Abstract
Neoclassical game theory focuses exclusively on individual preferences, which are more naturally attuned to competitive, rather than cooperative, decision scenarios. Conditional game theory differs from classical theory in two fundamental ways. First, it involves a utility structure that permits agents to define their preferences conditioned on the preferences of other agents, and second, it accommodates a notion of group rationality as well as individual rationality. The resulting framework permits a notion of group preferences to be defined, and permits solution concepts that account for both individual and group interests.
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Stirling, W. (2013). A Conditional Game-Theoretic Approach to Cooperative Multiagent Systems Design. In: Filipe, J., Fred, A. (eds) Agents and Artificial Intelligence. ICAART 2011. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 271. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29966-7_22
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29966-7_22
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