Abstract
National Parliaments 14–17 contribute actively to the good functioning of the Union 18–27 :
See also the commentaries on Protocols No. 1 and No. 2.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Von Bogdandy and Bast (2010), p. 304.
- 3.
In this sense, see Louis (2009), p. 133, who also remembers (in fn. 2) that this is the only provision in the Treaty to be drafted in the “indicative present” and not as a shall prescription: this is a consequence of the opposition of the United Kingdom House of Commons to a previous draft text that seemed to impose a legal duty to Parliaments and that had been criticised in the House of Commons. See European Scrutiny Committee of the House of Commons—European Union Intergovernmental Conference, Follow-up Report—Third Report of Session 2007–2008, p. 7. According to Hölscheidt, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 12 EUV para 4, Art. 12 TEU has “declaratory nature”.
- 4.
- 5.
“One of the great innovations of the Treaties”, according to Fischer (2010), p. 146.
- 6.
A specific provision on national Parliaments had already been proposed by the report of the Group IV of the Convention on the Future of Europe, but it had not been included in the drafts and in the final text of the Treaty.
- 7.
Kapteyn et al. (2009), p. 218.
- 8.
Gennart (2010), p. 19.
- 9.
- 10.
The partial exceptions being those national Constitutions that allow ratification on the base of a referendum, that by-passes the parliamentary decision, like in the case of France (Art. 11 Const.): Oberdorff (2008), p. 718.
But also in the cases where Parliaments do preserve the power of ratification of the Treaties, the freedom of which they dispose “is largely reduced if not annihilated, because it cannot do anything else than accepting or refusing the Treaty that is submitted to it” (Saulnier 2002, p. 100).
- 11.
Also for the implementation of directives, the margins of choice for the national Parliaments are limited (Oberdorff 2008, p. 720). The French Constitutional Council has correctly underlined that the implementation of directives is “a community obligation and a constitutional necessity”, Decision 2004-496 DC (Judgment of 10 June 2004).
- 12.
Art. 20–25 ECSC Treaty; Art. 107–114 Euratom Treaty; Art. 137–144 EEC Treaty.
- 13.
Oeter (2010), p. 66.
- 14.
Decaro and Lupo (2009), p. 18 remark that at his origins the EP was “configurated as a typical Assembly of an international organization”. After all, as Besselink (2006), p. 1, notes, “European integration is by origin a foreign affairs matter. These affairs are traditionally dominated by national executives. National Parliaments play a role only in the margins”.
- 15.
- 16.
For a detailed account see for example Sicardi (2007), p. 40 et seqq.
- 17.
Rideau (1996), p. 170 mentions a proposal of the British delegation of 6 March 1991 during the Political Union Intergovernmental Conference, suggesting the adoption by the Conference of a Declaration “by which the Member States would commit themselves to transmit to their Parliaments all the legislative proposals made by the Commission, to take the necessary measures in order to allow the Parliaments to survey the said proposals and to ensure that the procedures followed by the Council would make available a previous examination of the final decisions at national level”. Rideau also notes that “the ideas developed in this note can also be found in a resolution adopted by the European Parliament on 10 October 1991”.
- 18.
Cartabia (2007), p. 105–106.
- 19.
This first mention of national Parliaments is correctly defined “minimal” by Chalmers et al. (2006), p. 28.
- 20.
On these three questions, and their connections, see Linde Paniagua (2004), p. 169 et seq.
- 21.
See the conclusions in CONV 353/02.
- 22.
See the conclusions in CONV 286/02.
- 23.
Passos (2008), p. 27.
- 24.
In the Convention draft national Parliaments had been dealt with by Art. III-160: “1. Member States’ national Parliaments shall ensure that the proposals and legislative initiatives submitted under Sects. 4 and 5 of this Chapter comply with the principle of subsidiarity, in accordance with the arrangements in the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Member States’ national Parliaments may participate in the evaluation mechanisms contained in Article III-161 and in the political monitoring of Europol and the evaluation of Eurojust’s activities in accordance with Articles III-177 and III-174”.
- 25.
Hölscheidt, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Art. 12 EUV para 2, notes that in the Constitutional Treaty national Parliaments were mentioned in 13 provisions.
- 26.
Doc. 11177/07 of 23 June 2007, Annex I, para 11.
- 27.
Villani (2009), p. 408.
- 28.
Craig (2008), p. 149.
- 29.
Using the language of Schmitter (2000).
- 30.
- 31.
On this see the remarks of Hölscheidt, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Art. 12 EUV para 12. It is interesting to remark that the language of European law uses the definition of “national” and not of “Member State” Parliaments: the idea of nation, with all its historic and semantic ambiguities, appears here, almost to testify that democratic legitimacy requires the nation-State.
- 32.
Uerpmann-Wittzack (2009), p. 462 underlines that the question of what is a national Parliament, or a Chamber thereof (for example the question if the German Bundesrat is a Chamber or not), “belongs to the fundamental political and constitutional structures of the MS”. Of course this does not mean that national law is entirely free in the choice qualifying of an authority as a national Parliament in the sense used by the Treaties: see on this problem Kiiver (2012), p. 48 et seqq.
- 33.
Unicameral Parliaments are foreseen by the Constitutions of Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Greece, Hungary, Luxemburg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Sweden.
- 34.
The bicameral Parliaments of the EU MS are those of Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, Rumania, Netherlands, Czech Republic, The Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Slovenia.
- 35.
It could be argued that this Declaration could be interpreted analogically in order to allow other MS to recognise subsidiarity objections formulated by their subnational Parliaments as if they were formulated by a Chamber of their national Parliaments.
- 36.
In Spain the main European functions of the two Chambers that compose the Cortes Generales are exercised by a Joint Committee (Comisión mixta para la Unión Europea): see Law No. 8/1994 as modified by Law No. 24/2009.
- 37.
An overview of many of the factors mentioned here can be found in Bergman (1997).
- 38.
See the examples of Italy, Spain and Portugal (for the regions of Azores and Madeira), where regions are endowed with legislative powers guaranteed by the constitution with the consequence that in some areas the national Parliament cannot intervene or can intervene only in a limited form. Also the UK must be considered in this list: even though the Scotland Act 1998 does not limit the power of the Westminster Parliament to legislate for Scotland, the “Sewel convention” provides in this sense and the role of constitutional conventions in the constitutional system of the United Kingdom is functionally equivalent to that of constitutional rules in other European countries.
- 39.
See the cases of Germany, Austria and Belgium.
- 40.
The classical case is Art. 34 of the French Constitution.
- 41.
This can be the case of the powers of Governments to adopt acts having force of (primary) law in Italy and in Spain.
- 42.
See for example the difference in the powers of Parliaments to influence Governments (up to the point of dismissing them) between rationalised and non-rationalised parliamentary systems and—within the formers—between systems where only a constructive motion of no confidence can be adopted to dismiss the Government (like in Germany, Spain, Belgium and Slovenia) and systems where a simple vote of no confidence is the form to reach that end (like in Italy, Austria and Sweden). Moreover, the existence of an independent President, directly elected by the people and endowed with extensive powers (specially in France and Cyprus), strongly reduces the power of Parliament to influence the executive power (given the constitutional rule according to which that Head of State is not responsible before his national Parliament, while his Prime Minister is: Besselink 2006, p. 6) and reduces the importance of the confidence relation (that in Cyprus seems not to exist at all; Cyprus is also quoted by Grabenwarter (2010), p. 109 as the only EU country whose Parliament does not have any competences to participate to the European legislative process).
- 43.
See Saalfeld (2005).
- 44.
See Holzhacker (2005).
- 45.
According to the seminal distinction proposed by Lijphart (1984).
- 46.
For example the participation to the formation of the second Chamber (in Austria), or to constitutional amendment (in the United States) or to the election of the President (in Italy and in Germany).
- 47.
Kiiver (2006), p. 99 et seqq. underlines that national Parliaments are national institutions, that perform a national constitutional function and that defend national interests. “Using” them in a European perspective is not impossible nor in itself dangerous, but must move from the idea that they are not European organs—neither supranational, nor intergovernmental—in their nature. According to Maurer and Wessels (2001), p. 464, national Parliaments are weak performers on the supranational scene, because they are trapped in their national role.
- 48.
Brosius-Gersdorf (1999).
- 49.
This is the language used by the German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92 (Judgment of 12 October 1993) C.I.2.a—Treaty of Maastricht, and 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) headnote 1 and para 229—Treaty of Lisbon.
- 50.
It is possible to generalise to the overall role of national Parliaments the opinion of Cooper (2006), p. 282: “[T]he Early Warning System has the dual purpose of promoting both democratic legitimacy and subsidiarity compliance within the EU”.
- 51.
- 52.
Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 12 EUV para 4.
- 53.
Von Bogdandy (2005) underlines the growth of the powers of the EP as a factor that reduces the impact of the de-parliamentarisation.
- 54.
But actually the real starting point is the Maastricht decision of the German Constitutional Court (1993). See Cartabia (1994), p. 203 et seqq.
- 55.
Tans (2007a), p. 3.
- 56.
See on this point the German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 297—Treaty of Lisbon.
- 57.
See on this point the German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 250–251—Treaty of Lisbon.
- 58.
See Ninatti (2004), p. 1405 (“a Parliament without politics”).
- 59.
A factor of this weakness is the reduced turnout at European election: historically low (starting from the highest percentage, 62 % in 1979), the turnout has steadily declined, arriving to 43 % in the 2009 election. Of course this is not a legal, but a cultural and political factor of weakness, expression of the absence of a European public opinion, mentioned in the text.
The German literature frequently points to another factor of weakness: “the distribution of the representatives’ seats among the individual Member States does not fully correspond to the population, even if taking into account a base for the smaller Member States” [Everling 2010, p. 719, among many]. This position has been restated by the German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 280–287—Treaty of Lisbon.
- 60.
See O’Brennan and Raunio (2007), p. 2–5.
- 61.
Schmidt (1999).
- 62.
See the rich debate in the German constitutional literature: e.g. Kirchhof (2001); Ruffert (2002); Herdegen and Morlok (2003); Dieringer (2005). For a critical view of this line of thought see von Bogdandy (2005), p. 448–459, arguing that the history of the role of Parliaments in Europe, both at the national and at the European level, has been a story of increase of powers and not of decline.
- 63.
Dann (2004), p. 269.
- 64.
Von Bogdandy (2005) remarks that the role of Parliaments in Europe has been strenghtened in the last decades of the twentieth Century: two examples of this growth of powers are the central role recognised to Parliament by the Constitutions of Central and Eastern European States after 1989 and the recover of authority of the French Parliament in the last 50 years, notwithstanding the diminishing provisions included in the Constitution of 1958. But these two facts, although remarkable, are not enough to counter the general trend described in the text.
- 65.
- 66.
According to Jacqué (2009), p. 67–68, the increase of the role of democracy in the Treaty of Lisbon has reduced the democratic deficit to “a political argument without a foundation in the reality of the Treaties”. But see the opposite opinion of the German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 293—Treaty of Lisbon.
