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An Empirical Study of Dangerous Behaviors in Firefox Extensions

  • Jiangang Wang
  • Xiaohong Li
  • Xuhui Liu
  • Xinshu Dong
  • Junjie Wang
  • Zhenkai Liang
  • Zhiyong Feng
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7483)

Abstract

Browser extensions provide additional functionality and customization to browsers. To support such functionality, extensions interact with browsers through a set of APIs of different privilege levels. As shown in previous studies, browser extensions are often granted more privileges than necessary. Extensions can directly threaten the host system as well as web applications, or bring in indirect threats to web sessions by injecting contents into web pages. In this paper, we make an empirical study to analyze extension behaviors, especially the behaviors that affect web sessions. We developed a dynamic technique to track the behaviors of injected scripts and analyzed the impact of these scripts. We analyzed the behaviors of 2465 extensions and discussed their security implications. We also proposed a solution to mitigate indirect threats to web sessions.

Keywords

Direct Threat Dangerous Behavior Extension Framework Extension Behavior Password Manager 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jiangang Wang
    • 1
  • Xiaohong Li
    • 1
  • Xuhui Liu
    • 2
  • Xinshu Dong
    • 2
  • Junjie Wang
    • 1
  • Zhenkai Liang
    • 2
  • Zhiyong Feng
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceTianjin UniversityChina
  2. 2.School of ComputingNational University of SingaporeSingapore

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