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Transnational Competition Law and Public Services

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European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2013

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((volume 4))

Abstract

International trade agreements aim at opening up national markets and remove obstacles to free trade. The majority of the trade agreements impose obligations upon states to remove these obstacles. However, over the years treaties tend to govern competition law as well. As a result, these treaties also require that companies refrain from anti-competitive practices. In fact, such agreements are capable of completing the process of trade liberalisation, as the competiveness of international markets is not only dependent on the removal of obstacles coming from state laws but also on the absence of anti-competitive practices of companies. However, at the same time, the fear exits that progressive trade liberalisation could put under pressure the provision of essential services every citizen should have access to. In various systems of national law States have developed special concepts in order to reconcile the need to open-up markets with the right of every citizen to have access to particular essential services or goods (such as the supply of water, the provision of particular health care services etc.). Due to the globalisation process (big enterprises are engaged in trans boundary business activities) and trade agreements concluded by States or International Organisations such as the EU it goes without saying that these concepts developed at national level fall short in addressing the tensions between trade liberalisation and the access to essential services.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See the Treaties discussed in section “Regional Trade Agreements and Public Services” of this article.

  2. 2.

    Cf. Hervey, If Only It Were So Simple: Public Health Servies and EU Law, in: Cremona (ed.), Market Integration and Public Services in the European Union, 2011, pp. 209–214.

  3. 3.

    See e.g. Cremona, Introduction, in: Cremona (ed.), Market Integration and Public Services in the European Union, 2011, pp. 1–10; Nistor, Public Services and the European Union. Healthcare, Health Insurance and Education Services, 2011, pp. 2 et seq.; Krajewski, Protecting a Shared Value of the Union in a Globalized World: Services of General Economic Interest and External Trade, in: van de Gronden (ed.), EU and WTO Law on Services. Limits to the Realisation of General Interest Policies within the Services Markets?, 2009, p. 188; Adlung, Public Services and the GATS, Journal of International Economic Law 2006, p. 455; Krajewski/Neergaard/van de Gronden, Introduction, in: Krajewski/Neergaard/van de Gronden (eds.), The Changing Legal Framework for Services of General Interest for Europe. Between Competition and Solidarity, 2009, p. 1.

  4. 4.

    Art. 101 and 102 TFEU, for example, are directed at “undertakings.”

  5. 5.

    Before the Treaty of Lisbon, OJ [2007] C 306/1, entered into force, the EU was based on the Treaty on the European Union (EU) and the Treaty establishing the European Community (EC).

  6. 6.

    On the question whether a competition law system should be introduced in the WTO framework, see Taylor, International Competition Law. A New Dimension for the WTO?, 2006, pp. 147 et seq.

  7. 7.

    On the role of the notion of competition in WTO law, see pp. 126 et seq.

  8. 8.

    Before the entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, Art. 81-89 EC contained these rules.

  9. 9.

    On this matter, see Townley, Article 81 EC and Public Policy, 2009, pp. 141 et seq. See also the Commission Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) [now Article 101(3)] of the Treaty, OJ [2004] C 101/97, para. 42.

  10. 10.

    ECJ, Case C-309/99, Wouters, ECR [2002] I-1577.

  11. 11.

    ECJ, Case C-519/04P, Meca-Medina, ECR [2006] I-6991.

  12. 12.

    The Wouters case concerned professional ethics of practicing lawyers.

  13. 13.

    See e.g. Jones/Sufrin, EU Competition Law. Text, Cases and Materials, 2011, pp. 577–599.

  14. 14.

    See e.g. ECJ, Case C-39/94, La Poste, ECR [1996] I-3547. This rule is derived from Art. 108(3) TFEU.

  15. 15.

    See previous note. See also Council Regulation (EC) No. 659/1999 of 22 March 1999, OJ 1999 L 83/1, Art. 14.

  16. 16.

    The leading judgment for this definition is ECJ, Case C-41/90, Höfner, ECR [1991] I-1979.

  17. 17.

    See e.g. ECJ, Case 118/85, Commission vs. Italy, ECR [1987] 2599.

  18. 18.

    See ECJ, Case C-343/95, Diego Calì, ECR [1997] I-1547.

  19. 19.

    ECJ, Case C-364/92, Eurocontrol, ECR [1994] I-43

  20. 20.

    See van de Gronden, Purchasing care: economic activity or service of general (economic) interest?, European Competition Law Review 25 (2004) 2, p. 84 (85).

  21. 21.

    Cf. Schweitzer, Services of General Economic Interest: European Law’s Impact o the Role of Markets and of Member States, in: Cremona (ed.), Market Integration and Public Services in the European Union, 2011, p. 22.

  22. 22.

    See e.g. ECJ Case C-437/09, AG2R Prévoyance vs. Beaudout Père et Fils SARL, 3 March 2011 n.y.r.; ECJ Case C-350/07, Kattner Stahlbau GmbH vs. Maschinenbau- und Metall-Berufsgenossenschaft, ECR [2009] I-1513; ECJ, Joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01, AOK Bundesverband, et al. vs. Ichthyol-Gesellschaft Cordes, Hermani & Co., et al., ECR [2004] I-2493, and ECJ, Joined Cases C-159/91 and C-160/91, Christian Poucet vs. Assurances Générales de France and Caisse Mutuelle Régionale du Languedoc-Roussillon, ECR [1993] I-637.

  23. 23.

    See van de Gronden/Sauter, Taking the temperature: EU competition law and healthcare, Legal Issues of Economic Integration 38 (2011) 3, p. 213 (218–223).

  24. 24.

    See, for example, ECJ, Case C-67/96, Albany International BV vs. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, ECR [1999] I-5751, ECJ, Joined Cases C-115/97, C-116/97 and C-117/97, Brentjens’ Handelsonderneming BV vs. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds voor de Handel in Bouwmaterialen, ECR [1999] I-6025; ECJ, Case C-219/97, Maatschappij Drijvende Bokken BV vs. Stichting Pensioenfonds voor de Vervoer- en Havenbedrijven, ECR [1999] I-6121, and ECJ, Case C-244/94, Fédération Française des Sociétés d’Assurance, et al. vs. Ministère de l’Agriculture et de la Pêche (FFSA), ECR [1995] I-4015.

  25. 25.

    ECJ, Case C-205/03 P, Federación Española de Empresas de Tecnología Sanitaria (FENIN) vs. Commission, ECR [2006] I-6295.

  26. 26.

    See e.g. ECJ, Case C-475/99, Ambulanz Glöckner, ECR [2002] I-8089.

  27. 27.

    See, for example, ECJ Case C-437/09, AG2R Prévoyance vs. Beaudout Père et Fils SARL, 3 March 2011 n.y.r.

  28. 28.

    This test was carried out for the first time in the landmark decision ECJ, Case C-320/90, Corbeau, ECR [1993] I-2533.

  29. 29.

    See Buendia Sierra, Exclusive Rights and State Monopolies cf. also EC Law. Article 86 (Former Article 90) of the EC Treaty, 1999, pp. 319, 320; cf. also Schweitzer, Services of General Economic Interest: European Law’s Impact on the Role of Markets and of Member States, in: Cremona (ed.), Market Integration and Public Services in the European Union, 2011, pp. 38–41.

  30. 30.

    See Van de Gronden, The Internal Market, the State and Private Initiative. A Legal Assessment of National Mixed Public-private Arrangements in the Light of European Law, Legal Issues of Economic Integration 33 (2006) 2, p. 105 (135–136), and Sauter, Services of General Economic Interest and Universal Service in EU law, European Law Review 33 (2008) 2, p. 167 (179–180).

  31. 31.

    ECJ, Case C-280/00, Altmark, ECR [2003] I-7747.

  32. 32.

    See ECJ, Case T-289/03, British United Provident Association, ECR [2008] II-81, paras. 161–162.

  33. 33.

    Commission Decision 2012/21/EU of 20 December 2011, OJ [2012] L 7/3.

  34. 34.

