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Article 22 [Identification of EU Interests and Objectives in the External Action Area: Competent Authorities and Instruments]

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The Treaty on European Union (TEU)

Abstract

Art. 22 TEU constitutes a complementary provision to Art. 21 TEU. The core theme underlying both articles is the issue of coherence and consistency. Both articles may be understood as reactions to the traditional state with its fragmentation of competences and organisational structures, which had been a logical consequence of the pillarisation of the EU since Maastricht. The segmentation into the classical community pillar and the new, second pillar of CFSP had led to strong institutional rivalries and a clear lack of consistency between Community policies of an external character and intergovernmental CFSP.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Koutrakos (2006), p. 17–32, 415–452; Eeckhout (2005), p. 9–57, 101–137, 138–167.

  2. 2.

    See Dijkstra (2009), p. 431 et seqq.; Thym (2009), p. 339 et seqq.

  3. 3.

    Cf. Koutrakos (2008), p. 485–506; Eeckhout (2005), p. 162–164; van Elsuwege (2010), p. 992 et seqq.; Thym (2009), p. 336 et seqq.

  4. 4.

    Cf. Nettesheim, in Oppermann et al. (2009), p. 99.

  5. 5.

    On the need of cross-pillar policy-making see Craig and de Búrca (2008), p. 125; cf. also van Elsuwege (2010), p. 1017.

  6. 6.

    Cf. Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 1.

  7. 7.

    On the scope of Art. 13 TEU-Nice, see Terhechte, in Schwarze (2009), Art. 13 para 1–4.

  8. 8.

    Cf. Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 22 para 1.

  9. 9.

    Cf. Cremer, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 1.

  10. 10.

    Cf. Cremer, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 22 EUV, footnote 1; cf. also Cremer, in Calliess and Ruffert (2006), Art. III-40 para 9.

  11. 11.

    Concerning the (still) differing structure of competences in external action, cf. De Baere (2008), pp. 108–112. Cf. furthermore Cremona (2008a), p. 38 et seqq.

  12. 12.

    As far as Art. 4.1 TEU-Nice is concerned, cf. Stumpf, in Schwarze (2009), Art. 4 para 3.

  13. 13.

    Cf. regarding Art. 13 TEU-Nice Terhechte, in Schwarze (2009), Art. 13 para 3–5.

  14. 14.

    Cf. Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 3.

  15. 15.

    Cf. Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 2.

  16. 16.

    Cf. Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 10.

  17. 17.

    Cf. Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 2.

  18. 18.

    Concerning the role of the European Council see Bulmer and Wessels (1987); Pernice (2003), p. 161 et seqq.; de Schoutheete (2006), p. 30 et seqq.; Carchidi (2007); Blázquez Peinado (2008), p.180 et seqq.; Dann (2009), p. 261 et seqq.

  19. 19.

    Cf. Craig and de Búrca (2008), p. 55; Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 15 para 1.

  20. 20.

    Cf. Craig and de Búrca (2008), p. 55.

  21. 21.

    Craig and de Búrca (2008), pp. 55–56.

  22. 22.

    Cf. de Schoutheete (2006), p. 57.

  23. 23.

    Cf. Koutrakos (2006), p. 391.

  24. 24.

    Cf. Wiehard, in Calliess and Ruffert (2006), Art. I-21 para 2; Cremer, in Calliess and Ruffert (2006), Art. I-40 para 8.

  25. 25.

    Cf. Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 15 para 3.

  26. 26.

    Cf. Thym (2009), p. 329.

  27. 27.

    Cf. Cremer, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 21 para 2.

  28. 28.

    Cf. Cremer, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 21 para 3.

  29. 29.

    Cf. also Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 4.

  30. 30.

    See also Youngs (2004), p. 415 et seqq., in particular p. 421 et seqq., and Dunne (1995), p. 367 et seqq.

  31. 31.

    Cf. Cremer, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 21 para 2; cf. furthermore Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 22 para 4.

  32. 32.

    Cf. Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 4.

  33. 33.

    Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 4.

  34. 34.

    Cf. Cremer, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 21 para 3.

  35. 35.

    Cf. Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 2.

  36. 36.

    Cf. Terhechte, in Schwarze (2009), Art. 12 para 3, but also Art. 13 para 11.

  37. 37.

    European Council of 26 Sept. 2010, Conclusions, Doc. EUCO 21/1/10 REV 1, Annex 1 lit. (a).

  38. 38.

    European Council of 26 Sept. 2010, Conclusions, Doc. EUCO 21/1/10 REV 1, Annex 1 lit. (a).

  39. 39.

    European Council of 26 Sept. 2010, Conclusions, Doc. EUCO 21/1/10 REV 1, Annex 1 lit. (b).

  40. 40.

    European Council of 26 Sept. 2010, Conclusions, Doc. EUCO 21/1/10 REV 1, Annex 1 lit. (c).

  41. 41.

    European Council of 26 Sept. 2010, Conclusions, Doc. EUCO 21/1/10 REV 1, Annex 1 lit. (e).

  42. 42.

    European Council of 16/17 Dec. 2010, Conclusions, Doc. EUCO 30/1/10 REV 1, para 9.

  43. 43.

    European Council of 16/17 Dec. 2010, Conclusions, Doc. EUCO 30/1/10 REV 1, para 9.

  44. 44.

    Cf. Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 3.

  45. 45.

    Cf. Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 3.

  46. 46.

    Cf. Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 3.

  47. 47.

    Cf. de Baere (2008), p. 9 et seqq., 267 et seqq.; cf. furthermore Koutrakos (2006), p. 415 et seqq.; Gauttier (2004), p. 28 et seqq.

  48. 48.

    Cf. Koutrakos (2006), p. 7 et seqq., 77 et seqq.

  49. 49.

    Cf. Cremer, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 21 EUV para 4.

  50. 50.

    Cf. Cremer, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 21 EUV para 4; Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 13.

  51. 51.

    See Common Strategy 1999/414/CFSP of 4 June 1999 on Russia, O.J. L 157/1; Common Strategy 1999/877/CFSP of 11 December 1999 on Ukraine, O.J. L 331/1; Common Strategy 2000/458/CFSP of 19 June 2000 on the Mediterranean Region, O.J. L 183/5; cf. furthermore Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 13.

  52. 52.

    Cf. Cremer, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 21 EUV para 4.

  53. 53.

    Cf. Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 3.

  54. 54.

    Cf. Terhechte, in Schwarze (2009), Art. 13 para 11.

  55. 55.

    Cf. Cremer, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 4.

  56. 56.

    Cf. Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 13.

  57. 57.

    Cf. Cremer, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 4.

  58. 58.

    Cf. Cremer, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 4.

  59. 59.

    Cf. Cremer, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 22 para 6 et seqq.

  60. 60.

    See Common Strategy 1999/877/CFSP of 11 Dec. 1999 on Ukraine, O.J. L 331/1, para 41.

  61. 61.

    See Common Strategy 2000/458/CFSP of 19 June 2000 on the Mediterranean Region, O.J. L 183/5, para 28.

  62. 62.

    See Common Strategy 2000/458/CFSP of 19 June 2000 on the Mediterranean Region, O.J. L 183/5, para 28.

  63. 63.

    Cf. also Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 15 para 5.

  64. 64.

    See European Council Decision 2009/882/EU of 1 December 2009 adopting its Rules of Procedure, O.J. L 315/51, at Art. 6.1 of the annexed Rules of Procedure.

  65. 65.

    Cf. also Cremer, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 10.

  66. 66.

    Cf. Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 5.

  67. 67.

    Cf. Terhechte, in Schwarze (2009), Art. 13 para 10.

  68. 68.

    Cf. Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 6.

  69. 69.

    Cf. Cremer, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 5; cf. furthermore Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 6.

  70. 70.

    See Art. 12 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Council (footnote 64 above).

  71. 71.

    See Art. 15.2 TEU.

  72. 72.

    See Art. 4.4 (3) of the Rules of Procedure of the European Council (footnote 64 above).

  73. 73.

    As a critical voice in that regard see Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 22 para 8 et seq., in particular para 9.

  74. 74.

    Concerning the role of the new EEAS see Missiroli (2010), p. 433 et seqq., and Duke (2011), p. 42 et seqq.; see furthermore Morillas (2011), p. 251 et seq., and in detail Vanhoonacker and Reslow (2010), p. 1 et seqq.

  75. 75.

    As to the roles of COREPER and PSC in foreign policy formulation since Lisbon see Duke (2011), p. 40 et seqq.; see furthermore Missiroli (2010), p. 444; Morillas (2011), p. 247, 249 et seq.; Juncos and Reynolds (2007), p. 127 et seqq.

  76. 76.

    To a certain degree, the concrete division of tasks between FAC and GAC is still unresolved—see Duke (2011), p. 38 et seqq.

  77. 77.

    See Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 7.

  78. 78.

    See Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 7.

  79. 79.

    Cf. Cremer, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 11.

  80. 80.

    See Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 7.

  81. 81.

    See only Dashwood (2008a), p. 70 et seqq.; Koutrakos (2008), p. 171 et seqq.; van Elsuwege (2010), p. 1001 et seqq.; Cremona (2011), p. 82 et seqq.

  82. 82.

    Cf. Dashwood (2008a), p. 76 et seqq., 93 et seqq., as well as van Elsuwege (2010), p. 1005 et seqq.

  83. 83.

    See, for example, Cremona (2011), pp. 86–88, and Dashwood (2008a), p. 93 et seqq.

  84. 84.

    Cf. Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 10.

  85. 85.

    Cf. Cremer, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 22 para 5 et seqq.

  86. 86.

    Cf. Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 10.

  87. 87.

    Cf. Thym (2008), p. 203 et seqq.

  88. 88.

    As to the new role of the HR, in particular in the operational business of CFSP, see Missiroli (2010), p. 430 et seqq., as well as Piris (2010), p. 243 et seqq.

  89. 89.

    Cf. Cremer, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 9.

  90. 90.

    Concerning the instrument of Union actions, see in detail Dashwood (2008b), p. 53 et seqq.; cf. furthermore Frenz (2010), p. 497 et seqq.

  91. 91.

    Cf. also Cremer, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 7, and Frenz (2010), p. 496.

  92. 92.

    Cf. Frenz (2010), p. 497.

  93. 93.

    Cf. Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 11; Thym (2009), p. 333 (also concerning the practical limits of any shift to qualified majority voting).

  94. 94.

    See in particular Grevi, in Amato et al. (2007), p. 778 et seqq.; see also van Elsuwege (2010), p. 995.

  95. 95.

    Cf. Cremer, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 7.

  96. 96.

    Cf. Cremer, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 8.

  97. 97.

    Concerning the growing shift of powers of initiative from MS to the HR see Morillas (2011), p. 244 et seq., in particular p. 252 et seq.

  98. 98.

    Cf. Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 7.

  99. 99.

    Cf. also Cremer, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 22 EUV para 12.

  100. 100.

    See also Duke (2011), p. 33 et seqq.; cf. furthermore Missiroli (2010), p. 430 et seqq., in particular at p. 432 et seq.

  101. 101.

    Concerning the two levels of “vertical” and “horizontal” coherence see Cremona (2011), p. 62 et seqq.

  102. 102.

    Concerning the duty of loyal cooperation according to Art. 4.3 TEU and, specifically for the area of CFSP, Art. 24.3 TEU see Hillion and Wessel (2008), p. 91 et seqq., as well as Cremona (2008b), p. 157 et seqq.

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Blanke, HJ., Mangiameli, S. (2013). Article 22 [Identification of EU Interests and Objectives in the External Action Area: Competent Authorities and Instruments]. In: Blanke, HJ., Mangiameli, S. (eds) The Treaty on European Union (TEU). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31706-4_23

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