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Non-malleable Instance-Dependent Commitment in the Standard Model

  • Wenpan Jing
  • Haixia Xu
  • Bao Li
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7372)

Abstract

An instance-dependent commitment (IDC) scheme takes an instance in a promise problem as public input at each time of committing and separately achieves statistical hiding and statistical binding when the instance is from different subsets of the promise. In this paper, we define a new security property called “instance-non-malleability ” for the IDC. It requires the non-malleability of the instances as well as the committed messages. Instance-non-malleability is not only stronger than previous definitions of non-malleability for commitments, but can be achieved in the standard model as well. We also present a general construction of the non-interactive instance-non-malleable IDC.

Keywords

non-malleability instance-dependent commitment zero-knowledge proof 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wenpan Jing
    • 1
  • Haixia Xu
    • 1
  • Bao Li
    • 1
  1. 1.Graduate University of Chinese Academy of SciencesBeijingChina

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