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How Secure Is ERTMS?

  • Richard Bloomfield
  • Robin Bloomfield
  • Ilir Gashi
  • Robert Stroud
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7613)

Abstract

This paper reports on the results of a security analysis of the European Railway Traffic Management System (ERTMS) specifications. ERTMS is designed to be fail-safe and the general philosophy of ‘if in doubt, stop the train’ makes it difficult to engineer a train accident. However, it is possible to exploit the fail-safe behaviour of ERTMS and create a situation that causes a train to halt. Thus, denial of service attacks are possible, and could be launched at a time and place of the attacker’s choosing, perhaps designed to cause maximum disruption or passenger discomfort. Causing an accident is more difficult but not impossible.

Keywords

Security assessment safety-critical systems ERTMS railway signaling systems safety security interactions 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Richard Bloomfield
    • 1
  • Robin Bloomfield
    • 2
    • 3
  • Ilir Gashi
    • 2
  • Robert Stroud
    • 3
  1. 1.Independent ConsultantUK
  2. 2.Centre for Software ReliabilityCity University LondonLondonUK
  3. 3.Adelard LLPLondonUK

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