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Analysing Applications Layered on Unilaterally Authenticating Protocols

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Formal Aspects of Security and Trust (FAST 2011)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7140))

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Abstract

There are many approaches to proving the correctness of application-layer protocols that are layered on secure transport protocols, such as TLS. One popular approach is verification by abstraction, in which the correctness of the application-layer protocol is proven under the assumption that the transport layer satisfies certain properties. Following this approach, we adapt the strand spaces model in order to analyse application-layer protocols that depend on unilaterally authenticating secure transport protocols, such as unilateral TLS. We develop proof rules that enable us to prove the correctness of application-layer protocols that use either unilateral or bilateral secure transport protocols, and illustrate them by proving the correctness of WebAuth, a single-sign-on protocol that makes extensive use of unilateral TLS.

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Gibson-Robinson, T., Lowe, G. (2012). Analysing Applications Layered on Unilaterally Authenticating Protocols. In: Barthe, G., Datta, A., Etalle, S. (eds) Formal Aspects of Security and Trust. FAST 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7140. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29420-4_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29420-4_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-29419-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-29420-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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