Abstract
Inspired by the recent “Battisti case,” the present paper provides a review of some of the main issues concerning extradition. Since the Italian legislation on in absentia proceeding has played an important role in this field, the contribution focuses mainly on the relationship between extradition and political offence. And although the evolution of international sources shows a clear, mature awareness of the part of the international community, which still refuses to qualify as “political crimes” particularly serious acts threatening primary assets such as life, personal safety and freedom, many aspects are still controversial, not least that underlying the “non-discrimination clause,” often accompanied and, to some extent, overlapped with the rules governing the relations between extradition and “political nature” of the offence.
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Notes
- 1.
For a clear, comprehensive examination of the suspected difference in the treatment of a “normal” defendant and an extraditee, particularly with respect to the fundamental right of personal liberty, see Marzaduri (1993).
- 2.
De Francesco (1982), p. 9.
- 3.
- 4.
For a recent, detailed reconstruction of cases involving the PAC, based on the study of the 53 folders stored at the State Archives of Milan, see Turone (2011).
- 5.
For the text of the convention, refer to http://www.giustizia.it/giustizia/it/mg_1_3.wpI.
- 6.
Chambre d’accusation de Paris, Decision No. 28796/1991.
- 7.
For much of the documentation relative to the “Mitterrand doctrine,” refer to http://www.mitterrand.org.
- 8.
Chambre de l’instruction de la Cour d’appel de Paris, Decision of 30 June 2004.
- 9.
Cour de cassation, Decision of 13 October 2004.
- 10.
Conseil d’Etat, Lecture of 18 March 2005 No. 273714—M.B., available at http://www.conseil-etat.fr.
- 11.
Cf., in more detail, below, § 3.
- 12.
Cf. Pisani (2007), p. 26. In more detail, see below, § 3.
- 13.
Under Article 1 of the Treaty, each of the Parties is obliged to extradite, in accordance with the conditions laid down in the Treaty, people in its territory sought by the judicial authority of the other party for the completion of criminal proceedings initiated against them or to enforce a custodial sentence of more than 9 months. Having affirmed the so-called principle of “double jeopardy” under Articles 2, 3 and 5 there are, as we will see in more detail, exceptions to the obligation to extradite.
For the complete text of the treaty, signed in Rome on 17 October 1989 and in force since 1 August 1993, refer to http://www.giustizia.it/giustizia/it/mg_1_3.wp.
- 14.
For the text of the Convention, done at Geneva on 28.7.1951, refer to http://conventions.coe.int/treaty.
- 15.
Brazilian Law 9.474/1997, available at http://www.planalto.gov.br.
- 16.
For the full text of the decision, refer to Referência: Processo nº. 08000.011373/2008-83, available at http://veja.abril.com.br . In more detail, see also below, § 4.
- 17.
See Article 11 Brazilian Law 9.474/1997.
- 18.
Under Article 102 of the Brazilian Constitution, in fact, “compete ao Supremo Tribunal Federal, precipuamente, a guarda da Constituição, cabendo-lhe: […] g) a extradição solicitada por Estado estrangeiro.”.
- 19.
Cf., in more detail, below, § 4.
- 20.
See also, in more detail, below, § 3.
- 21.
STF, Ext. 1.085/Repùblica italiana, rel. Cezar Peluso, 16 December 2009, the full text of which is available at http://www.giurcost.org/casi_scelti.
- 22.
Cf. Opinion No. AGU/AG-17/2010 at http://www.agu.gov.br.
- 23.
Cf. below, § 5.
- 24.
The Court itself, although divided internally, felt it needed to specify that “a decisão de deferimento da extradição não vincula o Presidente da República.”. See STF, Ext. 1.085/Repùblica italiana, rel. Cezar Peluso (footnote 21).
- 25.
Cf. Art. 84 of the Constitution: “Compete privativamente ao Presidente da República: [ … ] VII. manter relações com Estados estrangeiros”.
- 26.
- 27.
