Abstract
The compensation of the executive practitioners in the company has always been the focus of academic and practice circle. After the global financial crisis, it definitely became a hot issue. This paper take the listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock in 2001-2008 as the sample, from the perspective of the state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, to see the impact of institutional investors of the company’s compensation contracts. The results show that China’s institutional investors play significant roles in private enterprises’ governance, it can significantly improve the private enterprises’ “performance - pay” sensitivity; however, we did not find the same roles played in state-owned enterprises. This conclusion suggests that institutional investors’ managerial function need some right governance environment. This study not only enriches the study of institutional investors and compensation contracts, but also has a strong reference value for the relevant regulatory authorities in China.
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© 2012 Springer-Verlag GmbH Berlin Heidelberg
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Xu, T., Ma, L. (2012). Institutional Investors and Company’s Compensation Contrasts. In: Kim, H. (eds) Advances in Technology and Management. Advances in Intelligent and Soft Computing, vol 165. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29637-6_76
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29637-6_76
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-29636-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-29637-6
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