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Strongly Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol from Bilinear Groups without Random Oracles

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Provable Security (ProvSec 2012)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7496))

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Abstract

Malicious insider security of authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol addresses the situation that an AKE protocol is secure even with existing dishonest parties established by adversary in corresponding security experiment. In the eCK model, the EstablishParty query is used to model the malicious insider setting. However such strong query is not clearly formalized so far. We show that the proof of possession assumptions for registering public keys are of prime importance to malicious insider security. In contrast to previous schemes, we present an eCK secure protocol in the standard model, without assuming impractical, strong, concurrent zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge of secret keys done to the CA at key registration. The security proof of our scheme is based on standard pairing assumption, collision resistant hash functions, bilinear decision Diffie-Hellman (BDDH) and decision linear Diffie-Hellman (DLIN) assumptions, and pseudo-random functions with pairwise independent random source π PRF [12].

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Horst Görtz Institute for IT Security, Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany

    Zheng Yang & Jörg Schwenk

Authors
  1. Zheng Yang
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  2. Jörg Schwenk
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Kyushu University, Institute of Mathematics for Industry, Japan

    Tsuyoshi Takagi

  2. School of Computer Science & Software Engineering, University of Wollongong, Northfields Avenue, 2522, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

    Guilin Wang

  3. University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chendu, China

    Zhiguang Qin

  4. School of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, China

    Shaoquan Jiang

  5. University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, China

    Yong Yu

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Yang, Z., Schwenk, J. (2012). Strongly Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol from Bilinear Groups without Random Oracles. In: Takagi, T., Wang, G., Qin, Z., Jiang, S., Yu, Y. (eds) Provable Security. ProvSec 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7496. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33272-2_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33272-2_17

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-33271-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-33272-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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