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Several Weak Bit-Commitments Using Seal-Once Tamper-Evident Devices

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Provable Security (ProvSec 2012)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7496))

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Abstract

Following both theoretical and practical arguments, we construct UC-secure bit-commitment protocols that place their strength on the sender’s side and are built using tamper-evident devices, e.g., a type of distinguishable, sealed envelopes. We show that by using a second formalisation of tamper-evident distinguishable envelopes we can attain better security guarantees, i.e., EUC-security. We show the relations between several flavours of weak bit-commitments, bit-commitments and distinguishable tamper-evident envelopes. We focus, at all points, on the lightweight nature of the underlying mechanisms and on the end-to-end human verifiability.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Lausanne, Switzerland

    Ioana Boureanu & Serge Vaudenay

Authors
  1. Ioana Boureanu
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  2. Serge Vaudenay
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Kyushu University, Institute of Mathematics for Industry, Japan

    Tsuyoshi Takagi

  2. School of Computer Science & Software Engineering, University of Wollongong, Northfields Avenue, 2522, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

    Guilin Wang

  3. University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chendu, China

    Zhiguang Qin

  4. School of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, China

    Shaoquan Jiang

  5. University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, China

    Yong Yu

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Boureanu, I., Vaudenay, S. (2012). Several Weak Bit-Commitments Using Seal-Once Tamper-Evident Devices. In: Takagi, T., Wang, G., Qin, Z., Jiang, S., Yu, Y. (eds) Provable Security. ProvSec 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7496. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33272-2_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33272-2_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-33271-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-33272-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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