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Advances in Computer Science and Information Engineering pp 191–196Cite as

Different Characteristics of MCP and PAB in Electricity Market by Evolutionary Game Theory

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Part of the book series: Advances in Intelligent and Soft Computing ((AINSC,volume 168))

Abstract

There is a spirited debate on which auction mechanism is better, PAB or MCP in electricity generating-side market. This paper applies evolutionary theory game to study this problem under assumption of full competition. Our simulation results show that MCP is much better than PAB whenever the bidders with complete market information or not, represented by different kinds of payoff matrixes, with regards to social welfare and market stability.

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References

  1. Information on, http://www.cec.org.cn

  2. Chen, H.: Experimental analysis of uniform price and PAB auctions in electricity markets. In: The 8th International Power Engineering Conference, pp. 24–29 (2007)

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  5. Liu, Z., Zhang, X., Lieu, J.: Design of the incentive mechanism in electricity auction market based on the signaling game theory. Energy 35, 1813–1819 (2010)

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Control and Computer Engineering, North China Electric Power University, Beijing, 102206, China

    Xian Huang & Jialei Tan

Authors
  1. Xian Huang
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  2. Jialei Tan
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Xian Huang .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Wuhan Section of ISER Association, Guangshan Road 76, Wuhan, 430072, China, People's Republic

    David Jin

  2. Researcher Association, Guangzhou Section, International Science & Education, Jinheng Road, Jinbi Garden 85-1102 144, Guang Zhou, China, People's Republic

    Sally Lin

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© 2012 Springer-Verlag GmbH Berlin Heidelberg

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Huang, X., Tan, J. (2012). Different Characteristics of MCP and PAB in Electricity Market by Evolutionary Game Theory. In: Jin, D., Lin, S. (eds) Advances in Computer Science and Information Engineering. Advances in Intelligent and Soft Computing, vol 168. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30126-1_31

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30126-1_31

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-30125-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-30126-1

  • eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)

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