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Article 1 [Establishment and Functioning of the Union]

(ex-Article 1 TEU)

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The Treaty on European Union (TEU)

Abstract

By this Treaty, 61 the HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES 4 establish among themselves 3–19 a 18 EUROPEAN UNION, 13–17 hereinafter called ‘the Union’, 19 on which the Member States confer competences to attain objectives they have in common 16,20–23 .

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Cf. the Draft Treaty presented by the Luxembourg Presidency on 18 June 1991, Europe Doc. 1722/1723 of 5 July 1991.

  2. 2.

    The term “etablir” used in the French version of the Constitutional Treaty (“[…] la présente Constitution établit l’Union européenne […]”—on this see Giscard d’Estaing 2003, p. 31) has not been adopted by Art. 1 TEU.

  3. 3.

    Gagliardi (2001), Art. 1 para 5; Wessels and Hofmann (2008), p. 9; Streinz, in Streinz et al. (2010), p. 11; Obwexer, in Mayer and Stöger (2010), Art. 1 EUV para 13; on the “nation of citizens” in the domestic context of the French Republic see Häberle (2011), p. 357.

  4. 4.

    Nettesheim, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Art. 1 para 22.

  5. 5.

    Cf. German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92 (Judgment of 12 October 1993) para 100 et seq.—Maastricht (in BVerfGE 89, 155 [185 et seqq.]) (English translation in Oppenheimer 1994, p. 527–575); German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 249—Lisbon (in BVerfGE 123, 267 [357 et seq.])(English translation available online); Calliess (2010), p. 44.

  6. 6.

    Cf. German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 229—Lisbon (in BVerfGE 123, 267 [348]).

  7. 7.

    Following the judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the Treaty of Lisbon (2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 228) “joining a federal state […] is reserved to the directly declared will of the German people alone”. Thus, “the irrevocable transfer of sovereignty to a new subject of legitimacy” is not possible by means of an international treaty alone.

  8. 8.

    Cf. Ipsen (1972), para 8, 24 et seqq. and 54, 124.

  9. 9.

    On the Union Treaty of Maastricht see Blanke (1993), p. 412 et seqq.; on the attribution of the respective concepts of legitimation see Haltern (2007), para 29; a recent study on finality of the Union in a broad sense is made by Haltern (2010), p. 205 et seqq.

  10. 10.

    Nettesheim, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Art. 1 para 12.

  11. 11.

    Cf. Rideau, in Burgorgue-Larsen et al. (2007), Art. 1 para 3, who speaks of a “double volonté sur laquelle est fondée l’Union par une formule visant a dépasser la traditionelle opposition des Etats membres partagés entre l’Europe des Etats et l’Europe des peuples”.

  12. 12.

    Cf. Horspool (2011), p. 285.

  13. 13.

    Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 1 para 66.

  14. 14.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 231—Lisbon (in BVerfGE 123, 267 [348 et seq.]).

  15. 15.

    See Blanke (2011).

  16. 16.

    Cf. European Council, Statement by the Euro area Heads of State or Government of 9 December 2011, para 1 et seqq.

  17. 17.

    On the “capacity of the German Basic Law” see Nettesheim (2012a).

  18. 18.

    Cf. Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos (ECJ 7 March 1985) p. 12: “the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law”.

  19. 19.

    Cf. Blanke and Mangiameli (2006), p. XXVI et seqq.; Haltern (2010), para 24.

  20. 20.

    Case 294/83, Les Verts v Parliament (ECJ 23 April 1986) para 23; Opinion 1/91, European Economic Area (ECJ 14 December 1991) para 21.

  21. 21.

    See Denza (2002), p. 311 et seqq. with regard to the third pillar under the Treaty of Amsterdam.

  22. 22.

    With this view, however, Haratsch (2010), p. 67. See also Obwexer, in Mayer and Stöger (2010), Art. 1 EUV para 15 et seq.

  23. 23.

    Piris (2010), p. 63 et seq.

  24. 24.

    Cf. Häberle (2011), p. 241.

  25. 25.

    Cf. Piris (2010), p. 65 who admits “that, on its own, [the Treaty of Lisbon] is simply unreadable”.

  26. 26.

    Tosato (2010), p. 58 et seq., 65; Ziller (2010), p. 529, speaks of “little loss of substance” of the Treaty of Lisbon compared to the Constitutional Treaty; the deletion of symbolic items (hymn, holiday, motto) is on the negative list for the evaluation of the Treaty of Lisbon by Häberle (2011), p. 704.

  27. 27.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 2, 97—Lisbon (in BVerfGE 123, 267 [271, 304]).

  28. 28.

    With regard to the Federal Republic of Germany, German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 275—Lisbon (in BVerfGE 123, 267 [370]).

  29. 29.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 223—Lisbon (in BVerfGE 123, 267 [346]), with reference to von Martitz (1888), p. 416.

  30. 30.

    Twenty-eighth Amendment of the Constitution [Treaty of Lisbon] Act 2009.

  31. 31.

    Supreme Court of Ireland, [1987] IESC 4; [1987] IR 713, Raymond Crotty v An Taoiseach and Others (9 April 1987).

  32. 32.

    Cf. Loi constitutionnelle n° 2008-103 du 4 février 2008 modifiant le titre XV de la Constitution; for that, Art. 88.1 through 88 7 of the French Constitution have been reformed—http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/la-constitution/la-constitution-du-4-octobre-1958/revisions-constitutionnelles-du-4-fevrier-2008.5079.html.

  33. 33.

    Cf. Act on the cooperation between the Federal Government and the Bundestag in matters of the European Union (EUZBBG, BGBl. 1993 I, p. 311 as amended by BGBl. 2009 I, p. 3026); Act amending the Act on the cooperation between the Federation and the Länder in matters of the European Union (EUZBGL, BGBl. 1993 I, p. 313 as amended by BGBl. 2009 I, p. 3031); Act on the extension and strengthening of the rights of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in matters of the European Union (core of this Act is the IntVG of 22 September 2009, BGBl. 2009 I, p. 3022, as amended in BGBl. 2009 I, p. 3822).

  34. 34.

    Cf. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/12/contents.

  35. 35.

    Cf. Bull. EC, October 1972, No 10, p. 16.

  36. 36.

