Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Sufficient Condition for Ephemeral Key-Leakage Resilient Tripartite Key Exchange

  • Conference paper
Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 2012)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7372))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

Tripartite (Diffie-Hellman) Key Exchange (3KE), introduced by Joux (ANTS-IV 2000), represents today the only known class of group key exchange protocols, in which computation of unauthenticated session keys requires one round and proceeds with minimal computation and communication overhead. The first one-round authenticated 3KE version that preserved the unique efficiency properties of the original protocol and strengthened its security towards resilience against leakage of ephemeral (session-dependent) secrets was proposed recently by Manulis, Suzuki, and Ustaoglu (ICISC 2009).

In this work we explore sufficient conditions for building such protocols. We define a set of admissible polynomials and show how their construction generically implies 3KE protocols with the desired security and efficiency properties. Our result generalizes the previous 3KE protocol and gives rise to many new authenticated constructions, all of which enjoy forward secrecy and resilience to ephemeral key-leakage under the gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Abdalla, M., Chevalier, C., Manulis, M., Pointcheval, D.: Flexible Group Key Exchange with On-demand Computation of Subgroup Keys. In: Bernstein, D.J., Lange, T. (eds.) AFRICACRYPT 2010. LNCS, vol. 6055, pp. 351–368. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  2. Abdalla, M., Fouque, P.-A., Pointcheval, D.: Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange in the Three-Party Setting. In: Vaudenay, S. (ed.) PKC 2005. LNCS, vol. 3386, pp. 65–84. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  3. Abdalla, M., Pointcheval, D.: A Scalable Password-Based Group Key Exchange Protocol in the Standard Model. In: Lai, X., Chen, K. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 2006. LNCS, vol. 4284, pp. 332–347. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  4. Al-Riyami, S.S., Paterson, K.G.: Tripartite Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols from Pairings. In: Paterson, K.G. (ed.) Cryptography and Coding 2003. LNCS, vol. 2898, pp. 332–359. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  5. Baek, J., Safavi-Naini, R., Susilo, W.: Efficient Multi-receiver Identity-Based Encryption and Its Application to Broadcast Encryption. In: Vaudenay, S. (ed.) PKC 2005. LNCS, vol. 3386, pp. 380–397. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  6. Bellare, M., Pointcheval, D., Rogaway, P.: Authenticated Key Exchange Secure against Dictionary Attacks. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1807, pp. 139–155. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  7. Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: Entity Authentication and Key Distribution. In: Stinson, D.R. (ed.) CRYPTO 1993. LNCS, vol. 773, pp. 232–249. Springer, Heidelberg (1994)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Bellovin, S.M., Merritt, M.: Augmented Encrypted Key Exchange: A Password-Based Protocol Secure against Dictionary Attacks and Password File Compromise. In: ACM CCS 1993, pp. 244–250. ACM (1993)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Boyko, V., MacKenzie, P.D., Patel, S.: Provably Secure Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Using Diffie-Hellman. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1807, pp. 156–171. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  10. Bresson, E., Chevassut, O., Pointcheval, D., Quisquater, J.-J.: Provably Authenticated Group Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange. In: ACM CCS 2001, pp. 255–264. ACM Press (2001)

    Google Scholar 

  11. Bresson, E., Manulis, M.: Contributory Group Key Exchange in the Presence of Malicious Participants. IET Information Security 2(3), 85–93 (2008)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  12. Bresson, E., Manulis, M.: Securing Group Key Exchange against Strong Corruptions. In: ACM ASIACCS 2008, pp. 249–260. ACM Press (2008); full version in Intl. J. Applied Cryptography in 2008

    Google Scholar 

  13. Bresson, E., Manulis, M., Schwenk, J.: On Security Models and Compilers for Group Key Exchange Protocols. In: Miyaji, A., Kikuchi, H., Rannenberg, K. (eds.) IWSEC 2007. LNCS, vol. 4752, pp. 292–307. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  14. Canetti, R., Krawczyk, H.: Analysis of Key-Exchange Protocols and Their Use for Building Secure Channels. In: Pfitzmann, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2045, pp. 453–474. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  15. Choo, K.-K.R.: Secure Key Establishment. Advances in Information Security, vol. 41. Springer (2009)

    Google Scholar 

  16. Cremers, C.J.F.: Examining Indistinguishability-Based Security Models for Key Exchange Protocols: The case of CK, CK-HMQV, and eCK. In: ASIACCS 2011, pp. 80–91. ACM, New York (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  17. Diffie, W., Hellman, M.E.: New Directions in Cryptography. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory IT-22(6), 644–654 (1976)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  18. Fujioka, A., Suzuki, K.: Designing Efficient Authenticated Key Exchange Resilient to Leakage of Ephemeral Secret Keys. In: Kiayias, A. (ed.) CT-RSA 2011. LNCS, vol. 6558, pp. 121–141. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  19. Gorantla, M.C., Boyd, C., González-Nieto, J.M., Manulis, M.: Modeling key compromise impersonation attacks on group key exchange protocols. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 14(4), 28 (2011)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  20. Joux, A.: A one round protocol for tripartite Diffie–Hellman. Journal of Cryptology 17(4), 263–276 (2004)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  21. Katz, J., Shin, J.S.: Modeling Insider Attacks on Group Key-Exchange Protocols. In: ACM CCS 2005, pp. 180–189. ACM Press (2005)