- 67.
On national Parliaments as “forms of external democratic legitimacy” see Ferraro (2003), p. 184. On internal and external democratisation see Verola (2006), p. 206–208, Gambale, (2006), p. 836 and Mastroianni (2010), p. 196–197. On the necessity of promoting both the role of the EP and that of national Parliaments in a complementary perspective, see Matía Portilla (2003), p. 214.
- 68.
Katz and Wessels (1999), p. 11.
- 69.
Gambale (2006) and Ninatti (2004), p. 1415 et seq., remark that the EP and national Parliaments have for a long time worked in two different functional areas: the first tried to increase its role in the legislative process, while the seconds attempted to strengthen their functions of control and direction of the respective governments.
- 70.
- 71.
German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92 (Judgment of 12 October 1993) C.I.2 b2—Treaty of Maastricht.
- 72.
Cartabia (2007), p. 126.
- 73.
According to Ninatti (2004), p. 1414, “it could be said that while the integrationist/federalist school of thought upholds the valorisation of the European Parliament, the intergovernmental school continues to underline the centrality of National Parliaments for the purpose of the democratic legitimacy of the community system”.
- 74.
See Morviducci (2008), p. 85 for the distinction between the legitimacy and the democratic deficits.
- 75.
See Maurer and Wessels (2001); De Felice (2008), p. 263 et seqq., who speaks of “comeback of the losers”. National Parliaments are losers because they actually suffer not only of a loss of competence (that affects also national Governments) but also of the loss of the power to participate to the modification of the European “rule” (that Governments acquire).
- 76.
Cooper (2006), p. 292.
- 77.
Bermann (2009), p. 157.
- 78.
This was one of the questions posed by the Laeken Declaration.
- 79.
Van der Schyff and Leenknegt (2007).
- 80.
Linde Paniagua (2004), p. 169–171.
- 81.
This idea has often been advocated by the French National Assembly, by the French Senate [see Poniatowski 1992] and by the British Government (e.g. by the then UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook in 1998). The problem was expressly posed by the first question of the Laeken Declaration, but the answer of Group IV of the Constitutional Convention was negative.
- 82.
It also reminds of the shortages of that representative assembly: for a summary see Kiiver (2006), p. 135–137.
- 83.
See debate in the COSAC, mentioned in Neri (1998), p. 151 et seqq.
- 84.
See Art. 19 of the Preliminary Draft (CONV 369/02).
- 85.
Dann (2010), p. 269, calls this the “dilemma between their own right to control and the efficiency of Union procedures. The more they try to control their governments by means of supervision, the more they run the risk of blocking procedures”. See also Sleath (2007), p. 563 and Weber (2011), p. 503.
- 86.
In the terms of the Laeken Declaration of 2001, the trade-off is between the second (simplification) and the third (democratisation, also through a stronger role of national Parliaments) question.
- 87.
This is basically the same difference highlighted by Weatherill (2003), p. 909, between supervision of the performance of State representation acting in Council and holding them accountable for it on one side and engage directly the national Parliaments in the European law-making process.
- 88.
See the Preamble of the Protocol (No. 1) on national Parliaments. For Hölscheidt, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Art. 12 EUV para 8, “it is in first line competence of the internal legal orders to regulate the participation of national Parliaments in European affairs”.
- 89.
Villani (2009), p. 411, defines the powers of national Parliaments in the control of subsidiarity principle as “an instrument of protection of the prerogatives of those Parliaments”.
- 90.
Álvarez Conde and López de los Mozos Díaz-Madronero (2006), p. 156 propose to distinguish the functions of national Parliaments in: (a) ”participation” of national Parliaments to the legislative function; (b) control; (c) cooperation. Geiger, in Geiger et al. (2010), Art. 12 EUV para 4 et seqq. classifies all the functions in: (a) rights to information; (b) rights to take a position; (c) interparliamentary cooperation. Bogdandy and Bast (2010), p. 304 construct all the functions of national Parliaments as political control. The German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 293—Treaty of Lisbon, distinguishes the functions of national Parliaments in relation to the principle of subsidiarity between opportunities of influence and legally enforceable rights of participation.
- 91.
Ninatti (2004), p. 1413 and 1425. For this author, Art. I-46 (2) TCE [and now Art. 10.2 (2) TEU] demonstrate that accountability of European governance is structured through the various levels of government and that “the principle of political responsibility at the community level is clearly characterized by a multilevel dimension”. Another concept used in this perspective is that of league or union of Parliaments (Parlamentsverbund), that puts in evidence the horizontal dimension: see Weber (2010), para 228; Pernice and Hindelang (2010), p. 409.
- 92.
Schmidt-Radefeldt (2009), p. 773–787.
- 93.
Pernice (2008–2009), p. 391.
- 94.
- 95.
- 96.
Raunio (2007), p. 79.
- 97.
Dougan (2008), p. 657.
- 98.
Art. 88-4 of the French Constitution—introduced in 1992 with the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht and before the Treaty of Amsterdam—is an example of a national constitutional provision that establishes a series of information duties of the Government towards Parliament. For Italy see Art. 13.1 of Law No. 128/1998 and more recently Art. 3 of Law No. 11/2005 (on this law see Cartabia 2007, p. 118–125 and Cannizzaro 2005, p. 153).
- 99.
Cartabia (2007), p. 130.
- 100.
Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 (→ Protocol No. 1 para 20–21).
- 101.
Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 (→ Protocol No. 1 para 20–21). It is of course very important for national Parliaments to use these two first instruments in order to be prepared at best to use the 8-weeks windows foreseen by the early warning system (→ para 44).
- 102.
Art. 2 (3)–(5) of Protocol No. 1 and Art. 4 of Protocol No. 2 (→ Protocol No. 1 para 25–33). Bribosia (2005), p. 74, had criticised the limitation to “legislative acts” in the text of the Protocol on Subsidiarity included in the Constitutional Treaty because it did not include regulations not adopted with a legislative procedure, and some acts of implementation, like those elaborated through the comitology procedure.
- 103.
Art. 4 (1)–(3) of Protocol No. 2 (→ Protocol No. 2 para 46).
- 104.
Art. 5 of Protocol No. 1 (→ Protocol No. 1 para 85–88).
- 105.
Art. 4 (4) of Protocol No. 2 (→ Protocol No. 2 para 46).
- 106.
Art. 7 of Protocol No. 1 (→ Protocol No. 1 para 103–112).
- 107.
New accessions are regulated by Treaties that have to be ratified by each MS. France has a constitutional provision (Art. 88-5), introduced in 2005 and modified in 2008, establishing a special procedure for the ratification of Treaties of this type. While the procedure introduced in 2005 totally deprived Parliament of the ratification power (requiring always a referendum), the modification of 23 July 2008 permits ratification with a motion adopted by the two Chambers with a majority of three fifths: on this provision see Dero-Bugny (2009).
- 108.
- 109.
Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 12 EUV para 11: “information rights are the starting point and the precondition of the power of parliamentary control”. For Gennart (2010), p. 33, the rules of the Treaty of Lisbon that facilitate the acquisition of information by national Parliaments are not a “major evolution” and are placed in the same logic of the Treaty of Maastricht, that of supporting Parliaments without modifying directly their functions of control.
- 110.
Hölscheidt (2005), p. 442 et seqq.
- 111.
Art. 4 of Protocol No. 1 (→ Protocol No. 1 para 67). Hrbek (2012), no. 5.1 underlines that the current working of the “Comitology” system obliges national Parliaments “to become involved in the decision-making process as early as possible, since otherwise they would see themselves marginalised”.
- 112.
Art. 4 of Protocol No. 1 (→ Protocol No. 1 para 73).
- 113.
Council Decision of 1 December 2009, 2009/937/EU establishing the Council’s Rules of Procedure, O.J. L 325/35 (2009).
- 114.
Passos (2008), p. 36.
- 115.
Passos (2008), p. 36.
- 116.
Kiiver (2006), p. 154–155.
- 117.
Kiiver (2006), p. 158; see also → para 10.
- 118.
See a synthesis of the debate in Maiani (2004).
- 119.
Jacqué and Weiler (1990), p. 204–206
- 120.
Weiler (1999), p. 322. The idea of a Chamber of subsidiarity in the CJEU was also advanced during the Convention on the Future of Europe.
- 121.
- 122.
Bermann (2009), p. 156 correctly underlines this, recalling—from a United States perspective—John Calhoun’s doctrine of “state nullification of federal laws” as the only possible example.
- 123.
- 124.
Sauron (2008).
- 125.
- 126.
Art. 5 of Protocol No. 2 (→ Protocol No. 2 para 47 et seqq.).
- 127.
Bull. EC 10/93, point 2.2.2.
- 128.
- 129.
Criticism of the 6-weeks period, considered too short, had emerged in the 33rd COSAC meeting held in Luxembourg in 2005 (Kiiver 2006, p. 159; other criticism in Davies 2003, p. 692). For Bermann (2009), p. 160, even the increased term “may be simply insufficient in light of the need to consult sectoral parliamentary committees and regional Parliaments, not to mention stakeholders and, of course, parliamentarians in other States”. The option to increase the period from 6 to 8 weeks was made by the European Council in his Brussels meeting of 21 June 2007 that established the mandate for the ICG.
- 130.
The definition is widely used, beginning with the summary of the European Constitutional Draft prepared by the Secretariat of the EP after the IGC of Brussels in June 2004.
- 131.
Cooper (2006), p. 287.
- 132.
Cooper (2006), p. 236.
- 133.
Art. 3 of Protocol No. 1 (→ Protocol No. 1 para 48–56) and Art. 6 of Protocol No. 2 (→ Protocol No. 2 para ). According to Cooper (2006), p. 290, the early warning system is “strictly subsidiarity focused”.
- 134.
See criticism of this limitation in Schütze (2009), p. 533 and Cooper (2006), p. 283 and 300: “just as is true with subsidiarity, National Parliaments are well positioned for the role of ‘proportionality watchdogs’, because they are directly affected when the EU violates this principle”. The proportionality review is actually different from the subsidiarity review, but it is complementary to it: this latter concerns the question of the necessity of a EU legal act, while the former deals with the appropriateness of the means to the ends. National Parliament could be in favour of a EU legal act, but against its form (e.g. in the case of the adoption of a regulation instead of a directive) and be directly affected by this latter choice.
- 135.
Hölscheidt, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Art. 12 EUV para 22.
- 136.
Ritzer and Ruttlof (2006), p. 132; Buschmann and Daiber (2011), p. 505; Kiiver (2012), p. 98.
An example of an area included in the exclusive competences of the Union, where the subsidiarity check should apply are, according to Barents (2010), p. 711 the amendments to the Statute of the CJEU (Protocol No. 3 annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon).
- 137.
It has already been recalled (→ para 39) that this kind of procedure was already operational before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, because of a decision of the Council adopted in 2006, though without a legal base in the (then) existing Treaties.
- 138.
Hölscheidt, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Art. 12 EUV para 25.
- 139.
Vecchio (2009), p. 177. This seems to be a legal obligation for the Commission: the violation of it could be considered as infringement of the principle of subsidiarity that could be contested before the CJEU.
- 140.
Bussjäger (2010), p. 56.
- 141.
Bussjäger (2010), p. 56 remarks that “it is unlikely that a Government will approve in the Council a proposal against which its Parliament has submitted objections from a subsidiarity point of view”.
- 142.
According to Grabenwarter (2010), p. 115, the consultation of regional Parliaments is not an obligation but a possibility.
- 143.
Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 12 EUV para 12.
- 144.
Kiiver (2006), p. 157.
- 145.
On the coordination problem see Bermann (2009), p. 160.
- 146.
Pernice (2009), p. 381.
- 147.
COM(2012) 130, based on the flexibility clause.
- 148.
Dougan (2008), p. 660.
- 149.
Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 12 EUV para 7.
- 150.
Piris (2010), p. 129.
- 151.
Cooper (2006), p. 289.
- 152.
- 153.
Hölscheidt, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Art. 12 EUV para 29.
- 154.
Bermann (2009), p. 160.
- 155.
Gianniti (2010), p. 174 speaks of a “pregiudiziale di sussidiarietà”.
- 156.
Hölscheidt, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Art. 12 EUV para 32, who also notes that the majorities required in the EP for objecting to a legislative initiative on the ground of the principle of subsidiarity is different from the majority of the members required by Art. 294.7 lit. b TFEU to reject a proposal.
- 157.
- 158.
Saulnier-Cassia (2009), uses this definition (“carton rouge”) for the action before the CJEU.
- 159.
Louis (2009), p. 141.
- 160.
Violini (2003), p. 286; Álvarez Conde and López de los Mozos Díaz-Madronero (2006), p. 157 (speaking of the Constitutional Treaty). For Ninatti (2004), p. 1424–1425 the early warning system is a new device of political control that can be put in function by national Parliaments that will be so enabled to take part directly to the European legislative process.
- 161.
- 162.
According to Bussjäger (2010), p. 55, it is “rather difficult to be applicated”.
- 163.
This procedure has been criticised also from an opposite point of view. Manzella (2008), p. 338–339 sees in the possible interruption of the legislative process an “interference” of a “casual majority” of national Parliaments in the European decision-making process. But to this opinion it is possible to reply that the interference is an appropriate phenomenon in a multilevel constitutional system, in which the various level of government, and the different constitutional powers of each level, interact with powers placed at another level. The question should be to see if such interference is justified and functional.
- 164.
- 165.
Kiiver (2008), p. 81.
- 166.
Besselink (2006), p. 8.
- 167.
Kiiver (2008), p. 82.
- 168.
This is also the opinion of Craig (2008), p. 151. Kiiver (2011), p. 102–103, has compared the functions of national Parliaments to the role played by the Council of State in the French legal system: it is not a real co-legislative authority, but it cannot be regarded simply as one of the various subjects who are consulted. It is an institution that takes part to the consultative function, with the task not of expressing support to the measure on which it gives an opinion, but only to express reasoned objection on the base of a pre-defined criterion. In the light of this interpretation of the role of national Parliaments, Kiiver believes that the early warning system should be focused “on the lawfulness, on the admissibility of legislation, rather than on its political desiderability” (p. 108).
- 169.
Von Bogdandy and Bast (2010), p. 304: “There is […] a chance that political ex ante scrutiny and ex post judicial scrutiny could mutually enhance each other”.
- 170.
Von Bogdandy and Bast (2010), p. 304: The “promising political experiment whose functioning cannot yet be foreclosed”.
- 171.
This is the case of France (Art. 88-6.1 Const.: “L’Assemblée nationale ou le Sénat peuvent émettre un avis motivé sur la conformité d’un projet d’acte législatif européen au principe de subsidiarité. L’avis est adressé par le président de l’assemblée concernée aux présidents du Parlement européen, du Conseil et de la Commission européenne. Le Gouvernement en est informé”.) and Austria (Art. 23g B-VG); Protocol No. 1 para 17.
- 172.
This is the case of Spain, Portugal and Germany (but in this latter case, Section 11.1 of the Integrationsverantwortungsgesetz of 22 September 2009 delegates the regulation of the procedure for the adoption of the opinion to the Rules of Procedure of each of the two Chambers: see now Art. 93a.1 sentence 2 and 4 and Art. 93c of the Rules of Procedure of the German Bundestag; → Protocol No. 1 para 17).
- 173.
This is the case of Italy, where an experimental procedure has been adopted in 2009 with an opinion of the Constitutional Affairs Committee of the Chamber of deputies (“Bressa-Calderisi Opinion”: see Esposito 2009, p. 1165. This first opinion was modified in 2010: see Fasone (2010), p. 7) and by the Rules of Procedure of the Committee of the Senate (→ Protocol No. 1 para 56).
- 174.
This is the case of Spain, where the Comisión mixta para la Unión Europea is empowered to approve the reasoned opinions on the respect of the principle of subsidiarity, with the exception of the cases in which one of the two Chambers asks to debate and vote directly on the opinion (Art. 5 of Law No. 8/1994, introduced by Law No. 24/2009). This is also the case of Italy (see Esposito 2009, p. 1165), Austria, France and Germany (in this latter case, it remains to be seen which regulation will be adopted by each of the two Chambers).
- 175.
