Abstract
This paper provides new evidence on the way in which ownership influences firm value. We analyze the effect of the insider ownership on firm performance in family SMEs, highlighting the generational effect using data on 336 non-listed Spanish family SMEs. For this purpose we have distinguished between first, second and subsequent generation family firms. Our results support the convergence of interest and entrenchment hypothesis on the relationship between firm performance and insider ownership in family firms. The performance of family firms grows with low and high levels of insider ownership and falls in the intermediate levels. Results depend on which generation runs the firm.
The authors thank Cátedra de Empresa Familiar de la UPV/EHU for financial support (DFB/BFA and European Social Fund). This research has received financial support from the UPV/EHU (Project UPV/EHU 10/30).
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Maseda, A., Iturralde, T., Arosa, B. (2012). Corporate Control and Generational Phase in Family SMEs. In: Gil-Lafuente, A., Gil-Lafuente, J., Merigó-Lindahl, J. (eds) Soft Computing in Management and Business Economics. Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing, vol 286. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30457-6_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30457-6_3
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