    OJ [2012] C 8/4.

  35. 35.

    OJ [2012] C 8/15.

  36. 36.

    OJ [2006] L 318/17.

  37. 37.

    See e.g. the Commission Communication, A Quality Framework for Services of General Interest in Europe, COM(2011) 900 final, 20 December 2011. On these Commission documents, see Neergaard, The Commission’s Soft Law in the Area of Services of General Economic Interest, in: Szyszczak/Davies/Andenaes/Bekkedal (eds.), Developments in Services of General Interest, 2011, pp. 37 et seq.

  38. 38.

    OJ [2010] C 83/389.

  39. 39.

    Protocol on Services of General Interest to be annexed to the Treaty on the European Union, to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and, where applicable, to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, OJ [2007] C 306/148.

  40. 40.

    On the various concept related to SGEI, see e.g. Neergaard, Services of General Interest: the Nature of the Beast, in: Krajewski/Neergaard/Van de Gronden (eds.), The Changing Legal Framework for Services of General Interest for Europe. Between Competition and Solidarity, 2009, pp. 19 et seq.

  41. 41.

    See e.g. Vedder, Competition Law and Environmental Protection in Europe: Towards Sustainability?, 2003, pp. 5, 237–246.

  42. 42.

    See e.g. ECJ, Case 267/86, Pascal Van Eycke vs. ASPA, ECR [1988] 4769.

  43. 43.

    ECJ, Case 267/86, Pascal Van Eycke vs. ASPA, ECR [1988] 4769.

  44. 44.

    ECJ, Case C-35/99, Criminal proceedings against Manuele Arduino, ECR [2002] I-1529.

  45. 45.

    ECJ, Case C-202/04, Federico Cipolla against Rosaria Portolese and Stefano Macrino and Claudia Capoparte against Roberto Meloni, ECR [2006] I-11421.

  46. 46.

    See Verschuur, Overheidsmaatregelen en het toezicht van nationale mededingingsautoriteiten. De consequenties van het arrest CIF voor nationale mededingingsautoriteiten en overheden, 2010, pp. 106–114.

  47. 47.

    ECJ, Case C-198/01, Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF) vs. Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, ECR [2003] I-8055.

  48. 48.

    ECJ, Joined Cases C-359/95 P and C-379/95 P, Commission and France vs. Ladbroke Racing Ltd., ECR [1997] I-6265. See also GC, Case T-387/94, Asia Motor France and others vs. Commission, ECR [1996] II-961.

  49. 49.

    See Elhauge/Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics, 2011, p. 67.

  50. 50.

    See e.g. Elhauge/Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics, 2011, pp. 38–47.

  51. 51.

    Parker vs. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307 (1943).

  52. 52.

    See Hovenkamp, Antitrust, (4th ed.) 2005, p. 332.

  53. 53.

    Elhauge/Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics, 2011, p. 40. They point out that even if a general waiver is in place, “persons” are not deemed eligible to be defendants under anti-trust law, unless the agency statute provides otherwise.

  54. 54.

    For example, under current US anti-trust law, predatory pricing (too low prices) is condemned under both section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 2 of the Sherman act (which deals with matters of market power). See Sullivan/Hovenkamp/Shelanski, Antitrust Law, Policy and Procedure: Cases, Materials, Problems, (6th ed.) 2009, pp. 669–670. However, in EU competition law, predatory pricing is only assessed under Art. 102 TFEU. AKZO, which is the leading case in this respect, is solely based on Art. 102 TFEU. See ECJ, Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV vs. Commission, ECR [1991] I-3359. Cf. also Jones/Sufrin, EU Competition Law. Text, Cases and Materials, (4th ed.) 2011, pp. 395–399.

  55. 55.

    See Hovenkamp, Antitrust, (4th ed.) 2005, p. 116.

  56. 56.

    Hovenkamp, Antitrust, (4th ed.) 2005, p. 116.

  57. 57.

    See Van de Gronden, The Treaty provisions on Competition and Health Care, in: van de Gronden/Szyszczak/Neergaard/Krajewski, Health Care and EU Law, 2011, p. 277.

