Begging Questions, Their Answers and Basic Cooperativity

  • Nicholas Asher
  • Jason Quinley
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7258)


We consider game-theoretic rationales for minimal cooperativity, in particular responses to questions or requests for help with false answers. Lying enables preservation of property and face for both speaker and hearer and constitutes a Pareto-optimal outcome. Rationales for this behavior include expectations of reciprocity, other-regarding, and maintenance of face.


Public Good Game Discourse Structure Trust Game Direct Answer Walk Away 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nicholas Asher
    • 1
  • Jason Quinley
    • 2
  1. 1.CNRS, Institut de Recherche en Informatique de Toulouse et Université Paul SabatierFrance
  2. 2.University of TübingenGermany

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