    Cf. the decision in the next-to-last consideration of the Preamble and Art. A.1 TEU-Maastricht.

  37. 37.

    Cf. Art. G TEU-Maastricht and Art. 1 EC-Maastricht.

  38. 38.

    Rightly so Gagliardi (2001), Art. 1 para 3.

  39. 39.

    Huber (1994), p. 6; see also Ipsen (1992), p. 176, points out the reservations of Foreign Minister Genscher towards the term “Union” at the Luxembourg European Council of 17 June 1991.

  40. 40.

    Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 1 EUV para 4.

  41. 41.

    Nettesheim, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Art. 1 para 14, 16; Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 1 EUV para 3.

  42. 42.

    Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L. (ECJ 15 July 1964) p. 593; German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvL 52/71 (Order of 29 May 1974)—As long as I (in BVerfGE 37, 271, 277 et seq.) with reference to 1 BvR 248/63 and 216/67 (Order of 18 October 1967)—EEC Directives (in BVerfGE 22, 293, 296); 2 BvR 255/69 (Order of 9 June 1971) (in BVerfGE 31, 145, 173 et seq.).

  43. 43.

    Cf. Blanke and Mangiameli (2006), p. XXVIII et seq.

  44. 44.

    Cf. Schmitz (2001), p. 65 et seqq., 113 et seqq; Frenz (2011), para 3.

  45. 45.

    Cf. Calliess (2010), p. 45. See also German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 317—Lisbon (in BVerfGE 123, 267 [389 et seq.]).

  46. 46.

    Cf. on this classification—before the introduction of Art. 23 GG—German Federal Constitutional Court, BvL 52/71, (Order of 29 May 1974) para 40—As long as I (in BVerfGE 37, 271, 278; English translation in Bundesverfassungsgericht 1992, p. 270 et seqq.). Chalmers et al. (2010), p. 207 et seqq. Cf. also the distinction made by Gnamou-Petauton (2008), p. 55 et seqq., between “organisation de coopération” (i.e. a “normal” international organisation) and “organisation d’intégration” (i.e. a supranational organisation).

  47. 47.

    Cf. Giscard d’Estaing (2003), p. 31 et seqq., who has used the term “federal method” (“le mode federal”) for the Community method (“le mode communautaire”) in the Constitutional Convention—though this has been rejected by the majority. To the term “federal” he attributed a “pedagogical value” as it takes into account the already existing reality—as in the case of the ECB.

  48. 48.

    Cf. A. Merkel, speech on 2 November 2010 http://www.bruessel.diplo.de/contentblob/2959854/Daten/945677/DD_RedeMerkelEuropakollegEN.pdf.

  49. 49.

    Giscard d’Estaing (2003), p. 32 regards the pursuit of objectives the MS have in common the legal nature of the Union.

  50. 50.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 249—Lisbon (in BVerfGE 123, 267 [357 et seq.]); Kirchhof (1992 b), § 183, para 69.

  51. 51.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92 (Judgment of 12 October 1993) headnotes 1 and 2, para 90, 108, 162—Maastricht; and 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) headnote 1 and para 229, 233, 294—Lisbon.

  52. 52.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 229—Lisbon (in BVerfGE 123, 267 [348]): “The concept of Verbund covers a close long-term association of states which remain sovereign, a treaty-based association which exercises public authority, but whose fundamental order is subject to the decision-making power of the Member States and in which the peoples, i.e. the citizens, of the Member States, remain the subjects of democratic legitimation.”

  53. 53.

    Cf. Obwexer, in Mayer and Stöger (2010), Art. 1 EUV para 33 et seqq.

  54. 54.

    Nettesheim, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Art. 1 para 14.

  55. 55.

    Obwexer, in Mayer and Stöger (2010), Art. 1 EUV para 14.

  56. 56.

    Nettesheim, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Art. 1 para 15; Piris (2010), p. 64.

  57. 57.

    Obwexer, in Mayer and Stöger (2010), Art. 1 EUV para 21.

  58. 58.

    Kühnhardt (2012), p. 5 et seq.

  59. 59.

    Bach (2008).

  60. 60.

    Heintschel von Heinegg, in Vedder and Heintschel von Heinegg (2012), Art. 1 para 5.

  61. 61.

    Ohler, in Streinz et al. (2010), p. 105; Russo, in Curti Gialdino (2012), Art. 1 TEU para 6.

  62. 62.

    Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 1 EUV para 59; Ohler, in Streinz et al. (2010), p. 46.

  63. 63.

    Cf. on Germany Hobe (1998), p. 137 et seqq. with a comparative overview on other States (p. 164 et seqq.); Grawert et al. (1995).

  64. 64.

    Schorkopf, in Bonner Kommentar zum GG (2011), Art. 23 para 63 et seqq. (65, 69).

  65. 65.

    Heintschel von Heinegg, in Vedder and Heintschel von Heinegg (2012), Art. 1 para 5–6.

  66. 66.

    Czech Constitutional Court, Pl. ÚS 19/08 (Judgment of 26 November 2008)—Treaty of Lisbon I, para 132; reaffirmed in its essential contents by Czech Constitutional Court, Pl. ÚS 29/09 (Judgment of 3 November 2009)—Treaty of Lisbon II.

  67. 67.

    Heintschel von Heinegg, in Vedder and Heintschel von Heinegg (2012), Art. 1 para 4.

  68. 68.

    Grawert (2003), p. 975; Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 1 EUV para 60.

  69. 69.

    Heitsch (2001), p. 814; Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 1 EUV para 60.

  70. 70.

    Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 1 EUV para 62.

  71. 71.

    Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 1 EUV para 60.

  72. 72.

    Blanke (1993), p. 419.

  73. 73.

    Everling (2010), p. 718 et seqq.; Priollaud and Siritzky (2008), p. 29; contested by Isensee (2009), p. 107, according to whom the democratic legitimation of the Union, directly or indirectly, does not come from on supranational, but rather a variety of national sources.

  74. 74.

    In that respect Hobe (2003), p. 8; affirmed by Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 1 EUV para 64 et seqq.

  75. 75.

    Peters (2001), p. 390 et seqq. (426 et seq.).

  76. 76.

    Bieber (1991), p. 411; Blanke (1993), p. 413, 423. However, in the light of the European debt crisis, parts of German economy consider that “time for consolidation has come”. The bicycle metaphor for European integration is in their opinion the wrong picture; cf. Busch (2012), p. 7.