  58. 58.

    See Elhauge/Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics, 2011, pp. 180–208.

  59. 59.

    See the State of Health Care Antitrust Enforcement Policy, issued by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, August 1996, available at: http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/industryguide/policy/hlth3s.pdf.

  60. 60.

    See the State of Health Care Antitrust Enforcement Policy, p. 70.

  61. 61.

    See State of Health Care Antitrust Enforcement Policy, p. 71.

  62. 62.

    See e.g. Sullivan/Hovenkamp/Shelanski, Antitrust Law, Policy and Procedure: Cases, Materials, Problems, (6th ed.) 2009, p. 591.

  63. 63.

    See e.g. Sullivan/Hovenkamp/Shelanski, Antitrust Law, Policy and Procedure: Cases, Materials, Problems, (6th ed.) 2009, p. 592.

  64. 64.

    See Hovenkamp, Antitrust, (4th ed.) 2005, p. 137.

  65. 65.

    See the report of the US Department of Justice (Antitrust Division), Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 2008, p. 7, available at: http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf.

  66. 66.

    See Hovenkamp, Antitrust, (4th ed.) 2005, p. 138. Cf. also Standard Oil Co. of N.J. vs. U.S., 221 U.S. 1, 31 S.Ct. 502 (1911).

  67. 67.

    Blair/Coffin, Physician Collective Bargaining: State Legislation and the State Action Doctrine, Cardozo Law Review 26 (2004–2005), p. 1732.

  68. 68.

    Areeda/Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application, Volume IA, (3rd ed.) 2006, p. 43.

  69. 69.

    Inman/Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, Texas Law Review 75 (1996–1997) 6, p. 1205.

  70. 70.

    See Hovenkamp, Antitrust, (4th ed.) 2005, p. 332.

  71. 71.

    California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n vs. Midcal Aluminum Co., 445 U.S. 97, 100 S.Ct. 937 (1980).

  72. 72.

    Hovenkamp, Antitrust, (4th ed.) 2005, p. 333.

  73. 73.

    See Areeda/Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application, Volume IA, (3rd ed.) 2006, p. 73.

  74. 74.

    On the Foreseeability Standard, see Trujillo, State Action Antitrust Exemption Collides With Deregulation: Rehabilitating the Foreseeability Doctrine, Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law 11 (2005–2006) 2, p. 349 (367–372).

  75. 75.

    See Semeraro, Demystifying Antitrust State Action Doctrine, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 24 (2000) 1, p. 203 (211–212).

  76. 76.

    See Areeda/Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application, Volume IA, (3rd ed.) 2006, p. 73.

  77. 77.

    See Areeda/Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application, Volume IA, (3rd ed.) 2006, p. 65, and Shenefield, The Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine and the New Federalism of Antitrust, Antitrust Law Journal 51 (1982), p. 344.

  78. 78.

    Inman/Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, Texas Law Review 75 (1996–1997) 6, p. 1262. Cf. also Federal Trade Commission vs. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992).

  79. 79.

    See Blair/Coffin, Physician Collective Bargaining: State Legislation and the State Action Doctrine, Cardozo Law Review 26 (2004–2005), p. 1732 (1747–1749).

  80. 80.

    Cf. Stine/Gorman, Putting the Lid on State-Sanctioned Cartels: Why the State Action Doctrine in its Current Form Should Become a Remnant of the Past, University of Miami Law Review 66 (2011) 1, pp. 128–131.

  81. 81.

    Inman/Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, Texas Law Review 75 (1996–1997) 6, p. 1252.

  82. 82.

    See Semeraro, Demystifying Antitrust State Action Doctrine, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 24 (2000) 1, p. 203 (212).

  83. 83.

    See Lafayette vs. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 98 S. Ct. 1123 (1978).

  84. 84.

    See e.g. Hovenkamp, Antitrust, (4th ed.) 2005, p. 335–337, and Inman/Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, Texas Law Review 75 (1996–1997) 6, p. 1259.

  85. 85.

    See Areeda/Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application, Volume IA, (3rd ed.) 2006, pp. 71 et seq.

