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Towards the Orchestration of Secured Services under Non-disclosure Policies

  • Tigran Avanesov
  • Yannick Chevalier
  • Michaël Rusinowitch
  • Mathieu Turuani
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7531)

Abstract

The problem of finding a mediator to compose secured services has been reduced in our former work to the problem of solving deducibility constraints similar to those employed for cryptographic protocol analysis. We extend in this paper the mediator synthesis procedure by a construction for expressing that some data is not accessible to the mediator. Then we give a decision procedure for verifying that a mediator satisfying this non-disclosure policy can be effectively synthesized. This procedure has been implemented in CL-AtSe, our protocol analysis tool. The procedure extends constraint solving for cryptographic protocol analysis in a significative way as it is able to handle negative deducibility constraints without restriction. In particular it applies to all subterm convergent theories and therefore covers several interesting theories in formal security analysis including encryption, hashing, signature and pairing.

Keywords

Web services Orchestration security policy separation of duty deducibility constraints cryptographic protocols 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Tigran Avanesov
    • 1
    • 2
    • 3
  • Yannick Chevalier
    • 2
  • Michaël Rusinowitch
    • 1
  • Mathieu Turuani
    • 1
  1. 1.INRIA Nancy Grand EstVandœuvre-lés-NancyFrance
  2. 2.IRITUniversité de ToulouseToulouseFrance
  3. 3.SnTUniversité du LuxebmourgLuxembourgLuxembourg

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