Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Agreements as Norms

  • Conference paper
Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2012)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 7393))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

Deontic logic has extensively been used to reason about what a player (or coalition) should do when confronted with several choices at its disposal while being aware of its opponents’ possibilities. So far this line of research, inspired by Horty’s utilitarian account of obligations, has been focused on interpreting coalitional oughts as rational choices, going on to characterizing game-theoretical solution concepts, such as Nash equilibria. With the present contribution we would like to extend the scope of this account to include contractual aspects of coalitional choices, arguing that deontic logic can be used as a comprehensive reasoning tool for the normative aspects of game theory.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 49.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Abdou, J., Keiding, H.: Effectivity Functions in Social Choice. Kluwer Academic Publishers (1991)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Aumann, R.J.: What is game theory trying to accomplish? In: Arrow, K., Honkapohja, S. (eds.) Frontiers of Economics (1985)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Belnap, N., Perloff, M., Xu, M.: Facing The Future: Agents And Choices In Our Indeterminist World. Oxford University Press, USA (2001)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Blackburn, P., de Rijke, M., Venema, Y.: Modal Logic. Cambridge Tracts in Theoretical Computer Science (2001)

    Google Scholar 

  5. Broersen, J., Herzig, A., Troquard, N.: A normal simulation of coalition logic and an epistemic extension. In: Samet, D. (ed.) Proceedings Theoretical Aspects Rationality and Knowledge, TARK XI, Brussels, pp. 92–101. ACM Digital Library (2007)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Broersen, J., Mastop, R., Meyer, J.-J.C., Turrini, P.: A Deontic Logic for Socially Optimal Norms. In: van der Meyden, R., van der Torre, L. (eds.) DEON 2008. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 5076, pp. 218–232. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  7. Castelfranchi, C., Cesta, A., Miceli, M.: Dependence relations among autonomous agents. In: Werner, E., Demazeau, Y. (eds.) Decentralized A.I.3. Elsevier (1992)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Coleman, J.: Foundations of Social Theory. Belknap Harvard (1990)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Goranko, V., Jamroga, W., Turrini, P.: Strategic games and truly playable effectivity functions. In: Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, pp. 1–27 (2012), http://www.springerlink.com/content/235460692g061203/

  10. Grossi, D., Turrini, P.: Dependence theory via game theory. In: Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2010, Richland, SC, vol. 1, pp. 1147–1154. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (2010)

    Google Scholar 

  11. Herzig, A., Schwarzentruber, F.: Properties of logics of individual and group agency. In: Areces, C., Goldblatt, R. (eds.) Advances in Modal Logic, pp. 133–149. College Publications (2008)

    Google Scholar 

  12. Horty, J.: Deontic Logic and Agency. Oxford University Press (2001)

    Google Scholar 

  13. Kooi, B., Tamminga, A.: Moral conflicts between groups of agents. Journal of Philosophical Logic 37(1), 1–21 (2008)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  14. Osborne, M.J., Rubinstein, A.: A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press (1994)

    Google Scholar 

  15. Pauly, M.: Logic for Social Software. ILLC Dissertation Series (2001)

    Google Scholar 

  16. Tamminga, A.: Deontic logic for strategic games. Erkenntnis, 1–18 (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  17. Turrini, P., Grossi, D., Broersen, J., Meyer, J.-J.C.: Forbidding Undesirable Agreements: A Dependence-Based Approach to the Regulation of Multi-agent Systems. In: Governatori, G., Sartor, G. (eds.) DEON 2010. LNCS, vol. 6181, pp. 306–322. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Individual and Collective Reasoning Group (ICR), University of Luxembourg, 6, rue Richard Coudenhove, Kalergi, L-1359, Luxembourg

    Paolo Turrini

Authors
  1. Paolo Turrini
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Information Science and Media Studies, University of Bergen, 7802, 5020, Bergen, Norway

    Thomas Ågotnes  & Dag Elgesem  & 

  2. Department of Information and Computing Sciences, Utrecht University, 80.089, 3508 TB, Utrecht, The Netherlands

    Jan Broersen

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Turrini, P. (2012). Agreements as Norms. In: Ågotnes, T., Broersen, J., Elgesem, D. (eds) Deontic Logic in Computer Science. DEON 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 7393. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31570-1_3

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31570-1_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-31569-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-31570-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation