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An Economics-Inspired Noise Model in Spatial Games with Reputation

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Advances in Intelligent Modelling and Simulation

Part of the book series: Studies in Computational Intelligence ((SCI,volume 422))

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Abstract

Games are useful mathematical constructs to model real-world problems involving strategic interactions in various contexts such as politics, economics, and biology. Understanding specific conditions that lead to cooperation between self-interested individuals is an important issue in the study of real-world interactions. Although noisy and spatial interactions have been incorporated into models of complex interactions to better reflect those found in the real-world, most past studies consider simple extensions whereby interactions between all individuals are equally noisy. Here, we study a novel economics-inspired noise model based on the notion of psychic distance that reflects real-world interactions. The psychic noise that affects interactions between individuals depends on their psychic distance (e.g., cultural difference). Results from extensive computer simulations using a multi-agent system framework to investigate the impact of various constructions of noisy interactions indicate that noise typically has a negative impact on cooperation. However, a certain condition produces results reminiscent of the psychic distance paradox, where an increase in the noise level leads to an increase in the level of cooperation.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Computer Science, University of Nottingham, Malaysia Campus, Jalan Broga, 43500, Semenyih, Malaysia

    Dhruv Gairola & Siang Yew Chong

Authors
  1. Dhruv Gairola
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  2. Siang Yew Chong
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Correspondence to Dhruv Gairola .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Computer Science, Cracow University of Technology, ul. Warszawska 24, Cracow, 31-155, Poland

    Joanna Kołodziej

  2. , Department of Electrical and Computer, North Dakota State University, Fargo, 58108-6050, USA

    Samee Ullah Khan

  3. Department of Computer Science, Cracow University of Technology, ul. Warszawska 24, Cracow, 31-155, Poland

    Tadeusz Burczy´nski

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Gairola, D., Chong, S.Y. (2012). An Economics-Inspired Noise Model in Spatial Games with Reputation. In: Kołodziej, J., Khan, S., Burczy´nski, T. (eds) Advances in Intelligent Modelling and Simulation. Studies in Computational Intelligence, vol 422. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30154-4_12

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30154-4_12

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-30153-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-30154-4

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