Abstract
We extend congestion games to the setting where every resource is endowed with a capacity which possibly limits its number of users. From the negative side, we show that a pure Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist in any case and we prove that deciding whether a game possesses a pure Nash equilibrium is NP-complete. Our positive results state that congestion games with capacities are potential games in the well studied singleton case. Polynomial algorithms that compute these equilibria are also provided.
This work is supported by French National Agency (ANR), project COCA ANR-09-JCJC-0066-01.
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Gourvès, L., Monnot, J., Moretti, S., Thang, N.K. (2012). Congestion Games with Capacitated Resources. In: Serna, M. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7615. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33996-7_18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33996-7_18
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