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An Alternative View of Uncertainty in Bilateral Bargaining Models with Incomplete Information

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Intelligent Decision Technologies

Part of the book series: Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies ((SIST,volume 15))

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Abstract

This paper seeks to analyze the implications of relaxing the assumption of rationality by using incomplete information. Specifically, we want to analyze the implications on the uniqueness and existence of equilibrium when individuals form expectations with different distributions of all possible states. This is done by postulating an alternative view of uncertainty in decision making in economic interactions. Thus an alternative model of bilateral bargaining with incomplete information is formulated.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Graduate School of Economics, UANL, Av. Lázaro Cárdenas S/N, Monterrey, N.L., Mexico, 64890

    Javier González & Vitaliy V. Kalashnikov

Authors
  1. Javier González
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  2. Vitaliy V. Kalashnikov
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Javier González .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Graduate School of Information,, Production & Systems (IPS), Waseda University, Hibikino 2-7, Kitakyushu, 808-0135, Japan

    Junzo Watada

  2. Graduate School of Information Science, Nagoya University, Furo-cho, Nagoya, 464-8601, Japan

    Toyohide Watanabe

  3. Sellinger School of Business and, Management, Loyola University Maryland, Charles Street 4501 N, Baltimore, 21210, USA

    Gloria Phillips-Wren

  4. KES International, PO Box 2115, Shoreham-by-Sea, BN43 9AF, United Kingdom

    Robert J. Howlett

  5. , School of Electrical and Information, University of South Australia, 5095, Adelaide, Australia

    Lakhmi C. Jain

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© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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González, J., Kalashnikov, V.V. (2012). An Alternative View of Uncertainty in Bilateral Bargaining Models with Incomplete Information. In: Watada, J., Watanabe, T., Phillips-Wren, G., Howlett, R., Jain, L. (eds) Intelligent Decision Technologies. Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies, vol 15. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29977-3_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29977-3_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-29976-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-29977-3

  • eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)

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