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A Framework for Security Analysis of Key Derivation Functions

  • Chuah Chai Wen
  • Edward Dawson
  • Juan Manuel González Nieto
  • Leonie Simpson
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7232)

Abstract

This paper presents a comprehensive formal security framework for key derivation functions (KDF). The major security goal for a KDF is to produce cryptographic keys from a private seed value where the derived cryptographic keys are indistinguishable from random binary strings. We form a framework of five security models for KDFs. This consists of four security models that we propose: Known Public Inputs Attack (KPM, KPS), Adaptive Chosen Context Information Attack (CCM) and Adaptive Chosen Public Inputs Attack(CPM); and another security model, previously defined by Krawczyk [6], which we refer to as Adaptive Chosen Context Information Attack(CCS). These security models are simulated using an indistinguisibility game. In addition we prove the relationships between these five security models and analyse KDFs using the framework (in the random oracle model).

Keywords

Key derivation function Security framework Indistinguishability Cryptographic keys 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Chuah Chai Wen
    • 1
  • Edward Dawson
    • 1
  • Juan Manuel González Nieto
    • 1
  • Leonie Simpson
    • 1
  1. 1.Queensland University of TechnologyAustralia

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