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Formal Analysis of Anonymity in ECC-Based Direct Anonymous Attestation Schemes

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Formal Aspects of Security and Trust (FAST 2011)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7140))

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Abstract

A definition of user-controlled anonymity is introduced for Direct Anonymous Attestation schemes. The definition is expressed as an equivalence property suited to automated reasoning using ProVerif and the practicality of the definition is demonstrated by examining the ECCbased Direct Anonymous Attestation protocol by Brickell, Chen & Li.We show that this scheme satisfies our definition under the assumption that the adversary obtains no advantage from re-blinding a blind signature.

Ben Smyth’s work was partly done at Loria, CNRS & INRIA Nancy Grand Est, France and the School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham, UK.

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Smyth, B., Ryan, M., Chen, L. (2012). Formal Analysis of Anonymity in ECC-Based Direct Anonymous Attestation Schemes. In: Barthe, G., Datta, A., Etalle, S. (eds) Formal Aspects of Security and Trust. FAST 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7140. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29420-4_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29420-4_16

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-29419-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-29420-4

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