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Conclusions

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Decoding Complexity

Part of the book series: Springer Theses ((Springer Theses))

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Abstract

The ensuing global financial, economic and sovereign debt crisis makes one thing quite obvious: the understanding of market mechanisms and of the stability of economies is incomplete.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Fama (1970).

  2. 2.

    See Appendix A.1.3.

  3. 3.

    See Sect. 1.1.

  4. 4.

    Our new model also considers shareholder coalitions.

  5. 5.

    From the blog post “OBVIOUS tag, where are you?”: http://josh.sg/2009/02/obvious_tag_where_are_you_1.html.

  6. 6.

    Often only Fidelity is analyzed in the literature.

  7. 7.

    http://theorie.physik.uni-wuerzburg.de/~reichardt/.

  8. 8.

    http://www.stanford.edu/~jacksonm/.

  9. 9.

    And its Competition Committee, see http://www.oecd.org.

  10. 10.

    I.e., by considering the direction and weights of links next to assigning non-topological state variables to the nodes, see Sect. 1.1.1.

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Glattfelder, J.B. (2013). Conclusions. In: Decoding Complexity. Springer Theses. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33424-5_6

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