  77. 77.

    Weiler (2003), p. 18 et seqq., speaks of a new “Principle of Constitutional Tolerance”. By contrast Isensee (2009), p. 103, who deliberately interprets this formula as meaning that the “European Union rises at a new level beyond the nation State” (our translation, emphasis added).

  78. 78.

    Nettesheim (2012a), p. 327.

  79. 79.

    Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 1 EUV para 9.

  80. 80.

    The principle of withdrawal as practised in international law is superseded by Art. 50 TEU as lex specialis: Streinz (2012), para 106 and → Art. 50 para 8, 12.

  81. 81.

    Emphasis added. Cf. on this Pernice (2005).

  82. 82.

    Müller-Graff (2000a), para 72; Zuleeg (1984), p. 296 et seqq., who now rejects the term due to the ongoing communitarisation.

  83. 83.

    Cf. the final report of the Working Group V “Complementary Competencies”, CONV 375/1/02, p. 2, according to which the impression should be avoided that “future transfer of competence to the Union remains in itself an aim and objective of the Union”; Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 1 EUV para 10.

  84. 84.

    Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 1 EUV para 11.

  85. 85.

    Piris (2010), p. 331.

  86. 86.

    Cf. on this the discussion preceding the past enlargement: Weidenfeld (2001), p. 186 et seqq.; cf. the recent Chairman’s Statement for an Interim Report by the Foreign Ministers’ group on the Future of Europe, “The time for a debate on the Future of Europe is now”, 15 June 2012, p. 4.

  87. 87.

    Schwarze, in Schwarze (2012), Art. 1 para 2 speaks of a concept of progress.

  88. 88.

    Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 1 EUV para 12 et seqq.

  89. 89.

    Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 1 EUV para 16.

  90. 90.

    Von Bogdandy (2001), p. 27.

  91. 91.

    Von Bogdandy (2009), p. 64 with further reference; Kottmann and Wohlfahrt (2009), p. 453.

  92. 92.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92 (Judgment of 12 October 1993) para 100 et seqq.—Maastricht (in BVerfGE 89, 155 [185 et seq.] with further reference). This is also the prevailing view in the literature: cf. Ress (1992), p. 985; Grimm (1995), p. 589; Nettesheim, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Art. 1 para 26; Pechstein, in Streinz (2012), Art. 1 EUV para 10; Graf Kielmansegg (2009), p. 228; Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 1 EUV para 24; Heintschel von Heinegg, in Vedder and Heintschel von Heinegg (2012), Art. 1 para 8.

  93. 93.

    Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 1 para 24.

  94. 94.

    Cf. Fischer (2000) [English translation: From confederacy to federation: thoughts on the finality of European integration, in Joerges et al. (2000), p. 19 et seqq.]; cf. also Müller-Graff (2000b), Kohler-Koch (2000) and Schneider (2000).

  95. 95.

    Cf. Haltern (2007), para 29.

  96. 96.

    Cf. Giering (1997) on the development of political science theories on integration in the process of European integration (p. 222 et seq.), on the federal concept (p. 193 et seqq.) and on intergovernmentalism (p. 201 et seqq.). Wulfert (2006), p. 15 with further reference; Kühnhardt (2010). Cf. also Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 1 EUV para 18 et seqq.

  97. 97.

    Cf. von Bogdandy (2001), p. 25 et seqq.

  98. 98.

    Streinz, in Streinz (2012), Art. 1 EUV para 11; Priollaud and Siritzky (2008), p. 30 et seq.

  99. 99.

    Cf. Czech Constitutional Court, Pl. ÚS 19/08 (Decision of 26 November 2008), para 146—Treaty of Lisbon I; Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Ref. No. K 32/09 K (Decision of 24 November 2010) point 3.8—Treaty of Lisbon, referring to the German Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009)—Treaty of Lisbon; see further Steinberger (1991), p. 16 (fn. 21); Pechstein, in Streinz (2012), Art. 1 EUV para 7, 13.

  100. 100.

    Priollaud and Siritzky (2008), p. 30.

  101. 101.

    Cf. on this definition Ipsen (1972), Ï 3 para 44 et seqq.

  102. 102.

    Cf. Schuman’s preface to Reuter (1953), La comrmunauté européenne du charbon et de l’acier.

  103. 103.

    Everling (2010), p. 733 et seq.

  104. 104.

    Cf. Rideau, in Burgorgue-Larsen et al. (2007), Art. 1 para 11; Piris (2010), p. 331. Evidently it is the intention of these voices to point out that the Union is a compositum mixtum (federal entity in some policy areas, international organisation in others) and thus far more than a traditional international organisation. However, this does not exclude the understanding of the Union and its foundation in international law as an international organisation of peculiar character, i.e. sui generis.

  105. 105.

    Cf. Everling (1977), p. 597 et seq., 610 with further reference.

  106. 106.

    Kohler-Koch (1999), p. 14.

  107. 107.

    In the context of the Union Treaty of Maastricht see Blanke (1993), p. 414 et seqq.; in this sense also the German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92 (Judgment of 12 October 1993) para 96 et seqq.—Maastricht (in BVerfGE 89, 155 [184 et seqq.]) and 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 271—Lisbon (in BVerfGE 123, 267 [368]).

  108. 108.

    Nettesheim (2002), p. 507.

  109. 109.

    Pechstein in Streinz (2012), Art. 1 EUV para 10; Piris (2010), p. 331.

  110. 110.

    Hallstein (1969), p. 228; the 5th edn. of 1979 was then named—a little less emotional—“Die Europäische Gemeinschaft” (“The European Community”); cf. on Hallstein’s work, Zuleeg (2003).

  111. 111.

    Di Fabio (1998), p. 139 (our translation).

  112. 112.

    Hugo (1867), p. 222.

  113. 113.

    Churchill (1946), p. 256. Isensee (2009), p. 118 with fn. 39, who interprets Churchill’s call as meaning a “Europe without British participation, that would serve its continental interests for a balance of power”.

  114. 114.

    In this sense Chancellor Kohl (1992), p. 353, who, however, distanced himself from this position in his speech on 6 May 1993: see Kohl (1993), p. 343 et seq.