  86. 86.

    See the section on the Useful Effect Doctrine in EU competition law.

  87. 87.

    Furthermore, it should be pointed out, as Taylor noted, that international trade and competition rules considerably overlap, as they both aim at increasing efficiency and global welfare. See Taylor, International Competition law. A new Dimension for the WTO?, 2006, pp. 167–184.

  88. 88.

    See Krajewski, Protecting a Shared Value of the Union in a Globalized World: Services of General Economic Interest and External Trade, in: van de Gronden (ed.), EU and WTO law on Services. Limits to the Realisation of General Interest Policies within the Services Markets?, 2009, p. 200.

  89. 89.

    See Krajewski, Protecting a Shared Value of the Union in a Globalized World: Services of General Economic Interest and External Trade, in: van de Gronden (ed.), EU and WTO law on Services. Limits to the Realisation of General Interest Policies within the Services Markets?, 2009, p. 199 and 200.

  90. 90.

    Adlung, Public Services and the GATS, Journal of International Economic Law 9 (2006) 2, p. 465.

  91. 91.

    See VanDuzer, Health, Education and Social Services in Canada: The Impact of the GATS, in: Curtis/Ciuriak (eds.), Trade Policy Research 2004, 2004, p. 396.

  92. 92.

    See Report of the Panel, Mexico – Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services (Mexico-Telmex), WT/DS204/R, para. 7.230. The definition is taken from the Oxford English Dictionary.

  93. 93.

    See Krajewski, Protecting a Shared Value of the Union in a Globalized World: Services of General Economic Interest and External Trade, in: Van de Gronden (ed.), EU and WTO law on Services. Limits to the Realisation of General Interest Policies within the Services Markets?, 2009, p. 201. He argues that such an elasticity should be determined on a case-by-case basis.

  94. 94.

    See Art. XVI GATS.

  95. 95.

    See Art. II GATS.

  96. 96.

    See Adlung, Public Services and the GATS, Journal of International Economic Law 9 (2006) 2, p. 468.

  97. 97.

    This database is available at: http://tsdb.wto.org/default.aspx.

  98. 98.

    Strikingly, this limitation refers only to exclusive rights and to special rights. As already was pointed out in the section on the EU rules on competition and public services, the TFEU contains not only provisions for firms with exclusive rights but also for firms with special rights. This raises the question whether the limitations are not applicable special rights. If this is true, certain special rights in the EU might be found incompatible with the GATS, irrespective of whether the special rights concerned are justifiable under Art. 106(2) TFEU.

  99. 99.

    See e.g. Poretti, The Regulation of Subsidies within the General Agreement on Trade in Services of the WTO. Problems and Prospects, 2009, p. 175.

  100. 100.

    See Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, 2010, p. 184.

  101. 101.

    Règlement 02/2002/CM/UEMOA relatif aux pratiques anticoncurrentielles à l’intérieur de l’UEMOA, available at: http://www.uemoa.int/Pages/Actes/NewPages/reglement_2_2002_CM_UEMOA.aspx.

  102. 102.

    See Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, 2010, p. 290.

  103. 103.

    Directive 01/2002 relative à la transparence des relations financières d’une part entre lest états membres et les entreprises publiques, et d’ autre part entre les Etats membres et les organisations internationale sou étrangères, available at http://www.uemoa.int/Pages/ACTES/ConseildesMinistres.aspx.

  104. 104.

    This treaty is available at: http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/revised_treaty-text.pdf.

  105. 105.

    Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, p. 182.

  106. 106.

    However, it should be noted that a UNCTAD report issued in 2005 noted that it was not clear whether COTED has exercised this power to exempt agriculture, a sector that is of great interest for CARICOM states, from the competition rules. See the UNCTAD Report, Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: How to Assure Development Gains, 2005, p. 456.

  107. 107.

