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An Architectural Countermeasure against Power Analysis Attacks for FSR-Based Stream Ciphers

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7275))

Abstract

Feedback Shift Register (FSR) based stream ciphers are known to be vulnerable to power analysis attacks due to their simple hardware structure. In this paper, we propose a countermeasure against non-invasive power analysis attacks based on switching activity masking. Our solution has a 50% smaller power overhead on average compared to the previous standard cell-based countermeasures. Its resistance against different types of attacks is evaluated on the example of Grain-80 stream cipher.

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Mansouri, S.S., Dubrova, E. (2012). An Architectural Countermeasure against Power Analysis Attacks for FSR-Based Stream Ciphers. In: Schindler, W., Huss, S.A. (eds) Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design. COSADE 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7275. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29912-4_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29912-4_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-29911-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-29912-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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