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The Security Impact of a New Cryptographic Library

  • Daniel J. Bernstein
  • Tanja Lange
  • Peter Schwabe
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7533)

Abstract

This paper introduces a new cryptographic library, NaCl, and explains how the design and implementation of the library avoid various types of cryptographic disasters suffered by previous cryptographic libraries such as OpenSSL. Specifically, this paper analyzes the security impact of the following NaCl features: no data flow from secrets to load addresses; no data flow from secrets to branch conditions; no padding oracles; centralizing randomness; avoiding unnecessary randomness; extremely high speed; and cryptographic primitives chosen conservatively in light of the cryptanalytic literature.

Keywords

confidentiality integrity simplicity speed security 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Daniel J. Bernstein
    • 1
  • Tanja Lange
    • 2
  • Peter Schwabe
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of Illinois at ChicagoChicagoUSA
  2. 2.Department of Mathematics and Computer ScienceTechnische Universiteit EindhovenEindhovenThe Netherlands
  3. 3.Research Center for Information Technology Innovation and Institute of Information ScienceAcademia SinicaTaipeiTaiwan

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