    Google Scholar 

  22. Katz, J., Yung, M.: Scalable Protocols for Authenticated Group Key Exchange. J. Cryptology 20(1), 85–113 (2007)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  23. Kim, M., Fujioka, A., Ustaoğlu, B.: Strongly Secure Authenticated Key Exchange without NAXOS’ Approach. In: Takagi, T., Mambo, M. (eds.) IWSEC 2009. LNCS, vol. 5824, pp. 174–191. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  24. Krawczyk, H.: HMQV: A High-Performance Secure Diffie-Hellman Protocol. In: Shoup, V. (ed.) CRYPTO 2005. LNCS, vol. 3621, pp. 546–566. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)

    Google Scholar 

  25. LaMacchia, B.A., Lauter, K., Mityagin, A.: Stronger Security of Authenticated Key Exchange. In: Susilo, W., Liu, J.K., Mu, Y. (eds.) ProvSec 2007. LNCS, vol. 4784, pp. 1–16. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  26. Lim, M.-H., Lee, S., Lee, H.: Cryptanalysis on improved one-round Lin-Li’s tripartite key agreement protocol. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2007/411

    Google Scholar 

  27. Lim, M.-H., Lee, S., Park, Y., Lee, H.: An Enhanced One-Round Pairing-Based Tripartite Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol. In: Gervasi, O., Gavrilova, M.L. (eds.) ICCSA 2007, Part II. LNCS, vol. 4706, pp. 503–513. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  28. Lin, C.-H., Lin, H.-H.: Secure one-round tripartite authenticated key agreement protocol from Weil pairing. In: AINA 2005, vol. 2, pp. 135–138. IEEE (2005)

    Google Scholar 

  29. Manulis, M.: Security-Focused Survey on Group Key Exchange Protocols. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2006/395 (2006), http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/395

  30. Manulis, M.: Group Key Exchange Enabling On-Demand Derivation of Peer-to-Peer Keys. In: Abdalla, M., Pointcheval, D., Fouque, P.-A., Vergnaud, D. (eds.) ACNS 2009. LNCS, vol. 5536, pp. 1–19. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  31. Manulis, M., Suzuki, K., Ustaoglu, B.: Modeling Leakage of Ephemeral Secrets in Tripartite/Group Key Exchange. In: Lee, D., Hong, S. (eds.) ICISC 2009. LNCS, vol. 5984, pp. 16–33. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  32. Menezes, A., Ustaoglu, B.: Comparing the Pre- and Post-specified Peer Models for Key Agreement. In: Mu, Y., Susilo, W., Seberry, J. (eds.) ACISP 2008. LNCS, vol. 5107, pp. 53–68. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  33. Moriyama, D., Okamoto, T.: An eCK-Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol without Random Oracles. In: Pieprzyk, J., Zhang, F. (eds.) ProvSec 2009. LNCS, vol. 5848, pp. 154–167. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  34. Okamoto, T.: Authenticated Key Exchange and Key Encapsulation in the Standard Model. In: Kurosawa, K. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2007. LNCS, vol. 4833, pp. 474–484. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  35. Okamoto, T., Pointcheval, D.: The Gap-Problems: A New Class of Problems for the Security of Cryptographic Schemes. In: Kim, K.-C. (ed.) PKC 2001. LNCS, vol. 1992, pp. 104–118. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  36. Shim, K.: Efficient one round tripartite authenticated key agreement protocol from Weil pairing. IET Electronics Letters 39(2), 208–209 (2003)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  37. Ustaoglu, B.: Comparing SessionStateReveal and EphemeralKeyReveal for Diffie-Hellman Protocols. In: Pieprzyk, J., Zhang, F. (eds.) ProvSec 2009. LNCS, vol. 5848, pp. 183–197. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  38. Zhao, J., Gu, D., Gorantla, M.C.: Stronger security model of group key agreement. In: ASIACCS 2011, pp. 435–440. ACM (2011)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. NTT Secure Platform Laboratories, 3-9-11 Midori-cho, Musashino-shi, Tokyo, 180-8585, Japan

    Atsushi Fujioka & Koutarou Suzuki

  2. University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7XH, United Kingdom

    Mark Manulis

  3. Izmir Institute of Technology, Urla, Izmir, 35430, Turkey

    Berkant Ustaoğlu

Authors
  1. Atsushi Fujioka
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Mark Manulis
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Koutarou Suzuki
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  4. Berkant Ustaoğlu
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. School of Computer Science and Software Engineering, University of Wollongong, Northfields Avenue, NSW, 2522, Wollongong, Australia

    Willy Susilo

  2. School of Computer Science and Software Engineering, University of Wollongong, Northfields Avenue, 2522, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

    Yi Mu

  3. School of Computer Science and Software Engineering, University of Wollongong, Northfields Avenue, 2522, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

    Jennifer Seberry

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Fujioka, A., Manulis, M., Suzuki, K., Ustaoğlu, B. (2012). Sufficient Condition for Ephemeral Key-Leakage Resilient Tripartite Key Exchange. In: Susilo, W., Mu, Y., Seberry, J. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7372. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31448-3_2

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31448-3_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-31447-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-31448-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation