Abstract
Despite the separation of state powers and the safety valves embedded in constitutions to prevent the concentration and abuse of power, and despite the victory of ideas expounding the advantages of an open society with a free market economy, there is no indication that political leaders and political parties will renounce soon the rewards they extract through big governments. Hence, if progress is to be achieved, democracies are in need of revolutionary institutional reforms that will enable citizens to reclaim their sovereign rights and control. Here, we explain why the transition to digital direct democracy (DDD) offers a promising and viable solution to the problems of representative democracy and how in this event the state might attempt to tackle issues with respect to the welfare of citizens in need and the equality of opportunities.
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- 1.
This is perhaps the mildest characterisation of the usurpation of peoples’ power in representative democracies. A stricter one would be that today the people barely have any power, since it is exercised essentially by the political parties, by centres that control the means of individual and mass information and by organised interest groups.
- 2.
Analysing the tendency of the political systems in representative democracies to become autonomous and escape from the control of citizens, Hayek (1973) proposed the adoption of constitutional limits so that each new government would not be able to use its majority to introduce laws that are injurious to society.
- 3.
As Barber (2003, xiii) has pointed out:
…But there is evidence that the party system is breaking down or breaking up, and that representative democracy may be being replaced by dangerous new variants of neodemocracy: the politics of special interests, the politics of neopopulist fascism, the politics of image (via television and advertising), or the politics of mass society.
- 4.
In the meantime, by promoting research and by enriching the relevant bibliography, movements in favour of referenda and direct democracy have made considerable progress in terms of organisation. For example, the Democracy Foundation of Korea and the European Institute of Initiatives and Referenda of Germany organised in Seoul the conference 2009 Global Forum on Modern Direct Democracy, in which more than 50 participants from all continents spoke and made presentations.
- 5.
On the contrary, Barber (2003) is very pessimistic regarding the developments in this direction. In his view, the Internet has been commercialised to such an extent that it is no longer suitable for political or democratic action. Our opinion is that the medium’s potential in this respect is only just becoming apparent and technology will once again prove a very potent catalyst.
- 6.
According to Ober (2008), this was actually the case in Athenian democracy.
- 7.
Dal Bó et al. (2008) come to the same conclusion with the help of experimental analysis using a game theoretic approach.
- 8.
According to Dahl (1989, 113, 143), DDD may function effectively because it meets the following conditions: (a) it ensures sufficient participation by individuals who express their preferences under conditions of equality in the opportunity to participate; (b) the preferences of the voters are taken into consideration (equality of the vote); (c) the voters have all required information regarding the consequences upon themselves of the decisions they are called to make; and (d) the voters are aware of the alternative policies that are being proposed by the government or other public authority.
- 9.
Levy (1989, 2002) evaluated the use of lottery as a supplementary mechanism in the election of public officials having specific qualifications and found that it offers significant advantages in collective decision-making. Additionally, as shown by studies such as Dowlen (2008), the use of lottery has been adopted with satisfactory results in jury selection, and there are proposals to extend its use to the selection of individuals that make decisions on behalf of the public, and their positions do not require specialised knowledge or information.
- 10.
Computer experts suggest that it would be farfetched to expect all security issues to be addressed while electronic voting remains practical and functional. They do believe, however, that an electronic system that is at least as secure as the existing voting systems will be feasible soon.
- 11.
This trend was identified also in the study by OECD (2003). The authors discuss problems that will need to be solved and specific procedures that will have to be adopted for extensive and effective implementation of electronic participation in public governance.
- 12.
Undeniably, despite its weaknesses (dissemination of wrong information, negative influences, etc.), the Internet has probably been more influential than any other technological achievement in the liberation of the individual with regard to knowledge, information and creativity.
- 13.
Direct democracy is especially widespread in Switzerland (in the period 1945–1988, 311 referenda took place), while it is applied much less in Italy (1945–1988, 47 referenda), in New Zealand (1945–1988, 26 referenda), in Australia (1945–1988, 24) and in Ireland (1945–1988, 21) (Schmidt, 2000, 403). Conversely, in Greece, it has been rarely applied since, according to Tridimas (2010), in the period 1945–1988 only 4 referenda took place, most of which involved issues of the state. With reference to applications of direct democracy on various issues and at the state level in the USA, Matsusaka (2004, 2005) found that (a) the trend towards direct democracy is continually growing and (b) the positive effects that accompany this trend far outweigh the negative, especially in regard to tax reduction and the more efficient use of public funds.
- 14.
For example, Hague and Loader (1999) report that many of the technological weaknesses that existed over a decade ago regarding the smooth and effective functioning of digital democracy have been resolved by now, while the familiarisation of the public with Internet has covered to a large extent the gap between generations in information access.
- 15.
It is understood that our reference to the state includes the public authorities at the provincial, regional and local levels.
- 16.
For a more detailed account of the thoughts that follow, including a summary of the relevant bibliography, see Bitros (1992).
- 17.
State support for the disadvantaged must extend also to their children. Otherwise, as argued by Drakopoulos et al. (2011), these children will probably develop many health problems in the future.
- 18.
We say “at least” because the benefits that will arise in terms of increased personal liberties, the taming of corruption and the strengthening of entrepreneurship, are very great.
- 19.
According to Barr (1992), to meet the above objectives, some countries transferred various functions of the state either to markets or to independent institutions. For example, in 1993–1994 New Zealand introduced some of the most advanced reforms by reducing the role of the state through privatisation and deregulation. The results were numerous as well as positive. The GDP increased; public debt, inflation and unemployment declined; the effectiveness of the public sector improved; the privatisation of telecommunications was very effective and the abolition of state subsidies rendered its agricultural sector one of the most competitive in the world. The report by Evans et al. (1996) about the range and the results of these reforms is very illuminating.
- 20.
- 21.
Welfare aid should be granted only to those in need after first determining if their need is real and gauging what effects might have, because there are cases in the bibliography where aid over the long term worsened rather than ameliorated the situation. For example, in a recent study by Morgan (2007) in the United Kingdom, the subsidy for single-parent families was found not only to be unfair to two-parent families, who were penalised through taxation for the failings of others, but also motivated fraud (e.g. couples separated in order to obtain the subsidies). In other words, financial aid from the state to families can cause their break up as well as promote irresponsible behaviour by parents.
- 22.
These inequalities do not include factors such as individual intelligence, personal desires or even pressures from the family and the social environment. Otherwise, we would have a society of robots, like the one described by Orwell (1949), which is a far cry from the democracy we are examining.
- 23.
Griffith et al. (2007) found that the reduction in state intervention and regulation, which took effect in the 1990s in various economic sectors in many European countries, increased competition and employment as well as in real wages and salaries. In other words, liberalisation led to a reduction in socio-economic inequality.
- 24.
It is not by chance that world-renowned thinkers, such as Sen (1999), stress that the level of a society’s development shows to what extent the lack of freedom by individuals has been eased, especially in terms of those freedoms associated with the realisation of one’s potential.
- 25.
For a detailed discussion of the arguments in favour of subsidising such research activities, see the bibliography which has accumulated spectacularly since Arrow (1962).
- 26.
With respect to this last proposition, it is worth noting that insurance markets are evolving constantly in the sense that they offer coverage for more and more risks. Hence, it goes without saying that in the new welfare state, the government will revoke aid for any risk for which insurance markets introduce coverage at a reasonable premium.
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Bitros, G.C., Karayiannis, A.D. (2013). Democracy in the Future and the New Welfare State. In: Creative Crisis in Democracy and Economy. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33421-4_8
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