Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Design of Incentive Systems pp 187–200Cite as

Discussion and Outlook

  • Chapter
  • First Online:

  • 2026 Accesses

Part of the book series: Contributions to Management Science ((MANAGEMENT SC.))

Abstract

The findings presented in the previous part are summarized in the following and will be discussed according to three dimensions: in what way the findings are in line with the three objectives presented in the introduction; which are the implications that can be drawn for management practice; and which are the limitations of the findings leading to future research possibilities?

The important thing is not to stop questioning.

Curiosity has its own reason for existing.

Albert Einstein (1879 Ulm −1955 Princeton)

Cited in Miller (1955), p. 64

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Cf. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), p. 794

  2. 2.

    Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), p. 791.

  3. 3.

    Cf. Lazear (2000), pp. 1353, 1359.

  4. 4.

    Cf. Chiappori and Salanié (2003); Lazear (2004), p. 21; Eriksson and Villeval (2008).

  5. 5.

    Cf. Eriksson et al. (2009), p. 544.

  6. 6.

    Cf. Mawhinney (1979), pp. 41ff.; Frey (1997), pp. 20 ff.; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997), pp. 746 ff.

  7. 7.

    Cf. Spector (1982), p. 486; Ammon (2006), p. 106.

  8. 8.

    Cf. Bonner and Sprinkle (2002), p. 313.

  9. 9.

    Cf. Atkinson (1957); Lee et al. (1997), p. 557; Beckmann and Heckhausen (2006), p. 171.

  10. 10.

    Schneider (1987), p. 437.

  11. 11.

    Schneider (1987), p. 440.

  12. 12.

    Cf. Nastansky and Lanz (2010), pp. 39ff.

  13. 13.

    Cf. Nastansky and Lanz (2010), p. 38.

  14. 14.

    The influence of intrinsic motivation on productivity improvement effects of incentives have been slightly supported by the findings concerning interest as a factor of current motivation (Cf. Hypothesis 13).

  15. 15.

    Cf. Vecchio (1982).

  16. 16.

    Cf. Lazear (2004), p. 21.

  17. 17.

    Anxiety in terms of an affective state is conceivable to be a determinant of selection behavior as well. However, as it is measured after contract selection, it cannot be utilized as determinant of contract selection. This shows that the list presented in Fig. 7.1 is far from being a comprehensive list of influence factors of the incentive and sorting effects, but rather is a result of the research design, the research gaps identified as well as the hypotheses stated.

  18. 18.

    Cf. Spector (1982), p. 486; Ammon (2006), p. 106.

  19. 19.

    A related issue is brought forward by Eriksson et al. (2009), p. 544.

  20. 20.

    Cf. Kück (1991), p. 1087.

  21. 21.

    Cf. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), p. 791.

  22. 22.

    Schneider (1987), p. 440.

  23. 23.

    Cf. Schneider (1987), p. 440.

  24. 24.

    Cf. Küpper (2008), pp. 28 ff., 46; Horváth (2009), p. 64.

  25. 25.

    Cf. Horváth (2009), p. 102.

  26. 26.

    Cf. Schneider (1987), p. 440.

  27. 27.

    Cf. Horváth (2009), pp. 105 f.

  28. 28.

    Cf. Schneider (1987), p. 440.

  29. 29.

    This relationship should be tested empirically.

  30. 30.

    Cf. Horváth (2009), pp. 169, 200ff., 214ff.

  31. 31.

    Cf. Malmi and Brown (2008), pp. 291, 295; Küpper (2008), pp. 360, 362; Horváth (2009), pp. 20f.

  32. 32.

    Cf. Lee et al. (1997); Bonner (2008), pp. 220 ff.

  33. 33.

    Cf. Shields and Waller (1988).

  34. 34.

    Cf. Burks et al. (2009), p. 467.

  35. 35.

    Cf. Küpper (2008), pp. 28 ff., 46; Horváth (2009), p. 64.

  36. 36.

    Cf. Dohmen and Falk (2006), p. 3; Burks et al. (2009).

  37. 37.

    Cf. Knowles and Saxberg (1967), p. 22; Diamond (2005), pp. 322–362.

  38. 38.

    Hume (2007), p. 186.

