Strong, Independent, and Effective: The European Union’s Promotion of the International Criminal Court

  • Salla GarskýEmail author
Part of the Global Power Shift book series (GLOBAL)


The European Union has profiled itself as a staunch supporter of the ICC. This chapter provides an overview of the EU’s campaign for the ICC and seeks to explain why and how the EU supports the ICC? I argue that the EU has a special interest in the ICC, because it offers the EU a framework to oppose unilateralist policies of the US. Given that the Bush administration ferociously opposed the ICC, I argue that the EU has engaged in what I call “normative binding” in its global campaign for the ratification of the Rome Statute. Since the EU cannot compete with the US on military terms, an international system based on restrictive norms is important for increasing its power. By drawing the US into a debate over international norms, the EU may be able to build up its soft power by signaling an alternative concept of multilateral order to the rest of the world. Thus, the promotion of international legal institutions has implications for the international system by enabling normative binding. The EU’s policy towards the ICC forms the heart of the paper as I discuss the EU’s role in the establishment and promotion of the ICC and contrast it to the opposing US policy.


United Nations International Criminal Court International Criminal Rome Statute Bush Administration 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Political and Economic StudiesUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland

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