Assessing Software Interference Management When Modifying Safety-Related Software

  • Patrick J. Graydon
  • Tim P. Kelly
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7613)


Many systems deliberately manage interference between software components, e.g. through partitioning. When engineers modifying such software determine which items of verification evidence have been invalidated by changes, they consider interference management measures. A complete understanding of interference and its management is crucial when engineers re-use evidence. In prior work, we suggested: (a) a guided process for identifying interference and means of managing it; and (b) a strategy for arguing about interference management. In this paper, we present the results of a case study meant to answer two questions raised by this prior work: (i) which views of the system engineers should consider when identifying interference and its management; and (ii) whether our argument pattern captures a practical way to argue about interference management.


software partitioning interference software change management safety argument 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Patrick J. Graydon
    • 1
  • Tim P. Kelly
    • 1
  1. 1.University of YorkYorkUK

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