Abstract
Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) is a popular trusted computing protocol for the anonymous authentication designed for TPM or other embedding devices. Many DAA schemes give out detailed cryptographic proof, however, their security properties has not been yet automatically analyzed and verified particularly against the intruder’s or the malicious participant’s attack. It is proposed that a DAA analysis model focusing on the intruder’s attacks in this paper. The analysis method is the good supplements to the DAA cryptographic proof, though the intruder’s capability is not completely assumed. According to DAA protocol status analysis, we find out some attacks like rudolph attack, masquerading attack by using the Murphi tool. At last the paper gives out the reasons for these attacks, and also presents the recommendation solutions against these attacks. From our study, we propose that DAA protocol must be carefully analyzed from the intruder attacking point of view in the DAA system design and implementation.
* This paper is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.91118006 and The Knowledge Innovation Project of Chinese Academy of Science (ISCAS2009-DR14).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Bruschi, D., Cavallaro, L., Lanzi, A., Monga, M.: Replay attack in TCG specification and solution. In: Proceeding of 21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2005), pp. 127–137. IEEE Computer Society (2005)
Chen, L., Ryan, M.D.: Offline dictionary attack on TCG TPM weak authorisation data, and solution. In: Future of Trust in Computing. Vieweg & Teubner (2008)
Chen, L., Ryan, M.: Attack, Solution and Verification for Shared Authorisation Data in TCG TPM. In: Degano, P., Guttman, J.D. (eds.) FAST 2009. LNCS, vol. 5983, pp. 201–216. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
Amerson, H.L.: Automated Analysis of Security APIs. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA (2005)
Delaune, S., Kremer, S., Ryan, M.D., Steel, G.: A Formal Analysis of Authentication in the TPM. In: Degano, P., Etalle, S., Guttman, J. (eds.) FAST 2010. LNCS, vol. 6561, pp. 111–125. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)
Backes, M., Maffei, M., Unruh, D.: Zero-Knowledge in the Applied Pi-calculus and Automated Verification of the Direct Anonymous Attestation Protocol. In: Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP 2008), pp. 202–215. IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC (2008)
Backes, M., Hriţcu, C., Maffei, M.: Type-checking zero-knowledge. In: Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS 2008), pp. 357–370. ACM, New York (2008)
Brickell, E., Camenisch, J., Chen, L.: Direct anonymous attestation. In: Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 132–145 (2004)
Brickell, E., Li, J.: Enhanced privacy id: a direct anonymous attestation scheme with enhanced revocation capabilities. In: Proceedings of the 2007 ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES 2007), pp. 21–30 (2007)
Ge, H., Tate, S.R.: A Direct Anonymous Attestation Scheme for Embedded Devices. In: Okamoto, T., Wang, X. (eds.) PKC 2007. LNCS, vol. 4450, pp. 16–30. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
Feng, D., Xu, J., Chen, X.: A Forward Secure Direct Anonymous Attestation Scheme. In: WSEAS ACC 2009 (2009)
Brickell, E., Chen, L., Li, J.: A New Direct Anonymous Attestation Scheme from Bilinear Maps. In: Lipp, P., Sadeghi, A.-R., Koch, K.-M. (eds.) Trust 2008. LNCS, vol. 4968, pp. 166–178. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Brickell E., Li, J.: Enhanced Privacy ID from Bilinear Pairing. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2009/095 (2009), http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/095.pdf
Rudolph, C.: Covert Identity Information in Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA). In: Venter, H., Eloff, M., Labuschagne, L., Eloff, J., von Solms, R. (eds.) SEC 2007. IFIP, vol. 232, pp. 443–448. Springer, Boston (2007)
Leung, A., Chen, L., Mitchell, C.J.: On a Possible Privacy Flaw in Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA). In: Lipp, P., Sadeghi, A.-R., Koch, K.-M. (eds.) Trust 2008. LNCS, vol. 4968, pp. 179–190. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Qin, Y., Chu, X., Feng, D., Feng, W. (2012). DAA Protocol Analysis and Verification. In: Chen, L., Yung, M., Zhu, L. (eds) Trusted Systems. INTRUST 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7222. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32298-3_21
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32298-3_21
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-32297-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-32298-3
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)