References

  • Ammon S (2006) Commitment, Leistungsmotivation, Kontrollüberzeugung und erlebter Tätigkeitsspielraum von Beschäftigten. in Unternehmen und Behörden im Vergleich, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Atkinson JW (1957) Motivational determinants of risk-taking behavior. Psychol Rev 64:359–372

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beckmann J, Heckhausen H (2006) Motivation durch erwartung und anreiz. In: Heckhausen J, Heckhausen H (eds) Motivation und handeln. Springer, Heidelberg, pp 105–142

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Bonner SE (2008) Judgment and decision making in accounting. Pearson/Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River

    Google Scholar 

  • Bonner SE, Sprinkle GB (2002) The effects of monetary incentives on effort and task performance: theories, evidence and a framework for research. Account Org Soc 27(4–5):303–345

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Burks S, Carpenter J, Goette L (2009) Performance pay and worker cooperation: evidence from an artefactual field experiment. J Econ Behav Org 70:458–469

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chiappori J-C, Salanié B (2003) Advances in economics and econometrics. testing contract theory: a survey of some recent work. In: Dewatripont M, Hansen LP, Turnovsky SJ (eds) Advances in economics and econometrics. theory and applications; eighth world congress. Cambridge University Press (Econometric Society monographs, No. 35), Cambridge, pp 115–149

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Diamond J (2005) Arm und reich: Die Schicksale menschlicher Gesellschaften. Frankfurt am Main

    Google Scholar 

  • Dohmen T, Falk A (2006) Performance pay and multi-dimensional sorting: productivity, preferences and gender. Working paper: IZA discussion paper, Bonn

    Google Scholar 

  • Eriksson T, Villeval MC (2008) Performance-pay, sorting and social motivation. J Econ Behav Organ 68(2):412–421

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eriksson TO, Teyssier S, Villeval M (2009) Self-selection and the efficieny of tournaments. Econ Inq 47(3):530–548

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frey BS (1997) Markt und Motivation: Wie ökonomische Anreize die (Arbeits-) Moral verdrängen. München

    Google Scholar 

  • Frey BS, Oberholzer-Gee F (1997) The cost of price incentives: an empirical analysis of motivation crowding-out. Am Econ Rev 87(4):746–755

    Google Scholar 

  • Gneezy U, Rustichini A (2000) Pay enough or don’t pay at all. Q J Econ 115(3):791–810

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Horváth P (2009) Controlling, 11. ed. München

    Google Scholar 

  • Hume D (2007) A treatise of human nature: edited by Norton, D.F. and Beauchamp, T.L. Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Knowles HP, Saxberg BO (1967) Human relations and the nature of man. Harv Bus Rev 45(2):22–36

    Google Scholar 

  • Kück M (1991) Möglichkeiten und probleme der anreizgestaltung in selbstverwalteten betrieben. In: Schanz G (ed) Handbuch anreizsysteme. Poeschel, Stuttgart, pp 1083–1098

    Google Scholar 

  • Küpper H.-U (2008) Controlling: Konzeption, Aufgaben, Instrumente, 5. ed. Stuttgart

    Google Scholar 

  • Lazear EP (2000) Performance pay and productivity. Am Econ Rev 90(5):1346–1361

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lazear EP (2004) Output-based pay: incentives, retention or sorting. In: Polachek SW (ed) Accounting for worker well-being. Elsevier JAI (Research in labor economics, 23), Amsterdam, pp 1–25

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Lee TW, Locke EA, Phan SH (1997) Explaining the assigned goal-incentive interaction: the role of self-efficacy and personal goals. J Manage 23(4):541–559

    Google Scholar 

  • Malmi T, Brown DA (2008) Management control systems as a package – opportunities, challenges and research directions. Manage Account Res 19(4):287–300

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mawhinney TC (1979) Intrinsic × extrinsic work motivation: perspectives from behaviorism. Organ Behav Hum Perform 24(3):411–440

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nastansky A, Lanz R (2010) Vergütungsanreize für nachhaltige Erfolge. Personalführung 43(5):38–46

    Google Scholar 

  • Schneider B (1987) The people make the place. Pers Psychol 40(3):437–453

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shields MD, Waller WS (1988) A behavioral study of accounting variables in performance – incentive contracts. Account Organ Soc 13(6):581–594

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Spector PE (1982) Behavior in organizations as a function of employee’s locus of control. Psychol Bull 81(3):482–497

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vecchio RP (1982) The contingent-noncontingent compensation controversy: an attempt at a resolution. Hum Relat 35:449–462

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Business Administration, Universität Stuttgart, Stuttgart, Germany

    Dennis D. Fehrenbacher

Authors
  1. Dennis D. Fehrenbacher
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Fehrenbacher, D.D. (2013). Discussion and Outlook. In: Design of Incentive Systems. Contributions to Management Science. Physica, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33599-0_7

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation