Abstract
This work considers the impact of incomplete information on incentives for node cooperation in parallel relay networks with one source node and multiple relay nodes. All nodes are selfish and strategic, interested in maximizing their own profit instead of the social welfare. We consider the practical situation where a node cannot observe the state of links adjacent to other nodes. We examine a general game setting where the source has full bargaining power, and propose a framework for analyzing the efficiency loss induced by incomplete information.
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© 2012 ICST Institute for Computer Science, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
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Xiao, H., Yeh, E.M. (2012). The Impact of Incomplete Information on Games in Parallel Relay Networks. In: Jain, R., Kannan, R. (eds) Game Theory for Networks. GameNets 2011. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 75. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_33
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_33
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