Cf., in more detail, below, § 5.
- 28.
President Lula in the meantime had been succeeded by Dilma Rouseff.
- 29.
For the arguments given by the individual judges, see the Court’s own documents: STF concede libertate a Cesare Battisti, Quarta-feira, 08 de junho de 2011, http://www.stf.jus.br.
- 30.
See Vigoni (1992), pp. 5 ff.
- 31.
- 32.
Catelani (1995), pp. 230–231.
- 33.
For the full text of Protocol II, see http://www.coe.int.
- 34.
The first, historic case is ECtHR, 12 February 1985, Colozza v. Italy, Application No. 9024/80. For a perspicuous overview of “European” judgments relating to Italian trial by default, see Quattrocolo (2008b), para. 12.
- 35.
Cf. Chambre d’accusation de Paris Decision No. 28796/1991.
- 36.
Cf. above, § 2.
- 37.
Moreover, the fact that not even the rendition mechanism introduced by the 1988 Italian CPP satisfied the guarantees required by Article 3 Protocol II was soon clear. Thus, after two severe convictions by the European Court (ECtHR, 18 May 2004, Somogyi v. Italy, Application No. 67972/01; 10 November 2004, Sejdovic v. Italy, Application No. 56581/00) and a total ban on extraditions to Italy, of persons convicted in absentia, introduced by Spain, the legislator was forced to intervene with Law Decree 17/2005, subsequently converted into Law 60/2005.
- 38.
ECtHR, 12 December 2006, Battisti v. France, Application No. 28796/05.
- 39.
In the Brazilian developments of the case, in fact, only on two occasions has the conviction “à revelia” been adopted as an argument supporting the “potencial impossibilidade de ampla defesa” of which Battisti was allegedly the victim. The first was in the words of the Minister of Justice, Tarso Genro, in the decision to grant the status of refugee to the Italian fugitive [cf. the Referência: Processo nº. 08000.011373/2008-83, § 43]. The other, by the AGU, emphasized, in a clearly polemical stance, that the Italian Court of Cassation “entendeu que o pleno exercício do contraditório exigido pelo Estado estrangeiro como condição para entrega do extraditando encontra-se perfeitamente realizado con a possibilidade que se daria ao extraditando de requerer revisão do julgado ou desconsideraçao da preclusão.” [Cf. the Opinion AGU/AG-17/2010, para 104].
- 40.
“The fair trial outlined by the judgments of Strasbourg has become a universal model of criminal procedure, attentive to the rights of the defendant, which should be imported into all the national jurisdictions of the member states of the Council of Europe, but also exported to international jurisdictions, such as the Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and on Rwanda or the International Criminal Court.” Such are the effective observations of Mazza (2011), p. 33 and, in a very similar perspective, Maratea (2010), pp. 8–9.
- 41.
See, along these lines, the STF ruling, Ext. 678/ Governo da Itália v. Silvano Bertucelli Brandi, rel. Min. Celso de Mello, DJ 06/09/1996, where it is stated that “a circunstância de haver sido decretada a revelia do acusado por órgão competente do Estado requerente não constitui, por si só, motivo bastante para justificar a recusa de extradição.”
- 42.
It is, moreover, fairly symptomatic that, also within the “common area of justice” that should be represented by the European Union, the lack of a basic unity between the approaches taken by different national legal systems and, above all, the lack of clear definitions and transparent information about the possible grounds for refusing to oppose the request for an arrest warrant, have greatly reduced the effectiveness of the new instrument of rendition, so much so that the EU has adopted Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA to reduce the range of discretion available to the courts to which application is made.
- 43.
- 44.
The French Constitution of 1830 inaugurated the tradition.
Some authors conceive this exception as a “general rule of international law.” Cf. for example Parisi (1993), 65, and the abundant references provided there.
- 45.
- 46.
Padovani (2007), p. 77.
- 47.
Of great interest are the recent reflections of Pellissero (2011), pp. 453 ff.
- 48.
Padovani (2007), p. 77.
- 49.
By way of example see, in more detail, Chiavario (1980), pp. 83 ff.
- 50.
Done at Strasbourg on 27 January 1977 and entered into force on 1 June 1986. For the full text, refer to Barberini and Bellelli (2003), pp. 369 ff.
- 51.
Adopted by the UN General Assembly on 15 December 1997 and entered into force on 23 May 2001. For the full text, refer once again to Barberini and Bellelli (2003), pp. 209 ff.
- 52.
Incidentally, this provision reproduces without modification, and even with the same numbering, that of the previous bilateral agreement of 1983. For the full text of the Treaty currently in force, with effect from 1 February 2010, see http://www.giustizia.it/giustizia/it/mg_1_3.wp.
- 53.
For the full text, refer once more to http://www.giustizia.it/giustizia/it/mg_1_3.wp Replacing the text previously in force between the Parties dating back to 1981, the treaty in question—which has not yet entered into force—remodulates the grounds for “obligatory” refusal and with specific regard to the provision concerning political offences, significantly increases the number of exceptions.
- 54.
See criticisms in Onorato (1988), p. 456, who speaks rather of inconsistency.
- 55.
Marchetti (2010), para. 1.
- 56.
Mutatis mutandis, the interpretative path taken at the level of international law is similar to that outlined by some Italian authorities on the age-old controversy regarding the definition of a constitutional concept of political crime and the usefulness or otherwise, for this purpose, of the definition set forth in Article 8 of the Italian Criminal Code. See, for example, De Francesco (1987), p. 904 and, more recently, Ciancio (2001), pp. 279–292.
- 57.
Cf. the rule made explicit in Article 5(1) of the Dublin Convention of 1996 relating to extradition between EU Member States, whereby “For the purposes of applying this Convention, no offence may be regarded by the requested Member State as a political offence, as an offence connected with a political offence or an offence inspired by political motives.” There are, however, potential exceptions, since the Member States still have the opportunity of expressing reservations (see §§ 2, 3 and 4 of the same Article). For the text of this Convention, which has never come into force, see Official Journal C 313, 23 October 1996, -0023. See also the failure to consider the issue in the FD EAW: the absence, in this European text, of the political nature of the offence as grounds for refusing rendition, falls within the “tendency of continental international law to progressively reduce the resistance of political offences to the extradition of their (alleged) perpetrators.” On this topic see Perduca (2006), p. 322.
At least partially different is the reasoning of the irrelevance of the political element in the Statute of the International Criminal Court: the fact that States Parties should provide all assistance that the Court requests, including the rendition of the person sought, without being able to oppose any kind of refusal (Articles 86 and 89 St.), is explained in the logic of complementarity that inspires the jurisdiction of the Court with regard to national criminal jurisdictions. For a wider-ranging discussion, see Ciavola (2005), pp. 436–437 and Gioia (2007), pp. 392 ff.
- 58.
See, amongst others, Dell’Anno (2009), p. 572.
- 59.
This finding, in itself, also involves the Italian Constitution, where the wording of Articles 10 and 26 has forced interpreters to perform a difficult task of downsizing, made more difficult by the persistence, in the Criminal Code (Art. 8), of an all-encompassing subjective definition of political crime. For a broad overview of the various solutions proposed see De Francesco (1982), pp. 902–906; Del Tufo (1988), pp. 6–7; Di Chiara (1998), para. 4. On the desirability of amending the aforementioned Articles, that would allow the introduction of the constraints imposed by international conventions, see Chiavario (1980), pp. 95 ff.
- 60.
See, in this regard, the detailed surveys of Chiavario (1980), pp. 83 and 93.
- 61.
Actually, not even this ambiguity can help explain how a concept historically built around a clearly “noble” purpose can be twisted to cover the murders of an officer of the prison service, a jeweller, a butcher and a police officer, which, although committed “as part of a mad subversive plan,” had nothing to do with any “acts of rebellion against civil liberty and totalitarian regimes.” See Grevi (2009), p. 26, and in similar terms, Pocar (2009), p. 16.
- 62.
“Extradition shall not be granted if the offence in respect of which it is requested is regarded by the requested Party as a political offence or as an offence connected with a political offence.”
- 63.
Di Chiara (1998), para. 4; Del Tufo (1989), p. 5; Ubertis (1987), p. 258. French legislation doesn’t provide an express definition of infranction politique. Everything has always been left to case law that, clinging to strictly objective criteria when the interests at stake are only, so to speak, of national law, shows quite a different willingness to consider subjective criteria if the interests regard international law. But, if we look closer, the awareness of the inappropriateness of exclusively adopting a subjective criterion, even in the face of extradition requests from abroad, already emerged in some previous judgments: paradigmatic is Conseil d’État, arrêt du 7 juillet 1978 Croissant, where it was stated that the fact that the crimes alleged in the case were aimed at overthrowing the established order in Germany, was not enough—given the gravity—to qualify them as being political in nature.
- 64.
See Grevi (2008), p. 42, who provides an effective summary of the case.
- 65.
Art. 1º Será reconhecido como refugiado todo indivíduo que:
I – devido a fundados temores de perseguição por motivos de raça, religião, nacionalidade, grupo social ou opiniões políticas encontre-se fora de seu país de nacionalidade e não possa ou não queira acolher-se à proteção de tal país;
II – não tendo nacionalidade e estando fora do país onde antes teve sua residência habitual, não possa ou não queira regressar a ele, em função das circunstâncias descritas no inciso anterior;
III – devido a grave e generalizada violação de direitos humanos, é obrigado a deixar seu país de nacionalidade para buscar refúgio em outro país.
This provision reproduces the wording of Article 1A of the 1951 Convention.
- 66.
Art. 3º Não se beneficiarão da condição de refugiado os indivíduos que:
I – já desfrutem de proteção ou assistência por parte de organismo ou instituição das Nações Unidas que não o Alto Comissariado das Nações Unidas para os Refugiados – ACNUR;
II – sejam residentes no território nacional e tenham direitos e obrigações relacionados com a condição de nacional brasileiro;
III – tenham cometido crime contra a paz, crime de guerra, crime contra a humanidade, crime hediondo, participado de atos terroristas ou tráfico de drogas;
IV – sejam considerados culpados de atos contrários aos fins e princípios das Nações Unidas.
This provision reproduces, with some additions and some “stylistic” changes, the wording of Art. 1F of the 1951 Convention.
- 67.
Art. 33. O reconhecimento da condição de refugiado obstará o seguimento de qualquer pedido de extradição baseado nos fatos que fundamentaram a concessão de refúgio.
- 68.
Already at the time of absolute States, “extradition was an […] exception, of covenantal origin, to right to asylum.” See Onorato (1988), p. 449.
- 69.
The provision for which is couched in absolute terms, as we shall see, in the Treaty of 1989, Article 3(1)(e).
- 70.
See Kapferer (2003), pp. 103 ff.
- 71.
For the full text of the Constitution, see http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constitui%C3%A7ao.htm.
- 72.
This is Law 6.815/1980, the text of which is available at https://www.planalto.gov.br.
- 73.
Of little consolation for a less vague and emotional configuration of the notion of “political crime” has been the frequent use that scholarship has made to the contents of the Law 7.170/1983 concerning “os crimes contra a segurança nacional, a ordem política e social” and, in particular, in Article 2 thereof, which states that “Quando o fato estiver também previsto como crime no Código Penal, no Código Penal Militar ou em leis especiais, levar-se-ão em conta, para a aplicação desta Lei:
I – a motivação e os objetivos do agente;
II – a lesão real ou potencial aos bens jurídicos mencionados no artigo anterior”.
Cf., in more detail, Tesseroli Filho (2010) and Souza Botelho (2010).
- 74.
As expressed in Decisão No. 1 of the Ministry of Justice, published in the Diário Oficial da União of 15 January 2009.
- 75.
The STF had opportunely adopted this line. Cf. See STF, Ext. 1.085/Repùblica italiana, rel. Cezar Peluso (footnote 21) and, in particular, point 3.
But the same case law of the Tribunal Supremo exhibits no lack of “negative” precedents: called to rule on the extradition of other former Italian militants of extra-parliamentary political formations, guilty of heinous crimes, it labelled such acts as political, and assured them that they would not be extradited under Article 3(e) of the Treaty with Italy. See, for example, STF, Ext. 994/Governo da Itàlia v. Pietro Mancini, rel. Min. Marco Aurélio Mello, DJ 04/08/2006; STF, Ext. 694/ Governo da Itàlia v. Luciano Pessina, rel. Min. Sydney Sanches, DJ 13/02/1997.
- 76.
Di Chiara (1998), para. 5.
- 77.
- 78.
“No Contracting State shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” See, in more detail, Van de Wijngaert (1980), pp. 80 ff.
- 79.
On the importance and complexity of interests drawn from the discrimination clause also in the field of judicial assistance which does not aim for rendition of the individual, see Valentini (1998), pp. 135 ff., who effectively states that in any case, “it should not be the individual guarantees and the protection of the basic values of the system that are sacrificed to the needs of international collaboration underlying the application.”
- 80.
Del Tufo (1989), p. 5; Parisi (1993), p. 11; Di Chiara (1998), para. 5; Kapferer (2003), p. 38; Marchetti (2010), para. 1. For examples of a discrimination clause see, in addition to the references given by Van de Wijngaert (1980), p. 82 footnote 450, see Article 5 European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism; Article 4(4) and (5) of the Inter-American Convention on Extradition (concluded in Caracas on 25 February 1981, which came into force on 28 March 1992); Article 3(b) of the aforementioned Italy–Canada Treaty of 2005 and, at the level of Italian law, Article 698 of the Italian CCP. The texts of the conventions cited are available, respectively, at http://www.oas.org and http://www.giustizia.it/giustizia/it/mg_1_3.wpI.
- 81.
For a particular emphasis in this sense, see De Francesco (1982), pp. 906 ff.
- 82.
This was predicted by Chiavario (1980), p. 99 and Van de Wijngaert (1980), p. 214 (“authorities may hesitate to apply the clause vis-à-vis friendly states or with respect to states upon which they are politically, militarily or economically dependent”). It was confirmed, on the basis of recent international practice, by Kapferer (2003), p. 38.
- 83.
Sometimes this “resistance” results in the complete omission, in regulatory terms, of the clause in question, as if to underline the belief, shared by the signatory countries, that in none of their respective territories may a discriminatory trial ever take place: in this light we should read, for example, Articles 3 and 4 of the EAW Framework Decision and the above-mentioned treaty of extradition between Italy and the USA. In similar terms, Chiavario (2009), p. 758.
- 84.
- 85.
…and, previously, according to the aforementioned opinion AGU/AG-17/2010 (cf. §153: “A condição pessoal do extraditando, agitador político que teria agido nos em anos difícesi da história italiana, ainda que condenado pro crime comun, poderia, salvo engano, provocar reação que poderia, em tese, provocar no extraditando, algum tipo de aggravamento de sua situação pessoal. Há ponderáveis razões para se supor que o extraditando poderia, em princípio, sofre alguma forma de aggravamento de sua situação”).
- 86.
Cordero (2006), p. 1268.
- 87.
Not even the European Parliament, to tell the truth, had remained insensitive to the matter: see European Parliament resolution of 5 February 2009 on the refusal to extradite Cesare Battisti from Brazil and, with regard to the subsequent decision of refusal made by the former President of Brazil, European Parliament resolution of 20 January 2011. Both measures can be found at http://www.europarl.europa.eu.
- 88.
- 89.
Grevi (2009), p. 26.
- 90.
In line with this is Piccichè (2011), pp. 250–251, albeit with specific attention to the opinion of the AGU.
- 91.
The distinction may seem obvious if it did not regard the peculiarities of the Brazilian legal system where, along with administrative bodies of a clearly administrative-governmental nature, such as the AGU, the Minister of Justice or the President of the Republic, who is Head of the executive pursuant to Article 76 of the Constitution, we find bodies such as the STF, which, while representing the apex of the judicial power with functions in part similar to Italy’s Constitutional Court, has a political connotation due, among other things, to its very composition. See Art. 101 Parágrafo único: “Os Ministros do Supremo Tribunal Federal serão nomeados pelo Presidente da República, depois de aprovada a escolha pela maioria absoluta do Senado Federal.”
- 92.
See, in this regard, the above-mentioned Articles 84 and 102 of the Constitution, the already mentioned Law 6.815/1980 and the comments of Pocar (2009), p. 15.
- 93.
See, among many, da Nóbrega (2009).
- 94.
Moreover, there is always in this perspective the criticism of a practice, unfortunately fairly consolidated, whereby Italy hands over extraditees to the US authorities even when the sentences inflicted on them clearly violate the dictates of Article 3 ECHR. On this issue, which deserves detailed discussion impossible here, see Fonseca (2011), pp. 502 ff.
- 95.
Signed at Rio de Janeiro, on 24 November 1954, and available at http://www.sidi.isil.org.
- 96.
- 97.
See, obviously, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done at Vienna on 23 May 1969, which entered into force on 27 January 1980. For the full text, refer to http://www.untreaty.un.org.
- 98.
See Ziccardi Capaldo (2010), pp. 1 ff. and the rich bibliography therein. Among other things, in his wide-ranging reflections, the author criticizes the position taken by France, describing it as a clear example of mala fides.
- 99.
See, in this regard, especially the perceptive comments of Gargani (2011), pp. 1259 ff.
- 100.
ECtHR, 16 July 2009, Sulejmanovic v. Italy, Application No. 22635/03, available at http://www.echr.coe.it.
- 101.
See Colella (2011), pp. 20–21.
- 102.
Cf. for example Catelani (1995), pp. 137 and 237.
- 103.
Which, however, were self-righteously quick to point out that “esse tipo de juízo não constitui afronta de um Estado ao outro, uma vez que situações particulares ao indivíduo podem gerar riscos, a despeito do caráter democrático de ambos os Estados,” as set forth in the previously cited Nota do governo brasileiro sobre o cidadão italiano Cesare Battisti.
- 104.
With all the difficulties, however persistent, arising from the perennial “hermeneutic elusiveness of the primary political event” and, therefore, from the identification of an “event that, in itself, assumes no other dimension than the political,” as comments Padovani (2007), p. 78.
- 105.
Cf. in more detail Chiavario (1980), p. 109.
- 106.
Chiavario (1986), p. 14.
- 107.
See, for further details, Van de Wijngaert (1980), pp. 214 ff. who does not rule out the possibility of these organisms, as third parties, conferring upon themselves a real decision-making function.
Abbreviations
- AGU:
-
General Advocacy of the Union (Advocacia Geral da União)
- CCP:
-
Code of Criminal Procedure
- CoEx:
-
European Convention on Extradition
- CONARE:
-
National Committee for Refugees (Comité Nacional para os Refugiados)
- ECHR:
-
European Convention on Human Rights
- ECtHR:
-
European Court of Human Rights
- FD EAW:
-
Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant
- ICCPR:
-
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
- ItBrTR:
-
Italy–Brazil Treaty on Extradition
- STF:
-
Federal Supreme Tribunal (Supremo Tribunal Federal)
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Galgani, B. (2013). Extradition, Political Offence and the Discrimination Clause. In: Ruggeri, S. (eds) Transnational Inquiries and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in Criminal Proceedings. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32012-5_12
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