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Asynchrony and Collusion in the N-party BAR Transfer Problem

  • Xavier Vilaça
  • Oksana Denysyuk
  • Luís Rodrigues
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7355)

Abstract

The problem of reliably transferring data from a set of \(N_{\cal P} \) producers to a set of \(N_{\cal C} \) consumers in the BAR model, named N-party BAR Transfer (NBART ), is an important building block for volunteer computing systems. An algorithm to solve this problem in synchronous systems, which provides a Nash equilibrium, has been presented in previous work. In this paper, we propose an NBART algorithm for asynchronous systems. Furthermore, we also address the possibility of collusion among the Rational processes. Our game theoretic analysis shows that the proposed algorithm tolerates certain degree of arbitrary collusion, while still fulfilling the NBART properties.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Asynchronous System Synchronous System Block Message Cooperative Service 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Xavier Vilaça
    • 1
  • Oksana Denysyuk
    • 1
  • Luís Rodrigues
    • 1
  1. 1.INESC-ID, Instituto Superior TécnicoUniversidade Técnica de LisboaPortugal

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