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Evolutionary Trajectories of Patents and the Politics of Exclusion in Sub-Saharan Africa

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Patenting of Pharmaceuticals and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa
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Abstract

As I have noted in the preceding chapters, countries in SSA and their citizens have been marginalized in both international and domestic patent polity, respectively. These marginalizations challenge the legitimacy of both the domestic and the international patent regulatory frameworks. They also produce juridical outcomes that fail to recognize different levels of development among nations/regions. In order to substantiate these claims, this chapter investigates the evolutionary trajectories of the concept of patents and tests whether the ‘participation’ of SSA countries in TRIPS negotiations met the basic conditions of the theory of democratic bargaining in global trade relations. Do the undemocratic outcomes, if any, affect the implementation of TRIPS in SSA countries?

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See generally Gervais (2007a) [Gervais, “TRIPS and Development”]; Gold et al (2008).

  2. 2.

    Footer (2003) at 125 [Footer, “Technical Assistance and Trade Law”].

  3. 3.

    Vaver (2002) at 5.

  4. 4.

    Mgbeoji (2006) at 16.

  5. 5.

    Mgbeoji (2006), ibid at 16.

  6. 6.

    Mgbeoji (2006), ibid.

  7. 7.

    Hestermeyer (2007) at 22 [Hestermeyer, Human Rights and the WTO].

  8. 8.

    Mgbeoji (2006), supra note 4 at 16.

  9. 9.

    Penrose (1951) at 2.

  10. 10.

    Mgbeoji (2006), supra note 4 at 27; Merges and Duffy (2002) at 4.

  11. 11.

    Mgbeoji (2006), ibid at 16.

  12. 12.

    Penrose (1951), supra note 9 at 3.

  13. 13.

    Amani (2009) at 41 [Amani, State Agency and the Patenting of Life].

  14. 14.

    See The Clothesworkers of Ipswich Case, 78 ER 147; Statute of Monopolies, 1623.

  15. 15.

    Baxter (1976) at 7.

  16. 16.

    Mgbeoji (2006), supra note 4 at 122.

  17. 17.

    Mgbeoji (2006), ibid at 122.

  18. 18.

    See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v Signature Financial Group, Inc, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed Cir, 1998) cf In Re Bernard L Bilski & Rand A Warsaw (2007-1130) (Serial No. 08/833,892) [as of writing in 2011, this case was on appeal at the US Supreme Court].

  19. 19.

    See Amani (2009), supra note 13 at 58.

  20. 20.

    Mgbeoji (2006), supra note 4 at 30.

  21. 21.

    See Article 28 of the TRIPS Agreement, which provides that a patent shall confer on its owner the exclusive rights to use, make, import, or sell the patented products or processes.

  22. 22.

    Mgbeoji (2006), supra note 4 at 29.

  23. 23.

    See Mgbeoji (2006), ibid at 24.

  24. 24.

    Mgbeoji (2006), ibid at 28.

  25. 25.

    Botoy (2004) at 118.

  26. 26.

    An Act Concerning Monopolies and Dispensations with Penal Laws, and the Forfeiture thereof 1623 (UK) 21 Jac 1, cap 3.

  27. 27.

    See Penrose (1951), supra note 9 at 7.

  28. 28.

    Oguamanam (2008a) at 33; Manteaw (2008–2010) at 114.

  29. 29.

    Mgbeoji (2006), supra note 4 at 37-38.

  30. 30.

    See e.g. Rahmatian (2009) [Rahmatian, “Neo-colonial Aspects of Global IP Protection”]; Hamilton (1996) [TRIPS may become one of the most effective vehicles of western imperialism in history].

  31. 31.

    See Okediji (2003) at 320–341 [Okediji, “The International Relations of IP”] [Historical accounts identify the early fifteenth century as the beginning of European contact and interaction with SSA These interactions continued on several fronts including trade and maritime travels until the nineteenth century when European countries concluded the Paris Convention in 1883 and the Berne Convention in 1886. The IP system became a central part of the commercial relations in and outside Europe. To this end, African countries were brought under the aegis of the international IP system through the agency of colonial rule. The modus operandi of the struggle towards independence also made African countries beneficiaries of standard IP laws; it was as though IP protection was an incidence of statehood itself]; Oguamanam (2008a), supra note 28.

  32. 32.

    Aoki (2007) at 741.

  33. 33.

    See Aoki (2007), ibid at 741.

  34. 34.

    Aoki (2007), ibid at 743.

  35. 35.

    Aoki (2007), ibid at 722, 745–747 [The cotton gin was cutting edge technology in the 1790s which perpetuated the antebellum chattel slavery regime for several decades].

  36. 36.

    Oguamanam (2008b).

  37. 37.

    Oguamanam (2008a), supra note 28 at 33.

  38. 38.

    See Kuruk (1999).

  39. 39.

    Dutfield (2002) at 905.

  40. 40.

    See Draft Report of the World Intellectual property Organization Fact-Finding Missions on Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowledge (Geneva: WIPO, 1998–1999).

  41. 41.

    Mgbeoji (2006), supra note 4 at 23.

  42. 42.

    Mgbeoji (2006), ibid at 29.

  43. 43.

    Mgbeoji (2007) at 263.

  44. 44.

    Mgbeoji (2006), supra note 4 at 38.

  45. 45.

    Mgbeoji (2006), ibid at 29.

  46. 46.

    See Article 1(3), Paris Convention, 1883.

  47. 47.

    See Article 1(4), Paris Convention, 1883.

  48. 48.

    Mgbeoji (2006), supra note 4 at 39.

  49. 49.

    Mgbeoji (2006), ibid at 40.

  50. 50.

    See Articles 13–15 of the Paris Convention, 1883.

  51. 51.

    See Article 20 of the Paris Convention, 1883.

  52. 52.

    See Article 4 to 5bis of the Paris Convention, 1883.

  53. 53.

    See Article 22 of the Paris Convention, 1883.

  54. 54.

    Mgbeoji (2006), supra note 4 at 40.

  55. 55.

    Article 2, Paris Convention, 1883.

  56. 56.

    See Article 4 of the Paris Convention, 1883.

  57. 57.

    Oddi (1987) at 856, 859.

  58. 58.

    Oddi (1987), ibid at 865; According to UNCTAD, 84 % of patents in developing countries are owned by foreigners.

  59. 59.

    Mgbeoji (2006), supra note 4 at 223. Arguably, Mgbeoji’s analogy fails to account for the moratorium granted to developing and LDCs in implementing the TRIPS Agreement. This moratorium is nonetheless threatened by recent bilateral and regional agreements which impose stringent patent regulatory standards on countries in SSA.

  60. 60.

    See Article 5(2) of the Paris Convention. This issue becomes manifest if a state fails to legislate to permit compulsory licensing.

  61. 61.

    Oddi (1987), supra note 57 at 869.

  62. 62.

    La Croix and Liu (2008) at 437.

  63. 63.

    WIPO, “Existence, Scope and Form of Generally Internationally Accepted and Applied Standards/Norms for the Protection of Intellectual Property, WO/INF/29 September 1988, GATT document MTN.GNG/NG11/W/24/Rev1.

  64. 64.

    Mgbeoji (2007), supra note 43 at 266.

  65. 65.

    Oddi (1987), supra note 57 at 854.

  66. 66.

    Croix and Liu (2008), supra note 62 at 438.

  67. 67.

    The Rounds include: 1949 in Geneva, England in 1950–1951, Geneva in: 1955–1956, 1960–1961 (Dillon Round), 1964–1967 (Kennedy Round), 1973–1979 (Tokyo Round), and 1986–1994 (Uruguay Round).

  68. 68.

    Brawley (2005) at 157–158.

  69. 69.

    The promise of the Enlightenment thinking was that human reason was the primary source and legitimacy for authority. This promise turned out to be a ‘myth’, a dysfunction. The promise imposed the political ideals and institutions of the powerful states on less powerful countries, by perpetuating discourse that tends to create and extend domination and dependency. The Enlightenment thinking also fostered the Second World War. For a detailed discussion of the failure of the Enlightenment thinking which took humanity down the barbaric path of Nazism, see Horkheimer and Adorno (1995).

  70. 70.

    Stiglitz (2002) at 282.

  71. 71.

    This is a formal exclusion of developing countries from the GATT requirements in order to shove up the standard of living of their people.

  72. 72.

    Article XVIII of GATT 1947.

  73. 73.

    Stiglitz and Charlton (2005)at 43 [Stiglitz & Charlton, Fair Trade For All].

  74. 74.

    See e.g. Okediji (2003), supra note 31 at 328.

  75. 75.

    Mgbeoji (2006), supra note 4 at 40.

  76. 76.

    Mgbeoji (2006), ibid.

  77. 77.

    See Dreyfuss et al. (2004) at xi.

  78. 78.

    See WIPO, “International Patent System Marks Two Millionth Filing – U.S. Mobile Technology Innovator, Qualcomm, files Landmark Application” PR/2011/687 (2011).

  79. 79.

    Mgbeoji (2006), supra note 4 at 41.

  80. 80.

    See Bronckers (1994).

  81. 81.

    Helfer (2004) at 2; Gervais (2007a), supra note 1 at 13.

  82. 82.

    Weissman (1996).

  83. 83.

    Drahos and Braithwaite (2004) [Drahos & Braithwaite, “Who Owns the Knowledge Economy”].

  84. 84.

    See Rahmatian (2009), supra note 30 at 47–48; Okediji (2003), supra note 31 at 336.

  85. 85.

    See e.g. Dutfield and Suthersanen (2008) at 236; Adusei (2002–2004).

  86. 86.

    Mossinghoff (1987).

  87. 87.

    Mossinghoff (1987), ibid.

  88. 88.

    Mossinghoff (1987), ibid.

  89. 89.

    Mossinghoff (1987), ibid.

  90. 90.

    Hale (2000) at xii.

  91. 91.

    Hale (2000), ibid.

  92. 92.

    Gervais (2007b) at xv.

  93. 93.

    Diamond v Chakrabarty, 447 US 303(1980).

  94. 94.

    See Berg et al. (1994).

  95. 95.

    Diamond v Diehr, 450 US 175 (1981) [granting protection to computer monitoring of a rubber molding process, because of the physical transformation of the rubber ‘into a different state or thing’].

  96. 96.

    See Ex Parte Hibberd, 227 US Patents Quarterly 443 (Board of Appeals and Interferences, 1985).

  97. 97.

    Sell (2003) at 72; ’t Hoen (2009) at 10.

  98. 98.

    Bayh–Dole University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act of 1980, Pub L No. 96–517, 35 USC 200–212. The original intent of this Act was to encourage technology transfer from the federally-funded universities in the US.

  99. 99.

    Heller (2008) at 58.

  100. 100.

    Gold and Trommetter (2007).

  101. 101.

    Belenzon and Schankerman (2009) at 112.

  102. 102.

    Belenzon and Schankerman (2009), ibid at 112.

  103. 103.

    Thursby and Thursby (2008) at 207.

  104. 104.

    This section 301 mechanism is a trade enforcement tool that permits the US to withdraw the benefits trade agreements or impose duties on goods from foreign countries. It also includes entering into new agreements to eliminate the alleged offending action.

  105. 105.

    Hoen (2009), supra note 98 at 11.

  106. 106.

    Sell (2003), supra note 98 at 122–123.

  107. 107.

    See Rahmatian (2009), supra note 30 at 48.

  108. 108.

    See Hoen (2009), supra note 98 at 10; Rahmatian (2009), ibid.

  109. 109.

    Hoen (2009), ibid at 11.

  110. 110.

    See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub L No. 97–164, 96 Stat. 25.

  111. 111.

    Arora et al (2008) at 126.

  112. 112.

    Sell (2003), supra note 98 at 69.

  113. 113.

    Merges (1988) at 806.

  114. 114.

    Maskus (2006) at 13.

  115. 115.

    See Roche Products Inc v Bolar Pharmaceutical Co (733 F 2d 858, Fed Cir, 1984). The effect of this ruling has now been minimized. Presently, generic manufacturers can use such test data before the expiry of the patent for purposes of meeting regulatory requirements for approval of generic medicines in the US after 5 years. See, the US Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, 1984, PuB L No. 98–417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (this Act is also called “Hatch-Waxman Act”).

  116. 116.

    958 F2d 1053, at 1058 (Fed Cir, 1992).

  117. 117.

    Sell (2003), supra note 98 at 67–69.

  118. 118.

    Mgbeoji (2006), supra note 4 at 14.

  119. 119.

    Gold and Gallochat (2007).

  120. 120.

    See EC, Guidelines Proposed by the European Community for the Negotiations on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, GATT DoC MTN.GNG/NG11/W/16.

  121. 121.

    See North American Free Trade Agreement, United States–Canada–Mexico, 17 December 1992, 32 ILM 289.

  122. 122.

    See Matthews and Munoz-Tellez (2006) at 635 [Matthews & Munoz-Tellez, “Bilateral Technical Assistance and TRIPS”].

  123. 123.

    Amani (2009), supra note 13 at 2.

  124. 124.

    Mgbeoji (2007), supra note 43 at 264.

  125. 125.

    US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Electronics and Information (1987) at 230.

  126. 126.

    See Section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies.

  127. 127.

    See Abbott (2005) at 81 [Abbott, “Toward a New Era of Objective Assessment”].

  128. 128.

    Amani (2009), supra note 13 at 13.

  129. 129.

    Landas (1968) at 163.

  130. 130.

    Oguamanam (2008a), supra note 28 at 31.

  131. 131.

    It must be noted at the outset that most of the accounts of the Uruguay trade deliberations are based on anecdotes and claims rather than concrete evidence, as there were no recordings of the oral arguments. The good news is that the credibility of some of the accounts has not been disputed by key players who participated in the Uruguay negotiations. On this point see Anell (2008). Anell chaired the Negotiating Group on TRIPS, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods.

  132. 132.

    Anell (2008), ibid at vii.

  133. 133.

    Sell (2003), supra note 98 at 8.

  134. 134.

    Gold and Lam (2003) at 15.

  135. 135.

    See Das (2005) at 35.

  136. 136.

    Ostergard (2007) at 116.

  137. 137.

    See Harris (2006) at 730 [Harris, “Carrying a Joke Too Far”]; Gervais (2008); Drahos and Braithwaite (2002) [Drahos & Braithwaite, Information Feudalism].

  138. 138.

    This refers to informal inner circle group meetings used by the Quad: the US, EC, Japan, and Canada to seek consensus and finalize decisions that should have been taken in the formal multilateral setting, where less developed countries can contribute. Occasionally, a number of developing countries were invited to join in such consensus seeking endeavours in order to build a seemingly broad coalition and give the decision a semblance of legitimacy.

  139. 139.

    Chimni (2003) at 53.

  140. 140.

    Drahos (2003) at 87 [Drahos, “When the Weak Bargain with the Strong”].

  141. 141.

    See Drahos (2002) at 769 [Drahos, “DC and International IP Standard-Setting”].

  142. 142.

    Drahos and Braithwaite (2004), supra note 84 at 19.

  143. 143.

    See Helfer (2004), supra note 82 at 3.

  144. 144.

    El-Said (2005) at 55 [El-Said, “From TRIPS-minus, to TRIPS, to TRIPS-plus”]; Helfer (2004), ibid at 22.

  145. 145.

    The Tower of Babel offers a metaphorical reminder of what happens when a shared ‘context’ is completely shattered as a result of divergent opinions. This point is taken from See Bartlett (1994) at 2550.

  146. 146.

    Drahos and Braithwaite (2004), supra note 84 at 25.

  147. 147.

    Shukla (1993) at 6.

  148. 148.

    Drahos (2003), supra note 141 at 91.

  149. 149.

    See Gravelle and Whalley (1996).

  150. 150.

    Hoen (2009), supra note 98 at 10.

  151. 151.

    Ogunkola (1999) at 3.

  152. 152.

    See Drahos and Braithwaite (2004), supra note 84 at 28.

  153. 153.

    Footer (2003), supra note 2 at 114.

  154. 154.

    See e.g. Blackhurst et al (2001).

  155. 155.

    Drahos and Braithwaite (2002), supra note 138 at 191. See also Yu (2006) at 375 [less developed countries were ignorant of the extensive nature of the obligations they adopted].

  156. 156.

    Preamble to the TRIPS Agreement.

  157. 157.

    Article 27.1 of TRIPS.

  158. 158.

    See Kwoka (2008–2009) at 655.

  159. 159.

    See Article 27.1 of TRIPS.

  160. 160.

    See Articles 41–43 of TRIPS.

  161. 161.

    These two new deadlines are based on an extension. The initial deadline for developing countries was 1 January 2000, and that of LDCs was 1 January 2006. See Decision by the Council for TRIPS of June 27, 2002, Extension of the Transition Period under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for LDC Members for Certain Obligations with respect to Pharmaceutical Products, WTO Doc IP/C/25, 1 July 2005. Besides, pharmaceuticals, LDCs have until 1 July 2013 to comply with TRIPS. As earlier indicated, the transition periods for developing and LDCs did not affect the national treatment and most favoured nations treatment obligations under Articles 3 and 4 of TRIPS, respectively.

  162. 162.

    Yu (2003) at 135.

  163. 163.

    This single undertaking rule obliges member countries to agree on an entire set of rules that have been multilaterally negotiated as part of the GATT/WTO. This approach was adopted in concluding the Uruguay Round such that the Final Act was presented as a package deal for which no pick and choose policy were permitted. According to Chimni, this single undertaking practice undermines the legitimacy of the Uruguay Round agreements: Chimni (2003), supra note 140 at 53.

  164. 164.

    Hestermeyer (2007), supra note 7 at 74 [mandating members to provide what is called a ‘mailbox’ system for exclusive marketing of pharmaceuticals for five years in consonance with Article 70.8 & 70.9 of TRIPS].

  165. 165.

    Harris (2006), supra note 138 at 727.

  166. 166.

    Stiglitz (2006) at 311.

  167. 167.

    Stiglitz (2006), ibid 105.

  168. 168.

    Stiglitz and Charlton (2005), supra note 73 at 11–46.

  169. 169.

    Idris (2003) at 133; Kitch (1994) at 171 [the incentive to invent and market technologies will only exist if there are patents available to protect innovators in those markets]; Sykes (2002).

  170. 170.

    See generally Kitch (1994), ibid; Sykes (2002), ibid.

  171. 171.

    May (2004) at 822 [May, “Capacity Building”].

  172. 172.

    Arewa at 45.

  173. 173.

    Harris defines a treaty of adhesion as a treaty procured through coercion as a result of unequal bargaining power, resulting in an unfair surprise and grossly unfair burdens for the weaker party. For him, embracing the treaty of adhesion doctrine will provide the WTO a basis for interpreting TRIPS more favorably to developing and least developed countries: see Harris (2006), supra note 138; Harris (2007).

  174. 174.

    See e.g. Harris (2006), ibid.

  175. 175.

    See generally Gravelle and Whalley (1996), supra note 150; Reichman (2000) and Gerhart (2000).

  176. 176.

    See May (2011), Anghie et al. (2003), and Arewa, supra note 173.

  177. 177.

    Agbakwa (2003) at 13; Oguamanam (2011) at 198; Stiglitz (2002), supra note 70 at ix.

  178. 178.

    Fuentes (2004) at 12–14.

  179. 179.

    Drahos and Braithwaite (2002), supra note 138 at 12; See also Finger et al (2001).

  180. 180.

    See Drahos and Braithwaite (2002), ibid at 13, citing Cooter and Ulen (1997).

  181. 181.

    Drahos and Braithwaite (2002), ibid at 13–14.

  182. 182.

    Drahos (2002), supra note 142 at 770; Drahos and Braithwaite (2002), supra note 138 at 14; 190–192.

  183. 183.

    Gervais (2007a), supra note 1 at 10.

  184. 184.

    Gervais (2007a), ibid at 10.

  185. 185.

    Gervais (2007a), ibid.

  186. 186.

    Gerhart (2000), supra note 176 at 368.

  187. 187.

    Lucyk (2007) at 212.

  188. 188.

    Drahos and Braithwaite (2002), supra note 138 at 106–107 [the threat of retaliatory sanctions has attained a machine-like efficiency in the post-TRIPS period].

  189. 189.

    El-Said (2005), supra note 145 at 59–61.

  190. 190.

    For a similar discussion of this point see McGinnis and Somin (2009) at 1778–1779.

  191. 191.

    See e.g. Drahos (2002), supra note 142 at 789; Matthews and Munoz-Tellez (2006), supra note 123.

  192. 192.

    Bacchus (2004). See also Shaffer (2004).

  193. 193.

    See Helfer (2004), supra note 82 at 42.

  194. 194.

    Helfer (2004), ibid at 43.

  195. 195.

    This Resolution of the Wealth Health Assembly is quoted in Helfer (2004), ibid.

  196. 196.

    Paranagua (2009) at 142.

  197. 197.

    Helfer (2004), supra note 82 at 4.

  198. 198.

    Helfer (2004), ibid at 4.

  199. 199.

    Amani (2009), supra note 13 at 153.

  200. 200.

    Helfer (2009) at 43 [Helfer, “Regime Shifting in International IPS”].

  201. 201.

    See the Preambles to the US FTAs with developing countries at: http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements; Smith et al. (2009) at 688.

  202. 202.

    Amani (2009), supra note 13 at 223.

  203. 203.

    Zoellick (2003) at 23.

  204. 204.

    Yu (2009) at 83.

  205. 205.

    Schwab (2006).

  206. 206.

    The US-SACU FTA is not yet concluded. For the EU-ACP EPAs, see the Revised Cotonou Agreement http://eCeuropAeu/development/icenter/repository/second_revision_cotonou_agreement_20100311.pdf.

  207. 207.

    USTR (2002).

  208. 208.

    See “SACU Stills Wants FTA with US that Delays Talks on Investment, IPR”, Inside US Trade, 24 February 2006.

  209. 209.

    Abbott (2005), supra note 128 at 89–90.

  210. 210.

    These Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are available online at: http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements.

  211. 211.

    Morin (2009) at 176.

  212. 212.

    See e.g. Drahos (2001).

  213. 213.

    Mgbeoji (2007), supra note 43 at 280.

  214. 214.

    Abbott (2005), supra note 128 at 100.

  215. 215.

    Helfer (2009), supra note 201 at 43.

  216. 216.

    Amani (2009), supra note 13 at 174–175.

  217. 217.

    Bhagwati and Panagariya (2003).

  218. 218.

    See e.g. Gervais (2002).

  219. 219.

    See Morin (2009), supra note 212 at 186–187.

  220. 220.

    UNCTAD-ICTSD (2005) at 24–25.

  221. 221.

    UNDP (2003) at 221.

  222. 222.

    May (2004), supra note 172 at 822.

  223. 223.

    See Summary of the Information on Technical Cooperation Activities: Secretariat of the WTO TRIPS Council (IP/C/W/22, 26 April, 1996).

  224. 224.

    Matthews and Munoz-Tellez (2006), supra note 123 at 632.

  225. 225.

    Matthews and Munoz-Tellez (2006), ibid at 634.

  226. 226.

    On this point see Drahos (2010).

  227. 227.

    Matthews and Munoz-Tellez (2006), supra note 123 at 635.

  228. 228.

    Matthews and Munoz-Tellez (2006), ibid.

  229. 229.

    Matthews and Munoz-Tellez (2006), ibid at 636.

  230. 230.

    Matthews and Munoz-Tellez (2006), ibid at 639. Admittedly the bulk of Japan’s anti-piracy seminars have focused on copyright law.

  231. 231.

    See Patricia Asero Achieng & 2 Others vs The Attorney General‏ MISC409/09; Suleiman Mbatiah, “Court Victory against ‘Anti-Counterfeit’ Agenda”, online http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=51168; Suleiman Mbatiah, “Agency Unaware of Anti-Counterfeit Law Suspension”, online http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=52015.

  232. 232.

    Matthews and Munoz-Tellez (2006), supra note 123 at 637.

  233. 233.

    Matthews and Munoz-Tellez (2006), ibid at 646–647.

