Skip to main content

Democracy, Free Market Economy and European Unification

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
  • 565 Accesses

Abstract

After a short digression to refresh memories regarding past attempts at European unification, we turn on the process of integration in the post-war period, emphasising the goals that were pursued in each phase and the ways and means that were adopted for this purpose. In particular, we assess the factors that contributed to the take-off of the economic integration of Europe; we review the results that were achieved in its first three stages, namely those of the customs union, the economic union and the monetary union; and finally, we look into the developments in the forefront of the political integration and explain the reasons why we believe that, despite the delays and difficulties, despite the present economic turmoil, eventually the European unification experiment, which started back in 1957, will prove successful in this century.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Of the 12 countries which were added during the latest enlargement, Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia entered in 2004, whereas Bulgaria and Romania entered in 2007.

  2. 2.

    For example, according to Aldcroft (2001, 270), the bureaucracy in the EEC in 1982 produced 80 million forms of documents.

  3. 3.

    Berend (2006, 193–194, 199) points out that the initiative in 1948 of certain European countries, e.g. France, Italy and Netherlands, to discuss the possibility of forming a customs union was also promoted by the Marshall Plan. As the data compiled by Eichengreen and Uzan (1992) show, the economic benefits of the Marshall Plan for Western countries were not only investment and imports, but mainly political and monetary stability, as well as liberalisation from the strong interventionist practices during the war years.

  4. 4.

    Shortly after the end of the war there appeared various spontaneous initiatives for the unification of European countries. Noteworthy among them is the establishment in 1948 of Benelux, i.e. of a customs union comprising Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, whereas intensely was debated also the economic cooperation among the Nordic countries (Berend 2006, 197–198).

  5. 5.

    Haberler (1949) had already emphasised that there could be no economic unification of Europe if it did not rely on the operation of a free market economy with little government intervention.

  6. 6.

    These issues attracted the attention of economists from the time when Viner (1950) showed that a customs union would affect member-states both positively and negatively. In particular, on the positive side, it would increase trade and trade due to tariff elimination, but on the negative side it would increase imports of raw materials and goods from the member-states, which may not be the cheapest available. A few years later, Meade (1955) established that the benefits for member-states of a customs union would increase not only from trade and production but also from the convergence in consumption patterns, which in turn would enhance economies of scale. Adding to these results from an empirical point of view, Lipsey (1970) found that the disadvantages alluded to by Viner (1950), due to imports of raw materials and goods from member-states at higher prices than from non-member-states, are much smaller than the advantages because of the economies of scale achieved in the customs union. Finally, it is worth mentioning that Scitovsky (1956) showed that the benefits of economic integration are much higher than those of a customs union, because the former increases competition among member-states.

  7. 7.

    This goal left almost no other choice, because the General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in Uruguay in 1986 reduced custom duties among the participating countries in many sectors, including agriculture, thereby reducing the competitiveness of countries with relatively high taxes and wages.

  8. 8.

    Certain European countries attempted also to set up monetary unions in the past. For example, in 1834 a group of them created the Zollverein monetary union, which in turn led to the political union of small states making up Germany. Sometime in the period 1861–1920 some other countries founded the so-called Latin Union, which dissolved very quickly; and in the twentieth century the Scandinavian countries established a monetary union, which lasted until 1924.

  9. 9.

    This situation led even socialist governments with a long tradition in the maintenance of large welfare states to renege on their promises. An example in this regard is Sweden where the government that won the elections in 1994 on the promise to extend the welfare benefits was forced to backtrack (Torbiörn 2003, 118).

  10. 10.

    For the analysis that follows we relied primarily on the publications of de Grauwe (1992) and Eichengreen (2007b).

  11. 11.

    Clearly, the complete liberalisation of capital movements raised the issue of the conditions that ought to be met in order to be compatible with the objective of exchange rate stability within the EMS.

  12. 12.

    For example, the negative outcome, albeit by a narrow majority (50.7 %), of the Danish referendum held on June 2, 1992, for the ratification of the treaty, sparked great controversy.

  13. 13.

    In a monetary union the cost of losing the possibility of an independent monetary policy increases if the following differences among member states prevail: (a) there is no full labour mobility and the wages and prices are not sufficiently flexible; (b) the member-states have different levels of prices and unemployment, i.e. they have different Phillips curves, which would imply that a member-state prefers higher prices and less unemployment than another member-state and (c) a member-state has a high inflation rate, so that issuing bonds instead of printing new money forces it to absorb the interest on bonds.

  14. 14.

    For the nature of this state intervention in labour markets and its role in the emergence of the European welfare state, as well as the degree to which it was adopted by the various member states, see Berend (2006, 194–195, 213–222).

  15. 15.

    According to the analysis by Alesina et al. (2010), the loss by member-states of the ability to depreciate their currencies so as to shield their non-competitive industries from international competition, led to the latters’ demise, whereas at the same time it put pressure on all other industries to find ways to increase their competitiveness. Both these trends boosted competitiveness in the EU.

  16. 16.

    Using various measurement techniques, Frankel (2010) found that in the period 2002–2006 trade among Eurozone member-states increased by 15 %, an increase that was less than the one predicted by other researchers. However, it was an important development because it showed that monetary integration was a process with great prospects for economic growth.

  17. 17.

    For relevant data, see Buti and Giudice (2007), whereas for information regarding the countries that belonged to the former Soviet bloc, see Roje and Ferjancic (2009, 15, 40–41).

  18. 18.

    Southern European countries made an effort initially to abide by the Maastricht criteria, but subsequently their fiscal policies got loose and started to pile up public deficits and debts at alarming rates.

  19. 19.

    In 1987 the community spent 19 % of the EU budget for this purpose, while in 1999 the respective figure rose to 35 %.

  20. 20.

    The data cited above come from Eichengreen (2007b, 346, 377). According to the findings of the empirical research by Fingleton and McCombie (1998), market liberalisation, mainly of industrial products, enabled businesses in many regions of the EU during the period 1979–1989 to achieve economies of scale and greater economic convergence.

  21. 21.

    As principal sources of information for the comparisons mentioned below we used the studies by Fonseca et al. (2001), Blanchard (2004), Baily and Kirkegaard (2004), Alesina and Giavazzi (2006) and Eichengreen (2007b).

  22. 22.

    The problems that may arise from the introduction of fiscal policies at the EU level are discussed in Alves and Afonso (2008).

  23. 23.

    The treaties and the agreements establishing these principles at the EU level are presented in considerable detail by Manners (2008).

  24. 24.

    A detailed account of the efforts by European authorities in these fronts is presented in the book by Balzacq and Carrera (2006).

  25. 25.

    The various European treaties which establish the rights of European citizens are presented and analysed in Wiener (2007).

  26. 26.

    Gillingham (2006) argues that certain weaknesses of the EU, such as the rejection of the European constitution, emanated largely from the fact that European citizens voted unaware of its importance and even worse because they were not represented in some way in the European institutions that decided in this respect.

  27. 27.

    Recent studies included in the book by Trechsel and Mendez (2005) highlight the great possibilities that exist in the direct electronic voting by all European citizens for their representatives in European Parliament and in other relevant EU bodies.

  28. 28.

    In this regard it is importance to note that, according to the Eurobarometer (2010, 11–12, 16), seven out of ten European citizens believe that the current EU crisis can be overcome only through a common economic policy, whereas eight out of ten believe that the EU must take a leading role in the regulation of international financial markets.

References

  • Aiginger K, Landesmann M (2008) Longer-term competitiveness of the wider Europe. In: Eichengreen B, Landesmann M, Stiefel D (eds) The European economy in an American mirror. Routledge, London, pp 62–103

    Google Scholar 

  • Aldcroft D (2001) The European economy 1914–2000, 4th edn. Routledge, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Alesina A, Giavazzi F (2006) The future of Europe: reform or decline. MIT, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Alesina Α, Ardagna S, Galasso V (2010) The euro and structural reforms. In: Alesina A, Giavazzi F (eds) Europe and the euro. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp 57–93

    Google Scholar 

  • Alves RH, Afonso O (2008) Fiscal Federalism in the European Union: how far are we? In: Ferreiro J, Fontana G, Serrano F (eds) Fiscal policy in the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp 6–24

    Google Scholar 

  • Baily MN, Kirkegaard JF (2004) A transformation of the European economy. Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC

    Google Scholar 

  • Balassa B (1975) Trade creation and diversion in the European common market. In: Balassa B (ed) European economic integration, Amsterdam: North Holland, 79–118

    Google Scholar 

  • Balzacq T, Carrera S (eds) (2006) Security versus freedom? A challenge for Europe’s future. Ashgate, Aldershot

    Google Scholar 

  • Berend I (2006) An economic history of twentieth-century Europe: economic regimes from Laissez-Faire to globalization. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Bernholz P (2004) Indebtedness and deficits of the nations of the European Union. In: Eusepi G, Schneider F (eds) Changing institutions in the European Union: a public choice perspective. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, pp 28–43

    Google Scholar 

  • Blanchard O (2004) The economic future of Europe. J Econ Perspect 18(4):3–26

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brecht A (1942) European federation: the democratic alternative. Harv Law Rev 55(4):561–594

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buti M, Giudice G (2007) Maastricht’s Fiscal rules at ten: an assessment. In: Paganetto L (ed) The political economy of the European constitution. Ashgate Publishing Limited, Aldershot, pp 23–48

    Google Scholar 

  • Cameron F (2004) Europe’s future. In: Cameron F (ed) The future of Europe: integration and enlargement. Routledge, London, pp 149–161

    Google Scholar 

  • de Grauwe P (1992) The economics of monetary integration. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Eichengreen B (2007b) The European economy since 1945. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ

    Google Scholar 

  • Eichengreen B, Uzan M (1992) The Marshall Plan: economic effects and implications for Eastern Europe and the former USSR. Econ Pol 7(14):13–75

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eichengreen B, Vasquez P (2000) Institutions and economic growth in postwar Europe: evidence and conjectures. In: van Ark B, Kuipers S, Kuper G (eds) Productivity, technology and economic growth. Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp 91–129

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Eurobarometer (2010) Brussels: TNS opinion & social

    Google Scholar 

  • Ferreiro J, Garcνa-del-Valle MT, Gomez C (2008) Fiscal adjustment and composition of public expenditures in the EMU. In: Ferreiro J, Fontana G, Serrano F (eds) Fiscal policy in the European union. Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp 84–108

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Fingleton B, McCombie JSL (1998) Increasing returns and economic growth: some evidence for manufacturing from the European Union regions. Oxford Econ Papers 50:89–105

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fonseca Ρ, Lopez-Garcia P, Pissarides CA (2001) Entrepreneurship, start-up costs and employment. Eur Econ Rev 45:692–705

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fontana B (2002) The Napoleonic empire and the Europe of nations. In: Pagden Α (ed) The idea of Europe: from antiquity to the European Union. Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 116–128

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Frankel J (2010) The estimated trade effects of the Euro: why are they below those from historical monetary unions among smaller countries? In: Alesina A, Giavazzi F (eds) Europe and the euro. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp 169–212

    Google Scholar 

  • Gillingham J (2006) Design for a new Europe. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Haberler G (1949) Economic aspects of a European union. World Polit 1(4):431–441

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Healey N (1995) From the treaty of Rome to Maastricht. In: Healey N (ed) The economics of the new Europe: from community to union. Routledge, London, pp 1–41

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Hitler A (1925-6) Mein Kampf. [English translation J. Murphy, 1939, Hurst and Blackett Ltd, London 2005]

    Google Scholar 

  • Hooghe L, Marks G (2004) Does identity or economic rationality: drive public opinion on European integration? Polit Sci Polit 37:415–420

    Google Scholar 

  • Humes JC (1994) The wit and wisdom of Winston Churchill. Harper Collins e-books, New York, 2007

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaiser W (2007) Christian democracy and the origins of European union. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kammas P, Philippopoulos A (2010) The role of international public goods in tax cooperation. CESifo Econ Stud 56(2):278–299

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan RD (2010) “East is east, and west is west. International Herald Tribune

    Google Scholar 

  • Karayiannis AD (1996) Entrepreneurial pluralism and cultural diversity. In: Bekemans L, Picht R (eds) European societies between diversity and convergence, Τομ. II, Brussels: European Interuniversity Press, Brussels, 189–203

    Google Scholar 

  • Karayiannis ΑD (2004) Sir James Steuart on ‘foreign trade’ and policy. Storia del Pensiero Economico 2:87–114

    Google Scholar 

  • Lipsey RG (1970) Theory of customs unions: a general equilibrium analysis. Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Majone G (2006) The common sense of European integration. J Eur Publ Pol 13(5):607–626

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Manners I (2008) The normative ethics of the European Union. Int Affairs 84(1):45–60

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Meade JE (1955) The theory of customs unions. North Holland, Amsterdam

    Google Scholar 

  • Milward A (1984) The reconstruction of western Europe 1945–51, 2nd edn. Routledge, London, 2005

    Google Scholar 

  • Roje M, Ferjancic M (2009) Overview of export performance of ‘New Europe’: Theoretical underpinnings and empirical evidence. In: Winiecki J (ed) Competitiveness of New Europe: papers from the second Lancut economic forum. Routledge, London, pp 15–51

    Google Scholar 

  • Scitovsky T (1956) Economies of scale, competition, and European integration. Am Econ Rev 46(1):71–91

    Google Scholar 

  • Torbiörn KM (2003) Destination Europe: the political and economic growth of a continent. Manchester University Press, Manchester

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Trechsel AH, Mendez F (eds) (2005) The European union and e-voting: addressing the European parliament’s internet voting challenge. Routledge, London

    Google Scholar 

  • van Ark B, Crafts N (1996) Catch-up, convergence and the sources of post-war European growth: introduction and overview. In: van Ark B, Crafts N (eds) Quantitative aspects of post-war European economic growth. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 1–26

    Google Scholar 

  • van Ark B, Smits JP (2008) Technology regimes and productivity growth in Europe and the United States: a comparative and historical perspective. In: Eichengreen B, Landesmann M, Stiefel D (eds) The European economy in an American mirror. Routledge, London, pp 41–61

    Google Scholar 

  • Viner J (1950) The customs union issue. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Warleigh A (2004) European union: the basics. Routledge, London

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Wiener A (2007) European citizenship practice. Paper presented at the European Union Studies Association Tenth Biennial International Conference, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 17–19 May 19

    Google Scholar 

  • Wyplosz C (1997) EMU: why and how it might happen. J Econ Perspect 11(4):3–21

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zahariadis N (2008) State subsidies in the global economy. Palgrave-Macmillan, London

    Book  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Bitros, G.C., Karayiannis, A.D. (2013). Democracy, Free Market Economy and European Unification. In: Creative Crisis in Democracy and Economy. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33421-4_7

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics