Abstract
The ensuing global financial, economic and sovereign debt crisis makes one thing quite obvious: the understanding of market mechanisms and of the stability of economies is incomplete.
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Notes
- 1.
See Fama (1970).
- 2.
See Appendix A.1.3.
- 3.
See Sect. 1.1.
- 4.
Our new model also considers shareholder coalitions.
- 5.
From the blog post “OBVIOUS tag, where are you?”: http://josh.sg/2009/02/obvious_tag_where_are_you_1.html.
- 6.
Often only Fidelity is analyzed in the literature.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
And its Competition Committee, see http://www.oecd.org.
- 10.
I.e., by considering the direction and weights of links next to assigning non-topological state variables to the nodes, see Sect. 1.1.1.
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Glattfelder, J.B. (2013). Conclusions. In: Decoding Complexity. Springer Theses. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33424-5_6
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