Abstract
1. On a reasoned proposal 23–28 by one third of the Member States, by the European Parliament or by the European Commission, the Council, acting by a majority of four fifths of its members after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
See Calliess (2004), p. 1033.
- 3.
- 4.
See Schorkopf, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 7 para 11.
- 5.
See Schmitt (1928), p. 483, who affirms: “interventions of the federations in the affairs of its members are not so truly a foreign interference, and are politically and legally possible and bearable, because the federation is based on a substantive affinity among the members” (our translation).
- 6.
See Morini, in Curti Gialdino (2012), Art. 7, p. 132.
- 7.
- 8.
See Case C-5/88, Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft (ECJ 13 July 1989); on this → Art. 2 para 7–10.
- 9.
On the protection of rights and the remedies available before the Court of Justice see Codinanzi and Nascimbene (2009).
- 10.
Schmitt von Sydow (2001), p. 294, 314 et seqq.
- 11.
Commission Communication on Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union—Respect for and promotion of the values on which the Union is based, COM(2003) 606 final, point 1.4.1.
- 12.
Sentence 1 of Art. 51.1 EUCFR provides: “The provisions of this Charter are addressed to […] the Member States only when they are implementing Union law.”
- 13.
Commission Report, 2010 Report on the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, COM(2011) 160 final, p. 3.
- 14.
Commission Report, 2010 Report on the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, COM(2011) 160 final, p. 3.
- 15.
Cases 3989/07 and 38353/07, Ullens de Schooten et Rezabek v Belgium (ECtHR 20 September 2011), in which he declared a violation of Art. 6.1 ECHR on the grounds that neither the Court of Cassation nor the Belgian Council of State had complied with the obligation of preliminary reference to the Court of Justice pursuant to Art. 234 EC (now Art. 267 TFEU). The Court dismissed the appeal on the merits, but has in principle accepted that the failure to meet the obligation to refer to the Court of Justice by institutions of last instance provided for by Art. 267 TFEU may result in a violation of Art. 6.1 ECHR.
- 16.
Commission Communication, Strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by the European Union, COM(2010) 573 final.
- 17.
The existence of such a link depends on the individual and specific situation, as with the examples given in the Communication. According to the Commission, for example, there is a link when the national legislation transposes a Union directive in violation of fundamental rights, when a public authority applies a rule of the Union in violation of such rights, or when a final judicial decision of a MS applies or interprets EU law in violation of fundamental rights.
- 18.
Commission Communication, Strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by the European Union, COM(2010) 573 final, p. 10.
- 19.
Cf. Art. 60.2 in conjunction with Art. 60.3 lit. b VCLT. On this see Haratsch et al. (2010), p. 54.
- 20.
Case C-294/83, Les Verts v Parliament (ECJ 23 April 1986) para 23: “the European Economic Community is a Community based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty”.
- 21.
Despite the Commission’s position, the Court of Justice has recognised that the former enjoys a margin of discretion in infringement procedures; see Case C-431/92, Commission v Germany (ECJ 11 August 1995). For some subject matters, such as violations of competition rules, the Commission’s discretion is still limited. Among the exceptions to these procedures see Article 126 TFEU, on excessive deficits. The non-compliance with secondary European legislation, including mixed agreements, is subject to the discussed procedures; see Case C-459/03, Commission v Ireland (ECJ 30 May 2006).
- 22.
- 23.
- 24.
See Schorkopf (2000a), p. 106 et seqq.
- 25.
Among the first comments see Monjal (1998).
- 26.
Draft Treaty establishing the European Union, O.J. C 77/33 (1984), Art. 4 and 44.
- 27.
On the close connection between the introduction of the sanction mechanism and the prospective EU enlargement, see Sadurski (2010), p. 1: “In this way, somewhat ironically, the Eastward enlargement of the EU was an important impetus of supranational constitutionalisation of the Union”.
- 28.
The provision further provided: “In doing so, the Council shall take into account the possible consequences of such a suspension on the rights and obligations of natural and legal persons”. Paragraph 4 of that provision laid down the rules on qualified majority by reference to Art. 205 EC.
- 29.
- 30.
Declaration by the 14 MS of 31 January 2000. For a discussion of the character of that legal act and its legal significance (from both a formal and a substantial point of view), see Hummer and Obwexer (2000b), p. 485; Adamovich (2001), p. 89; Schorkopf (2002); Winkler (2003), 158 et seqq. On this point see also Declaration by the Commission of 1 February 2000; European Parliament Resolution of 3 February 2000.
- 31.
Portuguese Presidency, 28 June 2000.
- 32.
- 33.
See Ahtisaari et al. (2003), pp. 209–210.
- 34.
The power of (justified) proposal belonged to one third of the MS, the EP or the Commission, while the preventive measure was adopted by the Council acting by a majority of four fifths of its members, with the assent of the EP.
- 35.
It was also foreseen that the Council “shall regularly verify that the grounds on which such a determination was made continue to apply” (Art. 7.1 (2) TEU).
- 36.
For an examination of those categories see Kelsen (1927), p. 72 et seqq.
- 37.
See Schorkopf, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 7 para 14.
- 38.
See Schmitt (1928), pp. 496–497.
- 39.
See Kelsen (1923), 173 et seqq.
- 40.
Cartabia (2010), p. 107 (our translation), according to whom the Charter now fills the provision of Art. 7 TEU with further content.
- 41.
- 42.
Indeed, the EP asked the Commission and the Council in a number of resolutions to verify the risk of breach, but they never followed through with the procedure. See, for example, the European Parliament Resolution of 22 April 2004, Risk of breaches of freedom of expression and information in the Union, particularly in Italy (art. 11,2 Charter of FR), 2003/2237(INI), para. 83; Resolution of 14 February 2007, Alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners, 2006/2200 (INI), para. 232.
- 43.
On 17 January 2012 the Commission instigated infringement procedures against Hungary regarding three points: independence of the Hungarian central bank, lowering the mandatory retirement age of judges provided by the Basic Law and the independence of the Hungarian data protection authority, and also asked the Hungarian authorities for more information on the issue of judicial independence. On this see the statements of the Council and the Commission on recent political developments in Hungary, made during the debate in the plenary session of Parliament on 18 January 2012, and the hearing of 9 February 2012 of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs; the EP resolution of 16 February 2012 on recent political developments in Hungary (2012/2511 [RSP]), where the EP “[i]nstructs the Conference of Presidents, in the light of the report described in point 6, to consider whether to activate necessary measures, including measures pursuant to Article 74e of the Rules of Procedure and Article 7(1) TEU”. On constitutional changes in Hungary see Kovács and Tóth (2011).
- 44.
Commission Communication on Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union—Respect for and promotion of the values on which the Union is based, COM(2003) 606 final.
- 45.
European Parliament, Report of 1 April 2004 on the Commission communication on Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union: Respect for and promotion of the values on which the Union is based, A5-0227/2004. In truth, the Report, in addition to the proposed EP Resolution, aimed at encouraging (but never adopted) the conclusion of an interinstitutional agreement on the subject. It also contains a minority opinion and the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market. The latter, on the contrary, considered the Commission Communication neither necessary nor appropriate, because it deals with a political article, the application of which depends on the discretion of the Council.
- 46.
European Parliament, Report, A5-0227/2004, p. 6 (point 2) and 11.
- 47.
According to the Committee, “in practice it is impossible to set precise criteria in advance regarding the adoption of a decision taken using political discretion […]. The Commission is not in a position to set conditions permitting the taking of a decision which is at the complete discretion of the Council; at most, it could try to set out the circumstances in which it would take an initiative under the power granted to it by Article 7, but it has not in fact done so, since clearly these would be mere speculations about future facts which are impossible to predict. With regard to respect for and promotion of common values the communication adds nothing new to what already exists.” (see European Parliament, Report, A5-0227/2004, p. 16).
- 48.
European Parliament, resolution of 15 December 2010 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union (2009)—effective implementation after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, P7_TA(2010)0483.
- 49.
Atripaldi and Miccù (2004), p. 82.
- 50.
Schmitt von Sydow (2001), pp. 303–305, according to whom bilateral action is not only superflous but also illegal.
- 51.
Atripaldi and Miccù (2004), p. 82: “The reaction of the States of the situation created in Austria has highlighted a paradox inherent in that situation: their intervention was legitimised on the basis of the need to protect the common political values related to democracy and respect for human rights. But this same action took the form of traditional sanctions of international law without any constitutional protection for the State concerned to be carried out through those same constitutional values or parameters considered common to all Member States.” (our translation).
- 52.
See Commission Report, 2010 Report on the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, COM(2011) 160 final.
- 53.
Schmitt von Sydow (2001), pp. 295–300.
- 54.
Nascimbene, in Tizzano (2004), Art. 7 TUE (p. 61).
- 55.
Commission Communication on Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union—Respect for and promotion of the values on which the Union is based, COM(2003) 606 final, point 1.4.12.
- 56.
European Parliament, Report, A5-0227/2004, p. 11.
- 57.
European Parliament, Report on fundamental rights in the European Union for 2000, 2000/2231(INI).
- 58.
Scheinin (2005).
- 59.
See Council Regulation (EC) No. 168/2007 of 15 February 2007 establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, O.J. L 53/1 (2007). On the academic debate over the idea of the Agency and on the historical origins that led to it, see Cartabia et al. (2009), p. 531 et seqq.; see also Paciotti (2009); von Bogdandy and Van Bernstorff (2009).
- 60.
In this respect the positions taken by the organs of the Council of Europe during the approval of the Regulation provide an account of how high the risk of interference was. These positions have determined the competences and functions of the Agency. See Cartabia et al. (2009), pp. 547–549.
- 61.
Cartabia et al. (2009), p. 52, providing an analysis of the weaknesses of the Agency.
- 62.
Toggenburg (2008), p. 385 et seqq.
- 63.
Periodically, the Agency will launch an open call to which all the actors of civil society can reply as long as they satisfy a set of criteria (such as the authority, expertise, rooting in the national reality, etc.). The FRP, under the coordination of the Director of the FRA, may make proposals to the Executive Board on the annual programme, express opinions and suggestions on the reports and forward recommendations. See Cartabia et al. (2009), p. 554.
- 64.
Schmitt von Sydow (2001), pp. 300–301.
- 65.
European Parliament, Report, A5-0227/2004, p. 7 (point 9) and p. 12.
- 66.
Nascimbene, in Tizzano (2004), Art. 7 TUE (p. 61).
- 67.
Zambelli (2004), p. 959.
- 68.
- 69.
In fact, the referring Article of the EAEC Treaty has been deleted—Art. 5 of Protocol No. 2 amending the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, O.J. C 306/199 (2007).
- 70.
Schmitt von Sydow (2001), p. 302.
- 71.
Schmitt von Sydow (2001), p. 310.
- 72.
European Parliament, Report, A5-0227/2004, p. 6 (points 4, 5).
- 73.
European Parliament, Report, A5-0227/2004, p. 11 (emphasis added).
- 74.
Atripaldi and Miccù (2004), pp. 79–80 (our translation), who make reference also to the analysis of the various forms of withdrawal. Moreover the doctrine does not think that Art. 60 VCLT can be applied to the EU. See Pechstein, in Streinz (2012), Art. 7 para 81; Ruffert, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 7 para 161.
- 75.
With this opinion also Schmitt von Sydow (2001), pp. 310–311.
- 76.
On the role of the Commission see Schmitt von Sydow (2001), pp. 313–317.
- 77.
Art. 74e.4 of the EP’s Rules of Procedure; see also Art. 122 (debates on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law) and Annex IV (guidelines and general principles to be followed when choosing the subjects to be included on the agenda for the debate on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law provided for under Rule 122).
- 78.
For details see European Parliament, Report, A5-0227/2004, pp. 7–8 (point 11).
- 79.
See Pechstein, in Streinz (2012), Art. 7 para 79.
- 80.
On the rule of law in the European legal order see Gianfrancesco (2006).
- 81.
As Hintersteininger (2000), pp. 31–33, states: “this need for legalisation has not been felt so strongly as to induce the IGC to subject all aspects of TEU art. 7, the substantive as well as the procedural, to judicial review. With their hearts the Member States tended to the lofty heights of the law; with their feet they still remained firmly on the ground of politics.”
- 82.
Atripaldi and Miccù (2004), p. 78.
Table of Cases
ECJ 23.04.1986, C-294/83, Les Verts v Parliament, ECR 1339 [cit. in para 8]
ECJ 13.07.1989, C-5/88, Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft, ECR 2609 [cit. in para 2]
ECJ 11.08.1995, C-431/92, Commission v Germany, ECR I-2189 [cit. in para 9]
ECJ 12.07.2005, C-304/02, Commission v France, ECR I-6263 [cit. in para 9]
ECJ 30.05.2006, C-459/03, Commission v Ireland, ECR I-4635 [cit. in para 9]
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Blanke, HJ., Mangiameli, S. (2013). Article 7 [The Principles of the Federal Coercion]. In: Blanke, HJ., Mangiameli, S. (eds) The Treaty on European Union (TEU). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31706-4_8
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