Abstract
The Hawk and Dove game is a well known model from biology for competition over resources between two types of behaviors: aggressive (Hawk) and peaceful (Doves). The game allows to predict whether one of the behaviors will dominate the other or whether we may expect coexistence of both at a long run; in the latter case it allows to predict what fraction of the population will be aggressive and what peaceful. This game is quite relevant to networking, and has been used in the past to predict the outcome of competition between congestion [2] control protocols (both in wireline and in wireless) as well as between power control protocols for wireless communications. In this paper we study new aspects of the game within the framework of flocks of birds, and obtain results that can be useful for network engineering applications as well.
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© 2012 ICST Institute for Computer Science, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
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Altman, E., Gaillard, J., Haddad, M., Wiecek, P. (2012). Dynamic Hawk and Dove Games within Flocks of Birds. In: Hart, E., Timmis, J., Mitchell, P., Nakamo, T., Dabiri, F. (eds) Bio-Inspired Models of Networks, Information, and Computing Systems. BIONETICS 2011. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 103. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32711-7_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32711-7_9
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