  234. 234.

    See https://www.ip4alLch/en/legal-info/international-cooperation/country-specific-projects/ghanAhtml.

  235. 235.

    One important caveat is that in July 2004, the UK-sponsored capacity building seminar in Kenya and Malawi also focused on the use of TRIPS flexibilities to promote access to medicines.

  236. 236.

    Matthews and Munoz-Tellez (2006), supra note 123 at 637.

  237. 237.

    Matthews and Munoz-Tellez (2006), ibid at 638.

  238. 238.

    Czapanskiy and Manjoo (2008) at 19 [Czapanskiy & Manjoo, “The Right of Public Participation in Law-Making”].

  239. 239.

    See WIPO’s Legal and Technical Assistance to Developing Countries for the Implementation of the TRIPS Agreement from 1 January 1996 to 31 December 2000 (Geneva: WIPO, 2001).

  240. 240.

    A study of the impacts of the WIPO projects on SSA is ongoing under the Open AI.R Project, which is being funded by IDRC Canada and Germany’s BMZ.

  241. 241.

    See Article 3, Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, 1967, 848 UNTS 3.

  242. 242.

    See Joint WTO-WIPO Press Release, 21 July 1998, Press/108, online: www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres98_e/pr108_e.htm.

  243. 243.

    May (2006) at 104, online: http://wwwbath.aCuk/cri/pdf/ecpr_pdf/1_May.pdf.

  244. 244.

    Article 1, Agreement between the UN and the WIPO, 1974, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/agreement/index.html.

  245. 245.

    This conclusion was reached based on the author’s experience from working in Ghana and interactions with IP policy-makers and practitioners in Kenya and Uganda.

  246. 246.

    See May (2004), supra note 172 at 825.

  247. 247.

    May (2004), ibid.

  248. 248.

    Amani (2009), supra note 13 at 6–7.

  249. 249.

    WIPO, “Technical Assistance Database” online at: <http://www.wipo.int/tad/en/>. For instance, WIPO member states have recently approved a project to build a common digital platform which will help streamline the identification of protected musical works across eleven West African countries, including Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo.

  250. 250.

    See e.g. Drahos (2002), supra note 142 at 777.

  251. 251.

    Amani (2009), supra note 13 at 7.

  252. 252.

    Czapanskiy and Manjoo (2008), supra note 239 at 15.

  253. 253.

    Ximena Fuentes (2004), supra note 179 at 13.

  254. 254.

    2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) (SA).

  255. 255.

    The health statutes include: Traditional Health Practitioners Act 35 of 2004 (recognizing and regulating traditional health healers); Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Act 38 of 2004 (making provision for registered nurses, other than midwives, to perform termination of pregnancies at certain public and private facilities); Dental Technicians Amendment Act 24 of 2004 (providing for persons who have been employed as dental laboratory assistants for a period of not less than five years under the supervision of a dentist or dental technician, and who have been trained by these professionals, to perform the work of a dental technician); and the Sterilisation Amendment Act 3 of 2005 (providing for additional information to be considered when contemplating sterilization and others).

  256. 256.

    Since the statutes were, at the time of judgment, in force, the Court’s decision was suspended for 18 months to enable Parliament to re-enact those legislation taking into account the requirements of the Constitution. The remaining two pieces of legislation were held to be duly enacted.

  257. 257.

    UNAIDS (2011).

  258. 258.

    See Fact sheet on settlement agreements. Cape Town, Treatment Action Campaign, (2003) http://www.taCorg.za/newsletter/2003/ns10_12_2003.htm; Avafia et al (2006).

  259. 259.

    Czapanskiy and Manjoo (2008), supra note 239 at 23.

  260. 260.

    See Stiglitz (2002), supra note 70 at x.

  261. 261.

    See “Statement to the media by Pascal Lamy upon taking office on 1 September 2005”, online: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news05_e/dg_lamy_1sept05_e.htm.

  262. 262.

    See Blakeney (2006) at 24.

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Adusei, P. (2013). Evolutionary Trajectories of Patents and the Politics of Exclusion in Sub-Saharan Africa. In: Patenting of Pharmaceuticals and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32515-1_3

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