  115. 115.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 277, 347—Lisbon (in BVerfGE 123, 267 [370 et seq., 404]); affirmative Russo, in Curti Gialdino (2012), Art. 1 TEU para 5.

  116. 116.

    Weiler (2001), p. 3.

  117. 117.

    On the notion see Kirchhof (1992b), para 50 et seqq.; Kirchhof (2010), p. 743 et seqq.; see also German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92 (Judgment of 12 October 1993) para 96, 108—Maastricht (in BVerfGE 89, 155 [184 et seqq., 188]); and 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) headnote 1 and para 229—Lisbon (in BVerfGE 123, 267 [267, 348]).

  118. 118.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92 (Judgment of 12 October 1993) para 96—Maastricht (in BVerfGE 89, 155 [184]).

  119. 119.

    Cf. Di Fabio (1998), p. 140 et seq.

  120. 120.

    Kirchhof (1992a), p. 43; with a critical view on this notion Ipsen (1994), p. 8, who notes that the attempts for a terminological determination should be vanquished. The term introduced by Ipsen (1994), p. 8 et seq., with reference to Carl Friedrich Ophüls, of a “community of States” (“Staatengemeinschaft”) is far less convincing than this notion, that is used in German academic literature also analogously in other terms (“Verfassungsverbund”, “Verwaltungsverbund”). Even the literature of other MS appraises this notion, cf. e.g. Russo, in Curti Gialdino (2012), Art. 1 TEU para 4 in fine.

  121. 121.

    Di Fabio (1998), p. 140.

  122. 122.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92 (Judgment of 12 October 1993) para 100—Maastricht (in BVerfGE 89, 155 [185 et seqq.]).

  123. 123.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 279 et seqq., 295—Lisbon (in BVerfGE 123, 267 [371–373, 379–380]).

  124. 124.

    Weiler (2001), p. 3.

  125. 125.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 280, 295—Lisbon (in BVerfGE 123, 267 [371–372, 379–380]).

  126. 126.

    US Constitution 17th Amendment, section 1: “each Senator shall have one vote”.

  127. 127.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92 (Judgment of 12 October 1993) para 100—Maastricht (in BVerfGE 89, 155 [186]).

  128. 128.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 295—Lisbon (in BVerfGE 123, 267 [379–380]).

  129. 129.

    More optimistic the view of Zwingmann (2012), p. 692 et seq. who holds, that “there are various courses of action open to the European Union to remedy the deficit without creating the perceived double bind”.

  130. 130.

    See, inter alia, Pernice (2002) and Pernice (2009).

  131. 131.

    Börzel and Risse (2000).

  132. 132.

    Cf. Ipsen (1972), p. 227, 233 (“Schwebelage der Souveränität”), with regard to the former EC; Frowein (1992), p. 67, with regard to the EU after Maastricht.

  133. 133.

    On this notion cf. Scharpf (1991), p. 418 et seqq.

  134. 134.

    Cf. Blanke (1993), p. 420, who, against the background of the Treaty of Maastricht, also called for a paradigm shift in the sense that such an allocation should be characterised by federal ideas instead of holding on to the state-centred notion of sovereignty.

  135. 135.

    Cf. Cappelletti et al. (1985) et seqq.

  136. 136.

    Von Bogdandy (1999) and von Bogdandy (2004), p. 1035 et seqq.

  137. 137.

    Beaud (2010), p. 61 et seqq.; Schönberger (2004), p. 85 et seqq.; Piris (2010), p. 331, with further reference, speaks of the EU as a “partially federal entity” and of “partial federalism”. With regard to the Constitutional Treaty, Rideau, in Burgorgue-Larsen et al. (2007) Art. 1 para 11, characterises the Union as “une Féderation d’Etats nations conciliant féderalisme et souveraineté des Etats […] faisant d’un objet politique et juridique non classable une catégorie définie par les caractéristiques spécifiques et hétérogènes de cet objet”.

  138. 138.

    Pescatore (1982), p. ix–x.

  139. 139.

    Cf. e.g. Stern (1984), p. 650, according to whom a “united Europe can only be thought as a federation”.

  140. 140.

    Cf. the letter addressed to Andreotti by Kohl and Mitterand of 6 December 1990, reprinted in Laursen and Vanhoonacker (1992), p. 304.

  141. 141.

    Cf. Nettesheim (2012b), p. 5: “In its further development during the crisis Europe does not have genuinely self-determined freedom” (our translation).

  142. 142.

    Cf. on this Fischer (2000), p. 7.

  143. 143.

    Cf. the speech given by Polish Foreign Minister R. Sikorski before the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), “Poland and the future of the European Union” (28 November 2011): https://dgap.org/sites/default/files/event_downloads/radoslaw_sikorski_poland_and_the_future_of_the_eu_0.pdf; See also European Council, EUCO 120/12, Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union, Report by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy.

  144. 144.

    European Parliament, Proposal for a modification of the Act concerning the election of the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage of 20 September 1976, 2009/2134 (INI).

  145. 145.

    Cf. Final Report of the Future of Europe Group of the Foreign Ministers of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain of 17 September 2012.

  146. 146.

    Nettesheim (2012b), p. 13.

  147. 147.

    Cf. Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 1 para 35 with reference to the “theory of the federation” (→ para 39).

  148. 148.

    Nettesheim (2012b), p. 15.

  149. 149.

    Kühnhardt (2012), p. 5 et seq.

  150. 150.

    Cf. Zotti (2010), esp. p. 89 et seqq.

  151. 151.

    Cf. Kühnhardt (2012), p. 8 et seqq.

  152. 152.

    Kühnhardt (2012), p. 9; Nettesheim (2012b), p. 5.

  153. 153.

    Cf. Rule 103 of the EP’s Rules of Procedure, O.J. L 116/1 (2011).

  154. 154.

    Gerhards (1993), p. 98.

  155. 155.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92 (Judgment of 12 October 1993) para 98—Maastricht (in BVerfGE 89, 155 [185]; cf. Luhmann 1992); on “publicity” as part of the theory of the modern State see Di Fabio (1998), p. 47 et seqq.

  156. 156.

    Pechstein, in Streinz (2012), Art. 1 EUV para 21; Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 1 EUV para 77–78.

  157. 157.

    O.J. C 191 (1992). This Declaration states: “The Conference considers that transparency of the decision-making process strengthens the democratic nature of the institutions and the public’s confidence in the administration […].” Cf. Pechstein, in Streinz (2012), Art. 1 EUV para 21.

  158. 158.

    Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 1 EUV para 77–78; Bitterlich, in Lenz and Borchardt (2010), Art. 1 para 12.

  159. 159.

    Cf. Bröhmer (2004), p. 326.

  160. 160.

    Cf. Case T-211/00, Kuijer v Council (CFI 7 February 2002) para 52, 71; Case T-309/97, Bavarian Lager v Commission (CFI 14 October 1999) para 36.

  161. 161.

    O.J. C 80/80 (2001), No. 6.

  162. 162.

    Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union, sub II.; http://european-convention.eu.int/pdf/lknen.pdf.

  163. 163.

    CONV 424/02 1, p. 21 et seq.

  164. 164.

    Pechstein, in Streinz (2012), Art. 1 EUV para 23.

  165. 165.

    Geiger, in Geiger et al. (2010), Art. 1 para 12.

  166. 166.

    Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 1 EUV para 77.

  167. 167.

    Cf. Santini (2004), p. 131 et seqq.

  168. 168.

    Parliament/Council Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, O.J. L 145/43 (2001).

  169. 169.

    Santini (2004), p. 140 et seqq.; cf. for the treatment of sensitive documents Art. 9 in conjunction with Art. 4 of Reg. 1049/2001.

  170. 170.

    Nettesheim, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Art. 1 para 33; with regard to the Treaty of Amsterdam see Hilf, in Grabitz and Hilf (1999), Art. A para 1.

  171. 171.

    Cf. Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 1 EUV para 1.

  172. 172.

    Cf. Stumpf, in Schwarze (2000), Art. 1 EUV para 1.

  173. 173.

    Cf. Bröhmer (2004), p. 324 et seqq.

  174. 174.

    Case T-191/99, Petrie et al. v Commission (CFI 11 December 2001) para 34 et seq., 37.

  175. 175.

    Schwarze, in Schwarze (2012), Art. 1 para 3.

  176. 176.

    Schwarze, in Schwarze (2012), Art. 1 para 3.

  177. 177.

    Case C-64/05 P, Sweden v Commission (ECJ 18 December 2007) para 66; Joined Cases C-39/05 P, C-52/05 P, Sweden and Maurizio Turco v Council (ECJ 1 July 2008) para 36.

  178. 178.

    Case C-404/10 P, Commission v Éditions Odile Jacob SAS (ECJ 28 June 2012) para 145.

  179. 179.

    Cf. Bröhmer (2004), p. 327.

  180. 180.

    With regard to Art. 1 (2) TEU-Amsterdam Bröhmer (2004), p. 327 et seqq., who even speaks of a justiciability of the transparency principle. Cf. from the European case law Joined Cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P, Sweden and Maurizio Turco v Council (ECJ 1 July 2008) and Case C-506/08 P, Sweden v Commission (ECJ 21 November 2011); cf. also Riemann (2004), p. 133 et seqq.; Epiney (2007).

  181. 181.

    Cf. the letter addressed to Andreotti by Kohl and Mitterand of 6 December 1990 (“We would like the intergovernmental conference to define the bases and structures of a political union that features strength and solidarity, is close to the citizens and committed to the direction laid down by its federal nature.”). The Memorandum from the Portuguese Delegation on “Political Union with a View to the Intergovernmental Conference” (30 September 1990) had stated before: “Intensification of the European integration process […] must be directed towards […] bringing the Community closer to the citizens by responding their deepest concerns” (see for these documents Laursen and Vanhoonacker 1992, p. 304, 313).

  182. 182.

    Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 1 EUV para 71; Pechstein, in Streinz (2012), Art. 1 EUV para 23.

  183. 183.

    Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 1 EUV para 73.

  184. 184.

    Russo, in Curti Gialdino (2012), Art. 1 TEU para 5.

  185. 185.

    Cf. Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 1 EUV para 72; Pipkorn (1992), p. 698.

  186. 186.

    Heintschel von Heinegg, in Vedder and Heintschel von Heinegg (2012), Art. 1 para 9.

  187. 187.

    Bitterlich, in Lenz and Borchardt (2010), Art. 1 para 13.

  188. 188.

    See initially Edinburgh European Council of 11/12 December 1992, Conclusions.

  189. 189.

    Cf. with regard to the “organisational structures” in relationship among public authorities (“organisational units”) Isensse (2001), p. 372 et seq. According to him, closeness to the citizen, as far as it is deduced from the principle of subsidiarity, is watered down to an infinitesimal rest in a federal order of competences.

  190. 190.

    In this sense also the criticism by Herzog (1987), p. 3566, with regard to the theorists of the catholic social teaching: An interpretation according to the criterion of “which community is ‘closer’ to the human personality and thus better serves its raison d’être, understood as ‘perfection’, is the uselessness of the principle of subsidiarity as a delimiting rule; ‘closeness to the personality’ is such a vague term that one cannot reasonably use it as a basis for the division of competences” (our translation).

  191. 191.

    The Adonino Report “A People’s Europe”, Bull. EC, Supplement 7/85, p. 20 with fn. 3, emphasises “voting rights and eventually eligibility in local elections” as an “essential feature of a People’s Europe”. In the programme “Europe for citizens” (2007–2013) the Commission states (p. 1): “Fostering participation through volunteering in particular, promoting equal opportunities for all, intercultural dialogue and contributing to an inclusive society are issues of fundamental importance to active citizenship, including as regards participation in political life.”

  192. 192.

    This was apparently the intention of the founding fathers of the Treaties: cf. Pechstein, in Streinz (2012), Art. 1 EUV para 23; the connection between “democracy, transparency, and subsidiarity” is already reflected by the “Interinstitutional declaration on democracy, transparency, and subsidiarity” (25 October 1993).

  193. 193.

    Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 1 EUV para73.

  194. 194.

    Pechstein, in Streinz (2012), Art. 1 EUV para 24.

  195. 195.

    Schwarze, in Schwarze (2012), Art. 1 para 3.

  196. 196.

    Schwarze, in Schwarze (2012), Art. 1 para 3.

  197. 197.

    Heintschel v. Heinegg, in Vedder and Heintschel von Heinegg (2012), Art. 1 para 10.

  198. 198.

    Schwarze, in Schwarze (2012), Art. 1 para 3.

  199. 199.

    Cf. CHARTE 4131/00 of 17 February 2000.

  200. 200.

    Cf. Brussels European Council of 21/22 June 2007, Conclusions, 11177/1/07 REV 1, No. 10.

  201. 201.

    Cf. Brussels European Council of 21/22 June 2007, Conclusions, 11177/1/07 REV 1, Annex 1.

  202. 202.

    Cf. on the detailed discussions on the constitutional character of the Treaty of Lisbon: Pernice and Tanchev (2009), esp. p. 44 et seqq.; Fleiner (2010), p. 15; Ipsen (1983), p. 29, calls the Community Treaties “a changing constitution of sui generis, otherwise not existing character” (eine Wandel-Verfassung einzigartigen, sonst nicht existierenden Typs).

  203. 203.

    Cf. with regard to the EU/EC Treaties since Maastricht Blanke and Mangiameli (2006), p. XXVII.

  204. 204.

    Cf. Griller (2009), p. 49 et seqq.; Nettesheim (2002), p. 502 et seqq.

  205. 205.

    Cf. Nettesheim (2002), 507 et seqq.; with a different view Griller (2009), p. 52 et seq.

  206. 206.

    Cf. Case 294/83, Les Verts v Parliament (ECJ 23 April 1986) para 23.

  207. 207.

    Cf. Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos (ECJ 7 March 1985) p. 12.

  208. 208.

    Kutscher (1976); Schwarze (2012), p. 29 et seqq. (59 et seqq., 61); differently Bleckmann (1982), p. 1181; Bernhardt 1980, p. 237; Bernhardt (1981), p. 20 et seq.

  209. 209.

    Schwarze (2012), p. 61 and p. 43 with fn. 67 and 68.

  210. 210.

    Bleckmann (1983), p. 68.

  211. 211.

    “Changing constitution” (Wandelverfassung), Ipsen (1987), p. 201.

  212. 212.

    Brussels European Council of 21/22 June 2007, Conclusions, 11177/1/07 REV 1, Annex 1, No. 2.

  213. 213.

    Cf. Laeken European Council of 14/15 December 2001, Conclusions, SN 300/1/01 REV 1, Annex I sub II. In the Constitutional Convention, Working Group III (“legal personality”) was tasked with this issue: cf. the final report of the Working Group, CONV 305/02.

  214. 214.

    Cf. Wessels and Faber (2007), p. 370.

  215. 215.

    Cf. on this understanding von Bogdandy (2001), p. 3; Haltern (2007), para 29.

  216. 216.

    With the same view the German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92 (Judgment of 12 October 1993) para 4 (in BVerfGE 89, 155, 159)—Maastricht, as well as, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 9—Lisbon.

  217. 217.

    Cf. Pechstein and Koenig (2000), para 100.

  218. 218.

    Cf. Oppermann (2004), p. 24; Ohler, in Streinz et al. (2010), p. 49 et seq.

  219. 219.

    Cf. Protocol No. 36 amending the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community annexed to the Constitutional Treaty.

  220. 220.

    Cf. Heintschel von Heinegg, in Vedder and Heintschel von Heinegg (2012), Art. 1 para 5.

  221. 221.

    Cf. Schwarze (2004), p. 493.

  222. 222.

    Piris (2010), p. 66.

  223. 223.

    O.J. L 112/10 (2012).

  224. 224.

    Cf. Obwexer (2009), p. 95 et seqq.

  225. 225.

    However, with the TCE, too, the MS wanted to ensure the safeguard of legal continuity in the process of European integration; with this view Müller-Graff (2004), p. 188; Schwarze (2004), p. 494. Nonetheless, the political will for an actual break has been far greater with the project of a European Constitution.

  226. 226.

    Cf. Streinz, in Streinz et al. (2010), p. 41.

  227. 227.

    Tosato (2010), p. 61 et seq., who holds the view that the specific provisions on the CFSP (Art. 23 et seqq.) should have been incorporated into the TFEU. Because of Art. 24.1 (2) sentence 1 and 2 TEU this view is not convincing.

  228. 228.

    Cf. on this Piris (2010), p. 67 et seq.

  229. 229.

    Cf. Jacqué (2009), p. 878; Geiger, in Geiger (2010), Art. 1 EUV para 10; Bitterlich, in Lenz and Borchardt (2010), Art. 1 EUV para 6; Ziller (2010), p. 530 et seq.; Blumann and Dubois (2010), p. 528; Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 1 EUV para 4; with a different view apparently Tosato (2010), p. 63, 66, who holds that the “application treaty” (“trattato applicativo”—TFEU) is subordinate to the basic treaty (“trattato-base”—TEU) and that they constitute “two levels”. With a slightly differing view Wessels and Hofmann (2008), p. 4, since the order of competences and the AFSJ are placed in the TFEU, not in the TEU.

  230. 230.

    Cf. Piris (2010), p. 69.

  231. 231.

    Cf. Brussels European Council of 21/22 June 2007, Conclusions, 11177/1/07 REV 1, Annex I sub II, No. 9 with FN 3 (without, however, stating the reason).

  232. 232.

    Piris (2010), p. 70, points out inconsistencies in the contents of TEU and TFEU; the most significant in his view is the fact “that the location of the provisions on CFSP [is] in the TEU and not in the TFEU”. Similarly Nettesheim, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Art. 1 AEUV para 53, who criticises the division on the provisions on the institutions and on Union citizenship. Another editorial insufficiency could be seen in the parallel provisions on Art. 53–55 TEU and Art. 356–358 TFEU (duration, ratification, languages).

  233. 233.

    Cf. Hesse (1999) and Müller (1979).

  234. 234.

    Cf. Häberle (2011), p. 259.

  235. 235.

    Cf. Hesse (1999), § 2 para 72. See also Marauhn and Ruppel (2008), esp. p. 281 et seqq.

  236. 236.

    Cf. Case C-112/00, Schmidberger (ECJ 12 June 2003) para 77, 83 et seqq. (89); cf. also Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation, Finnish Seamen’s Union v. Viking Line (ECJ11 December. 2007) para 76 et seqq.

  237. 237.

    Cf. Nettesheim, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Art. 1 AEUV para 42. Wessel (2011) calls this the “soul” (functions) of an international organisation which is distinct from its “body” (institutional framework).

  238. 238.

    Cf. Karl (2000), p. 936.

  239. 239.

    Cf. Explanation to Art. 52 EUCFR, O.J. C 310/456; final report of Working Group II of the Constitutional Convention, CONVENT 354/02 of 22 October 2002, p. 6.

  240. 240.

    CONVENT 27 of 18 April 2000, p. 3.

  241. 241.

    Cf. the overview in Hahn (1962a), p. 382 et seq. with examples from international practice further on in the contribution. See also Wessel (2011), p. 347 et seqq.

  242. 242.

    Cf. Wessel (2011), p. 351.

  243. 243.

    Myers (1993), p. 15; cf. also Gnamou-Petauton (2008), p. 5 et seqq. with numerous examples.

  244. 244.

    Cf. Gnamou-Petauton (2008), p. 18 et seqq.

  245. 245.

    See, in general, on the dissolution of an international organisation by the (new) constituent treaty of the successor, Gnamou-Petauton (2008), p. 133 et seqq., esp. p. 148 et seqq.

  246. 246.

    Cf. on this Art. 39 et seqq. VCLT, esp. Art. 54.

  247. 247.

    Such a replacement would have been subject to Art. 59.1 lit. a VCLT, that governs the termination of a treaty due to the conclusion of a new treaty relating to the same subject matter.

  248. 248.

    Cf. German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 2—Lisbon (in BVerfGE 123, 267 [271 et seq.]).

  249. 249.

    Cf. Terhechte (2008), p. 183.

  250. 250.

    Cf. Erlbacher (2009), p. 131; Erlbacher and Beaucillon (2010), p. 102, 104 et seq.; Calliess in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 1 EUV para 7, who explains the differing view with the differences that existed before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon regarding the EU’s legal personality. A legal new beginning of the EU is assumed by Pechstein (2010), p. 427; Haratsch (2010), p. 67; Haratsch et al. (2010), para 51.

  251. 251.

    Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011) Art. 1 EUV para 7, on the other hand, infers from this provision of the TCE, which provided for an (intended) new founding of the EU, that with the Treaty of Lisbon, which only deals with the succession of the EC by the Union, that no such new founding is intended any longer.

  252. 252.

    With this view also Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 1 EUV para 8.

  253. 253.

    Cf. Ohler, in Streinz et al. (2010), p. 51.

  254. 254.

    Cf. the considerations in the Convention: CONV 305/02, point 14.

  255. 255.

    Cf. Ohler, in Streinz et al. (2010), p. 51.

  256. 256.

    Cf. on this Hahn (2000), p. 1341 and Schermers and Blokker (2003), p. 1000 et seq.

  257. 257.

    Cf. Bindschedler (2000), p. 1299; Klein and Schmahl (2010), p. 305 et seq. para 93–95; Seidl-Hohenveldern and Loibl (2000), p. 93 et seq.; Scheffer (2010), p. 83 et seq.; with a different view Pechstein and Koenig (2000), para 62; Köck and Fischer (1997), p. 566 et seq.

  258. 258.

    Cf. Mosler (2000), p. 711.

  259. 259.

    Cf. Bindschedler (2000), p. 1299; Ballreich (2000), p. 945; Klein and Schmahl (2010), p. 306 et seq. para 96.

  260. 260.

    Cf. Bindschedler (2000), p. 1299; Klein and Schmahl (2010), p. 306 et seq. para 96; Scheffer (2010), p. 85 et seq.; The only exception to this rule is the UN, cf. International Court of Justice, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion of 11 April 1949), ICJ Reports 1949, p. 185.

  261. 261.

    Cf. on this Fassbender (2004), p. 28 et seqq.

  262. 262.

    Cf. Erlbacher (2009), p. 124 et seq., 126 et seqq.

  263. 263.

    On the Council practice since 2000 to conclude international treaties with third States and international organisations on behalf of the Union or with the Union as a “contracting party”, cf. Erlbacher (2009), p. 125 et seqq.

  264. 264.

    Cf. Ohler, in Streinz et al. (2010), p. 51.

  265. 265.

    Cf. Köck and Fischer (1997), p. 603.

  266. 266.

    Cf. on the succession of the League of Nations by the UN, the Permanent Court of International Justice by the ICJ and the case of OEEC/OECD see Köck and Fischer (1997), p. 603 et seqq. See also Hahn (1962a), p. 405 et seqq.; Schmalenbach (2006), para 11. On the OEEC/OECD in particular see Hahn (1962b).

  267. 267.

    Myers (1993), p. 12.

  268. 268.

    Cf. the examples given in Hahn (1962a) and Myers (1993); cf. also Gnamou-Petauton (2008), p. 7 et seq.

  269. 269.

    Cf. Pellet (1972), p. 416.

  270. 270.

    Art. 15 of the Founding Convention states: “When this Convention comes into force the reconstitution of the [OEEC] shall take effect, and its aims, organs, powers and name shall thereupon be as provided herein. The legal personality possessed by the [OEEC] shall continue in the Organisation, but decisions, recommendations and resolutions of the [OEEC] shall require approval of the Council to be effective after the coming into force of this Convention.”

  271. 271.

    Cf. on this Myers (1993), p. 37 et seq.; cf. also Gnamou-Petauton (2008), p. 43 et seqq.

  272. 272.

    Hahn (1962a), p. 405 et seqq.; Wessel (2011), p. 351; Myers (1993), p. 16 et seqq. Cf. ICJ, International status of South-West Africa (Advisory Opinion of 11 July 1950), ICJ Reports 1950, 128, p. 136: “It cannot be admitted that the obligation to submit to supervision has disappeared merely because the supervisory organ has ceased to exist, when the United Nations has another international organ performing similar, though not identical, supervisory functions.” See Pellet (1972), p. 416. A more express wording was used by the ICJ in another advisory opinion on that matter (21 June 1971; ICJ Reports 1971, 16, para 102) when it stated that “the United Nations […] is a successor of the League in this respect”.

  273. 273.

    Cf. on this the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of State Property, Archives and Debts of 1983 (not yet in force); Fiedler (2000), p. 644 et seqq.

  274. 274.

    Cf. Calliess (2010), p. 83.

  275. 275.

    On the distinction between “succession in fact” (change of territory) and “succession in law” (legal succession) see Jones (1947), p. 360 et seqq.; Zimmermann (2000), p. 9.

  276. 276.

    Cf. Dahm et al. (1988), § 50, IV. 2; Fiedler (2000), p. 643 et seq.

  277. 277.

    Cf. Ohler, in Streinz et al. (2010), p. 51.

  278. 278.

    Myers (1993), p. 38, however, classifies this as a mixture of constitutional change and merger of certain organs.

  279. 279.

    See ICJ, International status of South-West Africa (Advisory Opinion of 11 July 1950), ICJ Reports 1950, 128, p. 136: “It cannot be admitted that the obligation to submit to supervision has disappeared merely because the supervisory organ has ceased to exist, when the United Nations has another international organ performing similar, though not identical, supervisory functions.” See Pellet (1972), p. 416.

  280. 280.

    Schmalenbach (2006), para 3.

  281. 281.

    E.g. Joined Cases 27/59 and 39/59, Alberto Campolongo v High Authority of the ECSC (ECJ 15 July 1960), p. 404: “operational unity of the European Communities”.

  282. 282.

    Von Borries (2009), para 15.

  283. 283.

    Cf. Hahn (1962a), p. 418 et seq.

  284. 284.

    Von Borries (2009), para 7; Ubertazzi (2004), p. 11. Cf. on that matter Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, 21 June 1999, O.J. C 190/1 (1999); and Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, 29 February 2002, O.J. L 79/42 (2002); cf. also Council Decision 2002/596/EC of 19 July 2002 on the consequences of the expiry of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) on the international agreements concluded by the ECSC, O.J. L 194 (2002) and now Protocol No. 37. Cf. in general on the case of expiration of the constituent treaty of an international organisation Gnamou-Petauton (2008), p. 45–54 (with p. 45–46 on the ECSC) as well as p. 103–105; on the liquidation of the ECSC’s assets see Gnamou-Petauton (2008), p. 215–218 and 227–229.

  285. 285.

    O.J. C 306/199 (2007).

  286. 286.

    Blumann and Dubois (2010), p. 528.

  287. 287.

    Cf. Picker (2004), p. 759 et seq.

  288. 288.

    Cf. Ohler, in Streinz et al. (2010), p. 51.

  289. 289.

    Cf. on this generally Hahn (2000), p. 1340; cf. also Pellet (1972), p. 416.

  290. 290.

    Cf. on this Chiu (1965), p. 103 et seqq.

  291. 291.

    Cf. Graf Vitzthum (2010), p. 54 para 120.

  292. 292.

    Cf. Klein and Schmahl (2010), p. 291 et seq., para 60.

  293. 293.

    Cf. the identical provisions in Art. 50 VCSST and in Art. 51 of the Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in respect of State Property, Archives and Debts: “Succession of States means the replacement of one State by another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory.”

  294. 294.

    Hahn (1962a), p. 399.

  295. 295.

    Cf. Wessel (2011), p. 344 et seq.; Schmalenbach (2006), para 1.

  296. 296.

    Cf. O’Connell (1979), p. 725 et seqq.

  297. 297.

    See Hahn (1962a), p. 381. However, this Convention rather refers to the exercise of external relations of certain territories; cf. on this Art. 2.1 lit. b VCSST. Moreover for international organisations, different rules (their own) shall apply, Art. 4.

  298. 298.

    Cf. on this Köck and Fischer (1997), p. 606.

  299. 299.

    Those agreements have been concluded in the cases of the World Health Organisation and the World Meteorological Organisation and their respective predecessors; see Hahn (1962a), p. 390 et seqq.

  300. 300.

    Cf. Ubertazzi (2004), p. 2 et seqq. and FN 25.

  301. 301.

    Council Decision 2002/596/EC of 19 July 2002 on the consequences of the expiry of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) on the international agreements concluded by the ECSC. O.J. L 194/36 (2002).

  302. 302.

    See Wessel (2011), p. 354.

  303. 303.

    With the same view Erlbacher (2009), p. 131.

  304. 304.

    Cf. “The European Union and the WTO”, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/european_communities_e.htm.

  305. 305.

    Council Joint Action 2001/555/CFSP on the establishment of a European Union Satellite Centre, O.J. L 200/5 (2001), last amended by Council Decision 2011/297/CFSP, O.J. L 136/62 (2011).

  306. 306.

    Council Joint Action 2001/554/CFSP on the establishment of a European Union Institute for Security Studies, O.J. L 200/1 (2001), amended by Joint Action 2006/1002/CFSP, O.J. L 409/181 (2006).

  307. 307.

    Statement of the Presidency of the Permanent Council of the WEU on behalf of the High Contracting Parties of 31 March 2010.

  308. 308.

    Decision of the Council of the Western European Union of 27 May 2011 on the residual rights and obligations of the WEU; Council Decision 2011/297/CFSP of 23 May 2011 amending Joint Action 2001/555/CFSP on the establishment of a European Union Satellite Centre, O.J. L 136/62 (2011).

  309. 309.

    Cologne European Council of 3/4 June, Conclusions, Annex III No. 5: “We are now determined to launch a new step in the construction of the European Union […], including the […] the inclusion of those functions of the WEU which will be necessary for the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg tasks. […] In that event, the WEU as an organisation would have completed its purpose.”

  310. 310.

    Wessel (2011), p. 350.

  311. 311.

    Rightly so also Wessel (2011), p. 348.

Table of Cases

ECJ

  • ECJ 15.07.1960, Joined Cases 27/59 and 39/59, Alberto Campolongo v High Authority of the ECSC, ECR 391 [cit. in para 87]

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty for Economics, Law and Social Science, University of Erfurt, Erfurt, Germany

    Hermann-Josef Blanke

  2. National Research Council Institute for Regionalism, Federalism and Self-Government, Rome, Italy

    Stelio Mangiameli

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  1. Faculty for Economics, Law and Social Sc, University of Erfurt, Erfurt, Germany

    Hermann-Josef Blanke

  2. National Research Council - Institute fo Regionalism, Federalism and Self-Governm, Rome, Italy

    Stelio Mangiameli

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Blanke, HJ., Mangiameli, S. (2013). Article 1 [Establishment and Functioning of the Union]. In: Blanke, HJ., Mangiameli, S. (eds) The Treaty on European Union (TEU). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31706-4_2

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