Domain-Specific Pseudonymous Signatures for the German Identity Card

  • Jens Bender
  • Özgür Dagdelen
  • Marc Fischlin
  • Dennis Kügler
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7483)


The restricted identification protocol for the new German identity card basically provides a method to use pseudonyms such that they can be linked by individual service providers, but not across different service providers (even not malicious ones). The protocol can be augmented to allow also for signatures under the pseudonyms. In this paper, we thus view —and define— this idea more abstractly as a new cryptographic signature primitive with some form of anonymity, and use the term domain-specific pseudonymous signatures. We then analyze the restricted identification solutions in terms of the formal security requirements.


Signature Scheme Discrete Logarithm Problem Random Oracle Model German Identity Direct Anonymous Attestation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jens Bender
    • 1
  • Özgür Dagdelen
    • 2
  • Marc Fischlin
    • 2
  • Dennis Kügler
    • 1
  1. 1.Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)Germany
  2. 2.Technische Universität DarmstadtGermany

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