    Beckfor, The Appropriate Design and Enforcement of Competition Law and Policy in Countries at Different Stages of Market Development, paper submitted at the second Regional Seminar UNCTAD/SELA on Trade and Competiveness, p. 16. This paper is available at: http://www.jftc.com/Libraries/Speeches_and_Presentations/The_Appropriate_Design_and_Enforcement_of_Competition_Law_and_Policy_in_Countries_at_Different_Stages_of_Market_Development_The_case_of_CARICOM_-_Dr_Delroy_Beckford.sflb.ashx.

  108. 108.

    See Art. 31(2) sub a CARICOM Treaty.

  109. 109.

    This treaty is available at: http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/en/view.aspx?x=343.

  110. 110.

    See Nsour, Rethinking the World Trade Order. Towards a Better Legal Understanding of the Role of Regionalism in the Multilateral Trade Regime, 2010, p. 200.

  111. 111.

    See Art. 1501 NAFTA.

  112. 112.

    See NAFTA/UNCITRAL/ICSID, United States Parcel Service of America, Inc vs. Government of Canada, 2007. This case is available at: http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3749.htm.

  113. 113.

    See Nsour, Rethinking the World Trade Order. Towards a Better Legal Understanding of the Role of Regionalism in the Multilateral Trade Regime, 2010, p. 151.

  114. 114.

    See Art. 1(4) sub d of chapter 8.

  115. 115.

    Cf. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, 2010, p. 97.

  116. 116.

    OJ 2005 L265/1.

  117. 117.

    OJ [2004] L 345/39.

  118. 118.

    OJ [2002] L 352/3.

  119. 119.

    This Agreements is available at: http://www.efta.int/~/media/Documents/legal-texts/eea/the-eea-agreement/Main%20Text%20of%20the%20Agreement/EEAagreement.pdf.

  120. 120.

    The following states belong to this category: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, the Commonwealth of Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, the Co-operative Republic of Guyana, the Republic of Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Republic of Surinam and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.

  121. 121.

    OJ [2008] L 289/I/3.

  122. 122.

    Art. 91 of the CARIFORUM Treaty.

  123. 123.

    See the announcement made at: http://www.crnm.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=276&Itemid=76.

  124. 124.

    See Geradin/Petit, Competition Policy in the Southern Mediterranean Countries, Review of Network Economics 3 (2004) 1, p. 78.

  125. 125.

    See European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument—Algeria. Strategy Paper 2007–2013 & National Indicative Programme 2007–2010, p. 36, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_nip_algeria_en.pdf.

  126. 126.

    See Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, 2010, p. 115.

  127. 127.

    Art. 106(1) TFEU, for example, forbids Member States to take measures with regard to companies having a special position on the market contrary to the competition rules. A similar provision is found in many trade agreements the EU is a party to. Also, in other trade blocks such as those of the WAEMU countries or the parties to the NAFTA, monopolies and similar rights are placed under critical scrutiny.

  128. 128.

    In EU state aid law, the term Public Service Obligations is used, next to the concept of SGEI.

  129. 129.

    See Krajewski, Conclusion, in: Krajewski/Neergaard/van de Gronden (eds.), The Changing Legal Framework for Services of General Interest for Europe. Between Competition and Solidarity, 2009, pp. 504–505.

  130. 130.

    See in this respect the UNCTAD Report, Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: How to Assure Development Gains, 2005, p. 31 and Nsour, Rethinking the World Trade Order. Towards a Better Legal Understanding of the Role of Regionalism in the Multilateral Trade Regime, 2010, p. 153.

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  1. Faculty of Law, Radboud University Nijmegen, 9049, 6500 KK, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

    Johan van de Gronden

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  1. European Law, European and, University of Passau Chair for Constitutional and Administrat, Passau, Germany

    Christoph Herrmann

  2. Chair for Public Law, University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Erlangen, Germany

    Markus Krajewski

  3. Chair for Public Law, European and, Leuphana University Lüneburg, Lüneburg, Germany

    Jörg Philipp Terhechte

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van de Gronden, J. (2013). Transnational Competition Law and Public Services. In: Herrmann, C., Krajewski, M., Terhechte, J. (eds) European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2013. European Yearbook of International Economic Law, vol 4. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33917-2_6

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