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Information Theoretic Security by the Laws of Classical Physics

(Plenary Paper)

  • Conference paper
Soft Computing Applications

Part of the book series: Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing ((AISC,volume 195))

Abstract

It has been shown recently that the use of two pairs of resistors with enhanced Johnson-noise and a Kirchhoff-loop—i.e., a Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) protocol—for secure key distribution leads to information theoretic security levels superior to those of a quantum key distribution, including a natural immunity against a man-in-the-middle attack. This issue is becoming particularly timely because of the recent full cracks of practical quantum communicators, as shown in numerous peer-reviewed publications. This presentation first briefly surveys the KLJN system and then discusses related, essential questions such as: what are perfect and imperfect security characteristics of key distribution, and how can these two types of securities be unconditional (or information theoretical)? Finally the presentation contains a live demonstration.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Technical Informatics, University of Szeged, Árpád tér 2, Szeged, H-6701, Hungary

    R. Mingesz & Z. Gingl

  2. Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, 77843-3128, USA

    L. B. Kish & H. Wen

  3. Department of Engineering Sciences, The Ångström Laboratory, Uppsala University, P.O. Box 534, SE-75121, Uppsala, Sweden

    C. G. Granqvist

  4. College of Electrical and Information Engineering, Hunan University, Changsha, 410082, China

    H. Wen

  5. National Institute of Information and Communication Technology, Kobe, Hyogo, 651-2492, Japan

    F. Peper

  6. Sandia National Laboratories, P.O. Box 5800, Albuquerque, NM, 87185-1033, USA

    T. Eubanks

  7. Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, San Diego, CA, 92152, USA

    G. Schmera

Authors
  1. R. Mingesz
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  2. L. B. Kish
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  3. Z. Gingl
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  4. C. G. Granqvist
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  5. H. Wen
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  6. F. Peper
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  7. T. Eubanks
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  8. G. Schmera
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to R. Mingesz .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. , Department of Automation & Applied Infor, Aurel Vlaicu University of Arad, Blvd. Revolutiei 77, Arad, 310130, Romania

    Valentina Emilia Balas

  2. , Institute of Intelligent Engineering, Óbuda University, Bécsi út 96/b, Budapest, 1034, Hungary

    János Fodor

  3. Dept. Measurement &, Information Systems, Technical University Budapest, Magyar tudósok körutja 2, Budapest, 1521, Hungary

    Annamária R. Várkonyi-Kóczy

  4. , Department of Informatics, University of Szeged, Arpad ter 2., Szeged, 6720, Hungary

    Joszef Dombi

  5. , School of Electrical and Information, University of South Australia, 5095, Adelaide, Australia

    Lakhmi C. Jain

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Mingesz, R. et al. (2013). Information Theoretic Security by the Laws of Classical Physics. In: Balas, V., Fodor, J., Várkonyi-Kóczy, A., Dombi, J., Jain, L. (eds) Soft Computing Applications. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 195. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33941-7_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33941-7_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-33940-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-33941-7

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