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A Complementary Analysis of the (s)YZ and DIKE Protocols

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Book cover Progress in Cryptology - AFRICACRYPT 2012 (AFRICACRYPT 2012)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7374))

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Abstract

The Canetti–Krawczyk (CK) model remains widely used for the analysis of key agreement protocols. We recall the CK model, and its variant used for the analysis of the HMQV protocol, the CK\(_\text{HMQV}\) model; we recall also some of the limitations of these models. Next, we show that the (s)YZ protocols do not achieve their claimed CK\(_\text{HMQV}\) security. Furthermore, we show that they do not achieve their claimed computational fairness. Our attack suggests that no two–pass key establishment protocol can achieve this attribute. We show also that the Deniable Internet Key Exchange fails in authentication; this illustrates the inability of capturing some impersonation attacks in the CK model. Besides, we propose a secure, efficient, and deniable protocol, geared to the post peer specified model.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Université de Strasbourg, France

    Augustin P. Sarr

  2. Institut Fourier – CNRS, Université Grenoble 1, France

    Philippe Elbaz–Vincent

Authors
  1. Augustin P. Sarr
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  2. Philippe Elbaz–Vincent
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Ecole Polytechnice Fédérale de Lausanne, IC - LASEC, Bâtiment INF 238, Station 14, 1015, Lausanne, Switzerland

    Aikaterini Mitrokotsa  & Serge Vaudenay  & 

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Sarr, A.P., Elbaz–Vincent, P. (2012). A Complementary Analysis of the (s)YZ and DIKE Protocols. In: Mitrokotsa, A., Vaudenay, S. (eds) Progress in Cryptology - AFRICACRYPT 2012. AFRICACRYPT 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7374. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31410-0_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31410-0_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-31409-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-31410-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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