This is in principle the solution adopted in Portugal: the opinion is adopted by the Asambleia da República with a resolution (Art. 3.1 of Law No. 43/2006). But Art. 3.2 permits an exception: “em caso de fundamentada urgência, é suficiente um parecer emitido pela Commissão de Assuntos Europeus”. The solution provisionally adopted by the Italian Senate gives to the Committee on the European Union the power to examine the draft European act both on the substance and on the subsidiarity point of view, but when the Committee finds objections based on the principle of subsidiarity, the Assembly must examine the draft (the Assembly may also require to examine the drafts when one third of the Committee so requires).
- 176.
For Hölscheidt, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Art. 12 EUV para 23 MS Parliaments can also denounce the violation of the order of competences and of the principle of proportionality.
- 177.
- 178.
Case C-84/94, United Kingdom v Council (ECJ 12 November 1996) para 58; for more recent decisions, showing some hints of a deeper control C-377/98, Netherlands v European Parliaments and Council (ECJ 9 October 2001); C-491/01, ex parte British American Tobacco (ECJ 10 December 2002); Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04, Alliance for Natural Health et al. (ECJ 12 July 2005), quoted by Dougan (2008), p. 660 (notes 221 and 222). On the decisions of the Court of Justice concerning the principle of subsidiarity see Sander (2006), p. 517 et seqq.
- 179.
- 180.
- 181.
Woelk (2010), p. 13.
- 182.
Dougan (2008), p. 661. Similar is the opinion of Bermann (2009), p. 159: the participation of national Parliaments to the control on the respect of the principle of subsidiarity avoids a direct and excessive pressure on the CJEU and, at the same time, it gives to the Court—when an action is brought before it after Parliaments have elaborated and submitted their reasoned opinions and the act has been adopted, notwithstanding this—“an analytic and documentary trail that could be of great use and value to the Court of Justice if it were inclined to take a ‘harder look’ at compliance with the subsidiarity principle”. According to Hölscheidt, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Art. 12 EUV para 39 the action for the infringement of the principle of subsidiarity has above all a “legal psychological effect”.
- 183.
- 184.
The German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 305—Treaty of Lisbon, has raised the doubt about the possibility to bring action also against activities of the EU that are outside the competence for the draft European act.
- 185.
For criticism of this proposal see Ferraro (2003), p. 191.
- 186.
Von Bogdandy and Bast (2010), p. 304.
- 187.
- 188.
Thiele (2010), p. 47.
- 189.
For Barents (2010), p. 727, the formula included in the Protocol “leaves in the dark whether the Government of a Member State is obliged to bring an action if its Parliament so decides, or whether it has some discretion in doing so”.
- 190.
For Grabenwarter (2010), p. 115 “the way in which Parliament institutes the proceedings is an issue of national State organisation, which is decided by the national legislator according to the constitution”.
- 191.
See Group I, Final Report, 7 and comments in Di Capua (2005), p. 121 and in Petrangeli (2003), p. 174. According to Petrangeli (2003), p. 174 and Gianniti (2010), p. 172–173, the solution adopted in the Treaty is justified by the fear that a filter would have stimulated the use of the early warning system just to keep the possibility to bring later an action before the CJEU. On the contrary, according to Vecchio (2009), p. 179, the solution adopted in the Treaty does not incentive national Parliaments to exercise the preventive control, submitting reasoned opinions and leaves the controversy on subsidiarity to the judicial arena.
- 192.
The present text of Art. 88-6 is the result of three constitutional amendments. The first two have been adopted by Constitutional Law No. 2005-204 of 1 March 2005 and by Constitutional Law No. 2008-103 of 5 February 2008, that had been made necessary by two decisions of the Constitutional Council that had declared contrary to the Constitution the procedures on subsidiarity adopted respectively by the Constitutional Treaty (Decision No. 2004-505 of 19 November 2004) and by the Treaty of Lisbon (Decision No. 2007-560 of 20 December 2007). A third amendment was adopted by Constitutional Law No. 2008-724 of 23 July 2008, that actually introduced the possibility to oblige the Government to submit the action to the Court. On the history of Art. 88-6 see Saulnier-Cassia (2009) and the following footnote.
- 193.
This possibility is the most remarkable innovation added by the constitutional reform of 23 July 2008 on European affairs (it was introduced by an amending proposal of a MP). According to Saulnier-Cassia (2009), p. 1981, the last phrase of Art. 88-6 “apporte une valeur ajoutée considerable à la prerogative parlementaire de saisine de la Cour de Justice des Communautés européennes pour un cas de violation du principe de subsidiarité, puisque elle permet de s’assurer de la transmission obligatoire du recours”.
- 194.
Hölscheidt, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Art. 12 EUV para 37 defines it as a “parlamentarische Minderheitsrecht”. Shirvani (2010), p. 756–757 recalls that this minority right is constitutionally foreseen only in the lower Chamber, while in the upper Chamber the decision is left to the majority (or to a possible different solution if the internal rules of that Chamber will so decide).
- 195.
Uerpmann-Wittzack and Edenharter (2009), p. 313–329.
- 196.
See Art. 7 of the Law No. 8/1994, added by the Law No. 24/1999.
- 197.
That provision had not been included in the text adopted by the Convention and was added by the IGC of 2004.
- 198.
The German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 319—Treaty of Lisbon, defines it as an “Oppositionsrecht”.
- 199.
See German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 319–320—Treaty of Lisbon. According to Lecheler (2009), p. 1159, the Court has thus transformed the rights of participation of Parliament (Mitwirkungsrechte) in obligation to participate (Mitwirkungspflichten)
- 200.
German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 320—Treaty of Lisbon: “It is not possible to renounce to the veto right in the Council without the participation of the competent legislative authorities”. Already in its decision on the Treaty of Maastricht, the German Constitutional Court had underlined that the (then) European Communities and Union were legitimated on the base of the competences recognised to them by the Treaty and that on one side those competences needed to be clearly determined (point I.3 of the decision) and that on the other side further devolutions of powers to them needed an express decision of the German Parliament (and of the other National Parliaments) in order to respect the democratic principle. The role of the German Parliament was also underlined in its capability to influence the European policies of the Government (point II.1). According to Classen (2009), p. 886, this second element is less important in the Lisbon Decision.
- 201.
According to Art. 23i (2), in the case of the other (specific) passerelle clauses, the two Chambers can use their veto power, but in these cases they have to agree on the refusal, not authorise the consensus of the Austrian government.
- 202.
This is actually the interpretation given by Art. 88-7 of the French Constitution, that requires a motion adopted by the two Chambers with the same content.
- 203.
Also the systematic interpretation of Art. 6 and 8 of Protocol No. 1 in conjunction with Art. 48.7 TEU could lead to the same conclusion: but only at the condition of referring Art. 8 of Prot. No. 1 also to Art. 48.7 TEU and not just to the provisions of the Protocol.
- 204.
See German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 318—Treaty of Lisbon.
- 205.
See German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 328—Treaty of Lisbon.
- 206.
Moreover: it is not clear in what sense is “extent” to be understood: for example the extent could be judged from the number of articles affected or from the importance of the subject (even if the modification could be referred to a single article).
- 207.
Gennart (2010), p. 35.
- 208.
- 209.
Art. 69 TFEU also confirms the subsidiarity check made by national Parliaments in this area: → para 46.
- 210.
O.J. 15.5.2009 L 121/37. See De Moor and Vermeulen (2010).
- 211.
De Moor and Vermeulen (2010), p. 1177.
- 212.
Council Decision 2009/426/JHA of 16 December 2008, O.J. L 138/14 (2009).
- 213.
Both Articles were already present in the Constitutional Treaty, almost in identical form (Art. III-273 and III-276), with the difference that the forms of control were delegate to a “European law”, according to the “constitutional” terminology used in that Treaty.
- 214.
Following the Action Plan implementing the Stockholm Program, [COM(2010) 171, final], the Commission intends to make a proposal for a regulation in 2013.
- 215.
This difference is underlined by House of Commons—European Scrutiny Committee, Subsidiarity, National Parliaments and the Lisbon Treaty, XXXIII Report of Session 2007-08, p. 16.
- 216.
For the opposite opinion see Hölscheidt (2008), p. 261, according to which the role of national Parliaments in the control of Europol is “clearly smaller” than that outlined for Eurojust.
- 217.
See IP/10/1738 of 17 December 2010 and the Commission Communication on the procedures for the scrutiny of Europol’s activities by the European Parliament, together with national Parliaments, COM(2010) 776 final, point 5.1.
- 218.
Kotzur (2010), p. 362–363.
- 219.
Pernice (2008–2009), p. 381–382.
- 220.
Council Decision 2010/131/EU on setting up the Standing Committee on operational cooperation on internal security, O.J. L 52/50 (2010).
- 221.
- 222.
Mangiameli (2009), p. 417, pointing at Art. 21 TEU.
- 223.
The Treaty of Amsterdam has inserted in the Community budget not only administrative expenses, but also the large majority of operational expenses, thus allowing a control of the EP on them.
- 224.
But it could be argued that the new definition of the documents that shall be transmitted to the national Parliaments according to Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 (“any […] instrument of legislative planning or policy”) should include documents falling under the CFSP, that were not included in the documentation to be forwarded to national Parliament according to the Protocol annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam.
- 225.
Manzella (2008), p. 336.
- 226.
See the conclusions of the two conferences in http://www.europarl.europa.eu/webnp/webdav/site/myjahiasite/users/emartinezdealosmoner/public/Conclusions%20de%20la%20Pr%C3%A9sidence%20belge%20EN%20-%20FINAL%20VERSION%20(2).docx for that of Brussels and http://www.parl2011.pl/prezydencja.nsf/attachments/DKUS-8SYGLC/%24File/conclusions_PL_EN_FR.pdf for that of Warsaw.
- 227.
See now Pitruzzella (2012), p. 9–49.
- 228.
See the press release by the Commission COM(2010), 2020 final of 3 March 2010.
- 229.
Perez (2011), p. 1053.
- 230.
Parliament/Council Regulation (EU) No. 1173/2011 of 16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, O.J. L 306/1 (2011); Parliament/Council Regulation (EU) No. 1174/2011 of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, O.J. L 306/8 (2011); Parliament/Council Regulation (EU) No. 1175/2011 of 16 November 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, O.J. L 306/12 (2011); Parliament/Council Regulation (EU) No. 1176/2011 of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, O.J. L 306/25 (2011); Council Regulation (EU) No. 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, O.J. L 306/33 (2011).
- 231.
Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States, O.J. L 306/41 (2011).
- 232.
See Regulation No. 1173/2011 (consideration 11), Regulation No. 1174/2011 (consideration 9), Regulation No. 1175/2011 (consideration 11), Regulation No. 1176/2011 (consideration 5) and Regulation No. 1177/2011 (consideration 9).
- 233.
Consideration 25 to Regulation No. 1176/2011.
- 234.
Consideration 16 of Regulation No. 1175/2011. The transmission to Parliament of the national reform programme is foreseen in Italy by Art. 4-ter of Law No. 11/2005, as reformed by Art. 7 of Law No. 96/2011.
- 235.
Art. 3.4 of the Regulation No. 1466/1997, as amended by Regulation No. 1175/2011.
- 236.
Perez ( 2011 ), p. 1054.
- 237.
EUCO 120/12 of 26 June 2012.
- 238.
- 239.
See German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 987/10 et al. (Judgment of 7 September 2011) para 121–124.
- 240.
German Federal Constitutional Court, 2BvE 8/11 (Judgment of 28 February 2012).
- 241.
German Federal Constitutional Court, 2BvE 8/11 (Judgment of 28 February 2012) para 109 et seqq.
- 242.
- 243.
CONV 353/02 WG IV 17 point 36, 18. In this sense see already COM(2010) 367 final of 30 June 2010.
- 244.
On all these forms see Amico (2009). In some other cases, Parliaments integrate the foreign activities of governments, without creating specific interparliamentary forums: this is the case of ONU.
- 245.
Amico (2009), p. 76.
- 246.
The last modification, in November 2010, has introduced the paragraphs 2, 3 and 4.
- 247.
For this list see Neunreither (2010), p. 466 et seqq.
- 248.
- 249.
Pernice (2009), p. 343.
- 250.
These are the three factors highlighted by Tans (2007a), p. 11–17.
- 251.
Pernice (2009), p. 373.
- 252.
Oberdorff (2008), p. 724 remarks that MS “enjoy a constitutional autonomy in order to organize themselves according to their choice and to their constitutional traditions”.
- 253.
Norton (1996), p. 176.
- 254.
On these models see Cartabia (2007), p. 111 et seqq.
- 255.
Norton (1996), p. 179.
- 256.
Norton (1996), p. 182.
- 257.
De Martino (2002), p. 248 (and also p. 244).
- 258.
Grewe (2009), nr. 41.
- 259.
Grabenwarter (2010), p. 121.
- 260.
Oberdorff (2008), p. 716.
- 261.
See German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 240, 243, 245, 320, 330—Treaty of Lisbon. For a positive evaluation of this concept even in a critical comment of the decision see Häberle (2009), p. 404.
- 262.
Art. 11 and 117 Const. of Italy; Art. 23 German Basic Law; Art. 88-4 Constitution of France; Art. 23 Constitution of Austria.
- 263.
Tans (2007b), p. 231–233.
- 264.
Tans (2007b), p. 237–239.
- 265.
For an analysis see Janowski (2005).
- 266.
See for example art. 5 of the Portuguese law No. 43 of 2006.
- 267.
Grabenwarter (2010), p. 150.
- 268.
See Art. 45 of the German Basic Law. Recently also France, that had created in 1979 a “parliamentary delegation” (delegation parlementaire) in each Chamber, with an information role, but distinguishing them clearly from Parliamentary Committees, has introduced two “Parliamentary Committees responsible for EU affairs” with the constitutional reform of 23 July 2008 (now Art. 88-4, last paragraph of the French Constitution).
- 269.
See Kiiver (2006), p. 50–51 on the Finnish model.
- 270.
The base is Art. 96 of the Const. of Finland: “[…] the proposal is considered in the Grand Committee and ordinarily in one or more of the other Committees that issue statements to the Grand Committee”.
- 271.
See Blümel and Neuhold (2007).
- 272.
See Riis (2007).
- 273.
Cartabia (2007), p. 137 criticises the absence of recognition of this mechanism in the Constitutional Treaty (nothing changed on this point with the Treaty of Lisbon).
- 274.
On this latter experience see Art. 4 of law No. 11/2005 and, among others, Gambale (2006).
- 275.
Hrbek (2012), para 1: “National Parliaments are an integral part of the institutional architecture of the European Union, attributing them a role in the decision-making system”.
- 276.
Louis (2009), p. 132.
- 277.
O’Brennan and Raunio (2007).
- 278.
- 279.
Schütze (2009), p. 530.
- 280.
Craig (2010), p. 48 remarks that “much will depend on the willingness of National Parliaments to devote the requisite time and energy to the matter”.
- 281.
- 282.
- 283.
Pernice (2009), p. 391.
- 284.
Thus Manzella (2008).
- 285.
See e.g. Oberdorff (2008), p. 728.
- 286.
These words are taken from the Polish Constitutional Court, Ref. No. K32/09 (Judgement of 24 November 2010) nr. 4.2.3.
- 287.
Avbely (2009–2010), p. 529 remarks that the Treaty of Lisbon “giving National Parliaments more say through subsidiarity control and strengthening the role of the European Council could act as a good and hopefully not excessive counterbalance” to the possibility recognised to the EU institutions “to make their decisions more effectively and thus allow these institutions to occupy more of the legal space that previously remained in the National domain”.
- 288.
Gianniti (2010), p. 171.
- 289.
Bilancia (2009), p. 283.
Table of Cases
ECJ 12.11.1996, C-84/94, United Kingdom v Council, ECR I-5755 [cit in para 61]
ECJ 09.10.2001, C-377/98, Netherlands v Parliament and Council, ECR I-7079 [cit in para 61]
ECJ 10.12.2002, C-491/01, The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd, ECR I-11453 [cit in para 61]
ECJ 12.07.2005, Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04, Alliance for Natural Health et al., ECR I-6451 [cit in para 61]
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Blanke, HJ., Mangiameli, S. (2013). Article 12 [The Role of National Parliaments]. In: Blanke, HJ., Mangiameli, S. (eds) The Treaty on European Union (TEU). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31706-4_13
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