided by and tested in the praxis of such revolutionary militancy can assure that anthropology and social science will be applied in the people’s struggle for a government of the people, by the people, for the people.

Steven Polgar

Among the many excellent ideas Stavenhagen has put forward his positive use of ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ particularly strikes me. Although even scientific facts are not ‘objective’ (since, if nothing else, their selection for ascertainment and dissemination is value-laden), theories are even less so. We are beginning to recognize, as Stavenhagen has stressed, that to propound a theory about society is a political act. To go one step further and participate in the application of that theory requires a new self-concept among anthropologists. Those who have practiced applied anthropology, as Stavenhagen also points out, have usually done so in the employ of some group. The theories of social change that such employers have are usually firmly held, even if they are not explicit. Hence, the common complaint of the applied social scientist that he is being used as a mere technician. Those, on the other hand, who have acquired policy-making power within a group or organization have felt that they must abandon their self-concept as scientists. But the interpretation of theory in the light of specific situations is a scientific activity. To test out the validity of such interpretations in the crucible of action is, I would agree, also doing science. What Stavenhagen’s activist observer can hopefully do is to see his theories tested directly—without waiting for his book to be published and then possibly read by some receptive activist. If the theory and its reinterpretation are scientifically sound, the action will be successful. And if several actions based on the theory (and its interpretations) are successful, neither the social scientist’s participation nor some unaccounted variable can be validly proposed as alternative explanations of the results.

Reply of Rodolfo Stavenhagen

The comments on my paper address from different points of view, the various issues raised therein and I am grateful to my colleagues who felt that these were sufficiently important to deserve their attention, both to those who give me their enthusiastic or guarded approval, as well as to those who express their criticism.

While I do not feel it necessary to restate my position, some of the points raised require discussion. Let me begin by replying to my negative, if gentle, critics. The points made by Professors Barnett, Gallaher and Wax represent fairly faithfully the traditional approach which the radical social scientists are increasingly taking to task. Barnett, for example, regrets that he does not find in my paper a proper distinction between the anthropologist qua anthropologist and the anthropologist qua citizen; and Gallaher asks for a clear limit between what he calls the anthropological world view and that of other reference groups. But one of my points was precisely that such a distinction is illusory. While I certainly do not mean to imply that every political act engaged in by an anthropologist is anthropology, the converse however does hold. The practice of social and cultural anthropology (at least in most cases, and certainly applied anthropology) does constitute a political act, as Polgar rightly states when referring to the propounding of theories. Thus, when Barnett pleads for the need in academically-oriented research to select problems that are significant to the discipline without being swayed by the power and social biases of our own society; or when Gallaher opposes the rights and interests of a researched population to the supposedly “self-serving needs of a science”, it seems only fair to ask that the criteria whereby these problems and needs are determined be made explicit. Barnett, however, quite rightly recognizes that the development of knowledge is controlled through the allocation of resources and that the professional associations are not engaged in the politics of resource allocation. The contradiction here is self-evident. And in order to escape from this contradiction we may legitimately ask why the professional associations should not engage in the politics of resource allocation. By not doing so, are they not precisely letting the “self-serving needs” of the science be determined by the “power and social biases” of the society (vide establishment)?

Similarly unconvincing is Murray Wax’s contention that the study of elites would signify a return to ‘conventional’ research from which cultural anthropology has allegedly made a radical departure. As Professor Wax surely does not ignore, there are different ways to study elites—and even the posturings of military heroes. Cecil Rhodes and Teddy Roosevelt look quite different according to which side of empire-building one happens to be on. Likewise, there are different ways to study the oppressed, and one does not have to be a conspiratorial enemy of reason, liberty and science (as Professor Wax curiously suggests) in order to call a spade a spade and recognize that social research not only can, but increasingly has, become “a species of military intelligence”. What country has Professor Wax been living in?

Yet of course he is quite right in chiding radicals for their naïveté about the realities of power and their often eschatological attitude toward revolution. I can only suggest that in order that the whip of tyranny not turn into the scorpion of bureaucracy—as he seems to fear—we maintain our faith in the lion-like strength and the eagle-eyed vigilance of the popular masses.

Finally, a word on anthropological guilt, to which both Professors Barnett and Gallaher refer. Anthropologists, like other groups, have played social roles determined by historically given structures. There can be no question of ‘guilt’ on that level. But social scientists are also free human beings and, as intellectuals, have always borne particular social responsibilities. That scholars are able to act according to their conscience and not only to their social roles needs no reiteration here. The problem becomes critical when the definition of the social role enters into contradiction with the ethical values ostensibly held by the dominant culture which defines these roles. This, I hold, is what has been occurring in the applied social sciences, and has led to the issues we are debating.

Let me now turn briefly to some of the points raised by the other commentators. I plead guilty to Jones’ accusation of ‘radical elitism’ and do in fact feel uncomfortable about it. It is probably due to my not having been as much involved in ‘activist research’ as I should have, despite my advice to fellow radicals to do precisely that. The difficulties involved in such kind of research are of course great, as Polgar, Silverberg and others acknowledge, but can also be scientifically rewarding as Huizer demonstrates. Yet even to suggest that this approach can be extended to each and every kind of social research would be sheer nonsense.

On the other hand, political militancy, as Bonfil and Frank suggest, is, in today’s world where the lines of social struggle are fairly clearly drawn, much more than simply a personal commitment which can conveniently be kept apart from one’s ‘science’ or scholarly activities. As we all know, political organization for revolutionary social change will continue (fortunately, let me add) regardless of what a handful of social scientists decide to do. But if social science has anything to contribute to this process, then it is only by what social scientists as individuals do. And on this I must insist again that radical social scientists should be careful not to radicalize themselves out of meaningful social scientific activity altogether. Thus I do not believe, with Frank, that the dialogue between the social scientists and the people they study must necessarily lead to the latter’s co-optation into the system of their oppressors. That such dialogue may be used for manipulative ends is undeniable. But it is equally clear that it may lead to increased social and political awareness of both the social scientists and the people involved. Social scientists have indeed been known to acquire such awareness in the course of their scientific activity, to detach themselves from the establishment and to use their knowledge and scientific tools in the fashion suggested in my paper. Gunder Frank will surely allow me to mention his own intellectual development as a case in point. And if this process is to continue then the radical debate must be carried out at all possible levels, whether it be with Don Simpatico, in the university, in international organizations or within the staid and respectable professional organizations of the academic disciplines.